

# Donor Contributions to the Strengthening of the African Peace and Security Architecture

## German Development Institute (DIE)

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Studies / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik  
ISSN 1860-0468

**Donor contributions to the strengthening of the African peace and security architecture** / Stephan Klingebiel... – Bonn : DIE, 2008 –  
(Studies / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik ; 38)  
ISBN 978-3-88985-373-8

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## Preface

In the African continent the establishment of the AU in 2002 was important for the development of a new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). In response to the African reform dynamics and the emerging international security agenda, external actors have begun to adjust their instruments and rethink their choices for action. New security concepts and recent approaches in development and other policies seek explicitly to support the peace and security architecture in Africa. When it comes to external support, these developments have led to a search for changing approaches spanning foreign, security and development policy.

This study sets out to analyse the new APSA in the context of changing concepts of external support for it. It was conducted by a research team during the 2005/2006 training course organized by the German Development Institute (Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / DIE). The whole study was carried out in close collaboration with our partner, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), which is based in Pretoria / South Africa and has a well established network in the African continent. The ISS's input was guided by its Executive Director, Dr. Jakkie Cilliers, and supported and inspired by Prince Mashele, senior researcher at the ISS. I am grateful for this extremely fruitful collaboration.

During our stay in Ethiopia and South Africa (February to April 2006) we conducted a number of interviews with representatives of the AU, NEPAD, African embassies, donor institutions, other international organizations (NATO etc.) and think-tanks. In addition, we had the opportunity to visit the United Nations Mission for Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE). I would like to thank all interviewees and everyone who helped to prepare and carry out the study.

Bonn, April 2008

Stephan Klingebiel



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## Abbreviations

AA	Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office)
AAP	Africa Action Plan
ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training Assistance
ACPP	Africa Conflict Prevention Pool
AFD	French Development Agency
AHSI	African Human Security Initiative
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AMIB	AU Mission in Burundi
AMIS	AU Mission in Sudan
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
APF	African Peace Forum
APP	Africa Program for Peace
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
BMVg	Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (German Ministry of Defence)
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)
CAR	Central African Republic
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CDSP	Common Defence and Security Policy
CFSP	EU Common Foreign and Security Policy
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahelian and Saharan States
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism

CEWARU	Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CFA	Canada Fund for Africa
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COPAX	Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPS	Centre for Policy Studies (Johannesburg)
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DANIDA	Danish International Development Assistance
DDR	disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
DITF	Darfur Integrated Task Force
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
EASBRIG	East African Standby Brigade
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIPC	Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUCOM	United States European Command
FCO	UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FOMAC	Force of Central Africa
G8	Group of Eight
GDP	Gross Domestic Product

GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for Technical Cooperation)
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune-deficiency Syndrome
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IDP	Internal Displaced Person
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Agency for Development
IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue
InWEnt	Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung (German Institute for Capacity Building)
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement (conflict party in Sudan)
KA IPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
m	million
MAPEX	Major Map Exercise
MARAC	Early Warning Mechanism of Central Africa
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Japan
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NORTHBRIG	Northern Stand-by Brigade
NUPI	Norwegian Institute for International Affairs
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance

OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
OPDS	Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
OTA	USAID's Office of Transitional Assistance
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PRC	Permanent Representatives Committee
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSD	Peace and Security Directorate
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
P&S	Peace and Security
REC	Regional Economic Community
RECAMP	Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities
REPSO/ESA	USAID's Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa
RCF	Regional Cooperation Framework
RPTC	SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SOUTHBRIG	South Africa Standby Brigade
SPLMA	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

UNDPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMEE	United Nations Missions for Eritrea and Ethiopia
UNOPS	United Nations Operation Project Services
UN/SHIRBRIG	Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for the United Nations Operations
ZIF	Zentrum für internationale Friedenseinsätze (Center for International Peace Operations)



## Executive Summary

### *Background and purpose of the study*

Peace and security have become priority issues for the African continent and the international community. In the last few years in particular, the international community's heightened perception of peace and security issues has been accompanied by a greater willingness on the part of African states and institutions to take action. In the African continent the establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2002 is important for the development of an African peace and security architecture (APSA). In response to the African reform dynamics and the emerging international security agenda, external actors have begun to adjust their instruments and rethink their choices for action. New security concepts and recent approaches in development and other policies seek explicitly to support the peace and security architecture in Africa. When it comes to external support, these developments have led to a search for changing approaches spanning foreign, security and development policy.

Against this background, the present study sets out to make a contribution to ongoing discussions on how development policy can support the new African reform dynamics in the field of peace and security. More specifically, it seeks to answer the following question: How does development policy contribute to the strengthening of the APSA in the context of external assistance? It mainly considers the actors in African institutions, the international donor community and the international research community, which is taking a growing interest in related issues.

### *Nexus between security and development*

It is, generally speaking, no new task for development and security policies to have to define their relative positions. However, since the late 1990s the debate on the nexus between development and security policies (the latter including both foreign and defence policy) has gained ground. It is not only inherent necessities but also politics that shape this debate and its outcome: on the one hand, development policy has recognised that it will be hard to eliminate poverty without a significant reduction in violent conflicts; on the other hand, security policy has taken a growing interest in creating stability in conflict-prone regions with a view to making the countries concerned more

secure. Actors in the development arena have various options for managing the interfaces of the two policies at both conceptual and operational level.

Four distinct models can be identified for the relationship between development policy and security policy: (i) *distancing*, for maintaining independence from goals of other policies; (ii) *complementarity*, for identifying a division of labour based on common goals; (iii) *cooperation*, for ensuring close coordination of development, security and foreign policies; and (iv) *subordination* of development policy to a short-term security agenda focused on donors' self-interest. Different ways of managing the nexus entail different opportunities and risks.

Development policy and security policy are rapidly drawing closer together. Africa is the most important region to experience this dynamic. It can be seen in African reform activities and in external contributions to these activities.

### *The African Peace and Security Architecture*

The creation of the AU in 2002 must be seen as an important step towards a new peace and security architecture. In structural terms, the AU offers a set of new proactive conditions (e. g. the principle of non-indifference), whereas the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), its predecessor, had a largely unsatisfactory record in the field of peace and security. This was due to its inhibiting principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of its member states. Owing to a number of positive developments at regional level and the NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development) initiative, the AU is now seen as presenting a realistic approach to the concept of "African solutions to African problems".

The main pillars of the APSA include (i) the AU and (ii) the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). (i) The most important elements of the AU's structure are its Assembly of Heads of State and Government and its Peace and Security Council (PSC), the main decision-making organs. The Commission of the AU and its Directorate for Peace and Security are required to implement and coordinate the PSC's decisions. (ii) The RECs are considered to be the building-blocks of the AU and are primarily responsible for the implementation of AU policies. Whilst the AU should coordinate, monitor and establish policies and act at political level, the RECs are meant to implement at regional level decisions taken at continental level. At present, eight

RECs have signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the AU. However, this is inconsistent with the AU's vision of having only five RECs representing its five regions.

Only some of the RECs (ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD) are experienced in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. In terms of peace operations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is by far the most experienced and active regional organisation. There is no doubt that regional structures are needed to stabilise relations, to prevent the spill-over of conflicts and to consolidate emerging common values. However, even the relatively advanced RECs have no effective crisis response structures.

The RECs have a central role to play in the creation of an African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF is important for a security architecture that includes military options. It will be developed by 2010 in two phases and will be available for activities ranging from observer missions to peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations and post-conflict activities. The force will be composed of five standby contingents, with predominantly military components, in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment. The AU has identified five regions that should supply standby contingents, and ECOWAS and the SADC have already built up some regional military capacity and deployed troops in the past.

In general, the African Union has taken some impressive legal and institutional steps to transform itself into a credible and major actor for peace and security in Africa. Its willingness to intervene militarily has been demonstrated especially in the case of Darfur. Despite the promising developments in the area of peace and security in Africa, the success of the AU and the RECs will depend on whether they manage to establish fully the operational peace and security institutions.

African leadership and regional powers play an important role within the new African peace and security architecture. The implementation of the ambitious peace and security agenda at continental level through the AU and at regional level through the RECs largely depends on the political will and active engagement of regional powers (especially South Africa and Nigeria). In addition, civil society forms part of the APSA. A small number of civil society organisations are contributing to the APSA at continental or regional level,

through research, policy advice and training activities, for example.

*Special Relationship between the AU and UN*

In the area of peace and security, the UN is a unique partner of the African Union, particularly with regard to peacekeeping operations. Four types of operation in the African continent can be identified:

1. UN peacekeeping missions,
2. the deployment of missions of regional or continental organisations in the continent, with or without support from the UN,
3. co-deployment, i. e. the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops alongside those of regional organisations, and
4. combinations of 1 and 2, i. e. the sequencing of a mission by a regional organisation and a United Nations mission.

The AU's mission in Darfur (AMIS) was deployed in a highly complex political and humanitarian situation. The fact that the AU sent a significant number of troops into the crisis area is a success in itself. The decision taken in July 2007 to mount a joint African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation (and the earlier operation in Burundi) shows that there is a need for further discussion of a modus operandi for future operations in general and the "AU first, UN later" model in particular.

*Donor Contributions to the APSA*

Donors are becoming increasingly involved in peace and security in Africa. External support comes from various policies (development, defence and foreign policy) and from a number of bilateral and multilateral donors. It can be analysed from various angles:

(1) *Levels and areas of support.* Level of support refers to support for organisational structures of the APSA, which include the AU, the RECs, civil society and regional powers ("trilateral cooperation" aimed at supporting South Africa's capacity to engage in post-conflict situations in the African continent). Within these levels, donors engage in different *areas of support* that can be subdivided into five different categories: (i) capacity-building for the political and administrative structures, there being two main instruments used by donors to enhance the AU's and RECs' capacities in the area of peace and security: a UNDP-administered pooled fund and capacity-building funds

from the EU; (ii) early warning: support for early warning systems is either channelled through the regional organisations, mainly IGAD, or focuses on the development of the AU's Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the principal donors being the EU, the USA, the UK and Germany; (iii) enhancing military capacities: support in this area focuses mainly on the development of the ASF, the leading partners including France, the UK, the USA, Canada and the UN. At regional level, donor support is concentrated on military training and peacekeeping training centres; (iv) support for African peace operations: most support goes to peace operations and above all to the AU mission in Darfur, followed by smaller missions such as those in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Burundi, the principal donors being the USA, the EU and Canada; (v) post-conflict reconstruction: support in this area has thus far played a marginal role.

(2) *Modes of delivery*: Donors offer a multitude of modes of delivery when supporting the APSA. The African Union, the main partner in this regard, does not have any clear preferences in the short and medium term. In the long term, however, the AU favours budget support. Owing to Africa's flexibility in the short and medium term, the modes of delivery usually reflect the donors' preferences. Overall, six modes of delivery can be identified: equipment/support in kind, financial support, budget support, technical support, pooled support and trilateral cooperation. These modes of delivery have been identified because of their interesting features (for example, advantages of pooled funding for the AU due to reduced transaction costs).

(3) *Management of the nexus between development and security policy*: In this area examples can be found of the *distancing approach* (e. g. Germany's institutional setting and concepts for supporting the APSA), of the *complementary approach* (e. g. Canada's aligned strategy) and of the *cooperation approach* (e. g. UK's Africa Prevention Pool and the EU's African Peace Facility). There is no overall "best nexus management model". However, more coherent and harmonised approaches have several advantages, in terms of significance and reputation, for example.

(4) *Other challenges*: Other major challenges to external support for the APSA occur in the following three areas: (i) coordination and harmonisation among donors, (ii) demand-orientation towards the needs of the AU and flexibility, and (iii) predictability of donor support and the volume and origin of funding.

## Conclusions

Conclusions can be drawn on three thematic areas:

(i) *State of the APSA* : Generally speaking, the development of the APSA is proceeding satisfactorily, despite the challenges the AU faces in several respects. Factors suggesting positive change have been the AU's ability to act at political level to mandate peacekeeping missions and the steps it has taken to establish an African Standby Force and to set itself an ambitious political agenda. The challenges the AU faces include striking the right balance between establishing its structures and intervening in emergency situations, such as Darfur, to create stability. It may also want to consider focusing more on conflict prevention and post-conflict issues with a view to correcting the current bias towards military capacity-building.

The African Peace and Security Architecture is indeed still fragile and does not constitute a fully operational structure as such. One major problem is the relationship between the AU, RECs and NEPAD, which is still in its infancy. The RECs, the AU's implementing agents, are very heterogeneous and at very different stages in the development of their peace and security mechanisms. For a functioning structure, all these interdependent elements need to work together effectively.

(ii) *External support*: External support for the APSA from all policies development, defence and foreign - is essential for the APSA. Unless these policies pay increasing attention to peace and security, the African structures will be *de facto* incapacitated. Technical, financial and logistical support is crucial in terms of both establishing the APSA structurally and enabling peacekeeping operations to be undertaken. External political pressure and increased media attention can create the pressure needed if the AU is to live up to its constitution and resolutions.

(iii) *Nexus management*: External actors need to apply their competencies and strengths in all three areas of policy – development, defence and diplomacy – in helping to construct a viable peace and security architecture in Africa. Notwithstanding this insight, it should be noted that, as these areas of competence cannot be neatly separated from each other, they call for close collaboration, or what can be called “nexus management”.

The engagement of the various policies in support of the APSA suggests the emergence of a sensible division of labour between development policy and security policy. In general, development policy should continue to focus on strengthening the APSA's civilian components and on building bridges between the civilian and non-civilian areas, whereas security policy has a strong comparative advantage in providing support for the military aspects of the APSA.



## 1 Introduction

Peace and security have become priority issues for the African continent and the international community. Since the mid-1990s, the international community's heightened perception of peace and security issues has been accompanied by a greater willingness to take action. Where the African continent is specifically concerned, the establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2002 is important for the development of an African peace and security architecture (APSA). Through it, the AU structure provides more effective mechanisms for the achievement and maintenance of peace and security in Africa than its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

In response to African reform dynamics and the emerging international security agenda, external actors have begun to adjust their instruments and rethink their choices for action. New security concepts can be observed in the majority of multi-, supra- and bilateral donors, explicitly aimed at supporting the peace and security architecture in Africa. These developments have led to a search for and even, in some cases, to the adoption of comprehensive approaches spanning foreign, defence and development policies. The interfaces and overlaps between civil and military areas of cooperation have increased significantly. The development and conceptual sharpening of these comprehensive approaches have become a major challenge for donors, especially with regard to sub-Saharan Africa.

### *Study question*

The study therefore sets out to make a contribution to the ongoing debate on how development policy can support the new African reform dynamics in the field of peace and security. The ways in which donors deal with the aforementioned new challenges are discussed with a view to identifying possible new avenues and constructive ideas for donor engagement. More specifically, the study seeks to answer the following question: How does development policy contribute to the strengthening of the APSA in the context of external assistance? The study question is vital, since development policy is attaching increasing importance to the field of peace and security in Africa, and yet there is a lack of relevant monographs and studies. To answer the question, an overview is given of the underlying defence and foreign policy strategies and their use of military and diplomatic instruments, while development policy strategies and instruments are examined in depth. The consideration of both security policy and development policy in the study is important because

of the potential overlaps, complementarities and tangencies between the policies that have to be borne in mind. In this way, we hope to fill the information gap currently to be observed in the relevant literature on the engagement of development actors within the APSA.

By mapping and analysing donor activities, the study is principally addressed to representatives of African institutions and to actors in the international donor community. Information on forms of cooperation between the actors involved in peace- and security-related issues in Africa and the resulting recommendations will be aimed mainly at this audience. The study is also of interest to the international research community, which is becoming increasingly engaged in the debate on the security-development nexus and the African Peace and Security Architecture.

By asking “how” contributions are made, the study focuses on the manner in which donors provide assistance. This is understood and analysed in five different dimensions, which will be discussed in the report: areas and levels of support, modes of delivery, nexus management, coordination of donor support and demand orientation of donor support.

The international community contributes to different *levels* and *areas of support*. *Level of support* in this context refers to support for the organisational structures of the APSA, which include the AU, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), civil society and regional powers. Within these levels, donors engage in five different *areas of support*: (1) capacity-building for the political and administrative structures of the AU and the regional organisations, (2) early warning systems, (3) enhancement of military capacities, (4) support for peace operations and (5) post-conflict reconstruction. The focal areas of donor support will be illustrated with the aim of revealing any imbalances.

*Modes of delivery* describe the manner in which external actors provide their support. There are different models of modes of delivery, examples being “in-kind” contributions, “in-cash” support, budget support, technical support and trilateral cooperation. Current preferences for the various modes of support will be highlighted, and the advantages and disadvantages of each instrument will be discussed.

When development policy engages in supporting the APSA, interfaces exist between it and security policy. The way development policy and security policy manage these interfaces will be called *nexus management*. Four mod-

els of nexus management relating to the interfaces between foreign, defence and development policy will be applied to the empirical data that have been collected. The way development policy deals with the new challenges posed by this nexus and the impacts of each model will be discussed and highlighted with the aid of empirical findings.

*Coordinating* development efforts has been at the centre of the debate in the international donor community. The study therefore also considers how and how far donors coordinate their support for the APSA. Available coordination concepts gleaned from principles formulated by the development community, such as harmonisation of standards and complementarity of action, will be applied to the empirical data. The results will be used to determine the implications of coordination efforts for the APSA.

The *orientation of demand* to the APSA must be taken seriously in a context where donors support an “African solutions to African problems” approach. The extent to which donors’ instruments and strategies do in fact allow for demand orientation will therefore also be investigated in this study.

As development policy acts in the same sphere as security policy to some extent and the boundaries between the two policies are fading, a clear definition of development policy, adapted to the peace and security context, is needed for this study. Thus, without seeking to provide a generally valid definition of development policy, the study analyses development policies<sup>1</sup> where measures are (i) implemented by development actors or (ii) financed from funds devoted specifically to development.

### *Research methodology*

The study was conducted in three phases: preparation, empirical research and evaluation. During the *preparatory phase* in Germany, we analysed the existing literature in order to become acquainted with the current debate and to gather information on the subject. Experts from several governmental organisations and think-tanks<sup>2</sup> were interviewed. Furthermore, potential interview

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1 For a definition of development policy, see Box 1.

2 Including the Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ), the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), the European Union (EU), the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) and the Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH (InWEnt).

**Box 1: Terminology**

**Security:** For the term *security*, a narrow concept of human security is used, with the focus primarily on the protection of individuals and communities against violence (Human Security Centre 2006). It thus covers all aspects of “freedom from fear” and includes “freedom from want” only if it is conflict-related. At the same time, it is important to note that this notion does not exclude a state’s need for national security, for only a state that is secure can safeguard its own citizens.

**Peace:** The term *peace* will be understood to mean positive peace. Positive peace may be more than just the absence of overt violent conflict and include a range of relationships up to a level where nations – or any groupings in conflict – have collaborative and supportive relationships.

**Security policy:** *Security policy* includes all measures suitable for the prevention, management and resolution of internal and international conflicts between citizens or states. As the multidimensional notion of security policy includes diplomatic, military and development resources, defence policy is only one part of security policy.

**International actors:** The term *international actors* will be used where actors are not of African origin, e. g. donor countries and international organizations.

**Continental:** The term *continental* will be used where the AU or the whole of Africa is meant, the term *regional* for the African regions, e. g. North Africa, West Africa, East Africa, southern Africa, etc.

**Development policy:** In line with the definition of Official Development Assistance, the term *development policy* is used where grants or loans (i) are allocated to developing countries on the DAC List, (ii) are allocated by the official sector, (iii) have as their main objective the promotion of economic development and welfare and (iv) are provided on concessional financial terms, meaning that a loan must have a grant element of at least 25 per cent. In 2005, the High Level Meeting of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) increased the contributions that may be reported as official development assistance (ODA) in peace- and security-related areas, e. g. training the military in non-military matters and expenditures on peacekeeping activities (OECD/DAC 2005a).

partners in Africa were contacted, and the research design was developed and discussed in depth with the study counterpart, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS).

The main *empirical research* was conducted in Ethiopia and South Africa, since both countries play an important role in the APSA. The capital of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, is the site of the headquarters of the African Union and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and of key embassies and donors contributing to the APSA. The group therefore focused on interviews with staff of the African Union and donors contributing to it. Consequently, our interviewees in Addis Ababa comprised all relevant representatives of the AU Peace and Security Department (the Conflict Management Centre, Strategic Planning Unit, Peace Support Operations Division, etc.), the Political Affairs Department, the Secretariat to the Commission and representatives of the AU/United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project. We also interviewed representatives of the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), UNECA and the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). In addition, we talked to representatives of embassies and development agencies from Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the UK and the USA, as well as stakeholders from the African embassies of Algeria, Congo Brazzaville, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa.

In Ethiopia, we had an opportunity to visit the United Nations Mission for Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE). We conducted interviews with the Indian battalion for the central sector and the military observers at the Adigrad headquarters. This visit enabled us to gain an insight into the UN's operational level and helped us to analyse and assess the relationship between the AU and the UN.

The secretariat of the NEPAD, major embassies and most of the think-tanks that study peace and security issues are located in South Africa, which is also one of the key regional powers within the APSA. In South Africa we collected data by interviewing representatives of think-tanks, donors and governments in the NEPAD secretariat, the South Africa Institute for International Affairs, the Human Science Research Council, the Institute for Global Dialogue, the Africa Institute of South Africa and Safer Africa and the embassies of Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden.

The interviews with donors produced information on their current and future activities in the peace and security field, enabling us to analyse their management of interfaces, their modes of delivery and their local implementing

institutions. African actors were interviewed on their own current and future activities in the APSA and their perception of donor contributions.

We discussed the balance between support for military and civilian activities and the balance among the various areas of support with African actors and representatives of the international community. We were also interested in their perception of integrated mission concepts, i. e. activities that include military and civilian components. In addition, relations between the AU and the UN and between the AU and RECs were analysed with a view to identifying redundant activities and driving forces in the new APSA.

During the *evaluation phase*, the interviews were examined. In several feedback loops, the preliminary results were checked and, when necessary, developed further. A workshop at the Institute for Security Studies and various selected experts, mostly from think-tanks, verified the findings of the study.

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is the counterpart in this research project. The ISS has been working on peace and security topics for years. It is located in Pretoria and has branch offices in Addis Ababa, Cape Town and Nairobi. The concept of this study was discussed with Prince Mashele, a senior researcher at ISS, during his two-week stay in Bonn in December 2005. He also joined the team during several phases of the field research in Ethiopia and South Africa in 2006.

### *Structure of the report*

After an introduction in Chapter 1, the report continues with the conceptual background (Chapter 2) to the study, i. e. the current debate on the relationship between development and security and its manifestation in recent African reform dynamics. Chapter 3 examines the strengths and weaknesses of the entities that form part of the African Peace and Security Architecture and their relation to each other. Chapter 4 discusses the relationship between the AU and the UN and focuses on practical forms of cooperation in the peace and security field. Chapter 5 examines the approaches adopted by multinational, supranational and bilateral actors who support the African peace and security architecture. While outlining donors' diplomatic and military activities, the report concentrates on their development instruments. In this analytical part of this study, five dimensions of cooperation, namely areas of support, modes of delivery, nexus management, coordination of donor support

and demand orientation are analysed. The conclusion in Chapter 6 summarises the findings and makes policy recommendations.

## **2 The nexus of development and security policy**

This chapter is intended to give a brief introduction to the conceptual debate on the nexus of development and security policy and to the reform dynamics in Africa that have prompted international development policies to engage in the security field in the African continent.

It is not a new task for development and security policies to have to define their relative positions. Since the 1990s the debate on the links between them has gained ground. It is not only inherent necessities but also politics that shape this debate and its outcome. Political actors in the development arena have various options for managing the interfaces between the two policies both at strategic level and at financial and operational level. When political actors are deciding how to manage these interfaces, they must take various risks and opportunities for development policy into consideration. This chapter will discuss these issues. However, a general answer cannot be given to the question as to what action should be taken.

### **2.1 Overall developments**

The relationship between development and security policy has undergone a number of changes since development cooperation entered the policy sphere. The beginning of development cooperation in the wake of de-colonization coincided with the beginning of the Cold War. At that time, development policies were used mainly as instruments of foreign and security policies. Both Cold War blocs used development cooperation to reward friendly regimes and to tie them to their respective spheres of influence. Over the years international development cooperation widened its focus from economic growth to include other topics, such as the environment and gender issues. *“Yet the international aid industry carefully avoided peace, security and conflict issues”* (Tschirgi 2006, 47).

After the Cold War ended, a more holistic view of development and conflict issues was taken (UN 1992, 1994). This gave rise to the concept of human security (UNDP 1994). Within this concept, the traditional focus of safeguarding states and their territories has shifted to human individuals. The

concept of human security is protective to the core. Individuals are to be protected against threats to their lives or basic livelihoods over which they have no control. Financial crisis is likely to pose such a threat just as much as violent conflict (Alkire 2002). The most recent conceptual developments in the creation of a holistic view of development and conflict have been the “The Responsibility to Protect” agenda of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2005) and the UN Secretary-General’s report “In larger freedom” (UN 2005a).

Consequently, the distinction between development policies dealing with domestic socioeconomic issues and security policies dealing with intergovernmental political and military issues has softened since the end of the Cold War. This is true of both policies, of both policy arenas and of the issues concerned.

Throughout the 1990s, development policy expanded its arena to the international sphere and engaged in security issues. It became evident that the nation state no longer constituted the appropriate policy arena for solutions to many problems, such as pandemics and environmental pressures. Development policy therefore had to break out of the policy arena confined by national boundaries if it was to address its traditional challenges successfully. It also became involved in traditional security issues. On the one hand, it tried to establish instruments for the prevention and peaceful settlement of conflicts. On the other hand, it became sensitive to potentially counterproductive effects of its interventions. “Do no harm” (Anderson 1999) became a new guideline for development cooperation.

Security policy has moved in the opposite direction. It has expanded its policy arena to the space within national boundaries and become involved in such new issues as gender and the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS). These changes are easy to see at the level of the United Nations (UN) and also of various states. The Security Council has enlarged its responsibilities to include the protection of civilians in war, small arms, gender and AIDS. UN peace operations are no longer limited to keeping the peace previously established between and with the consent of two or more sovereign states: they have also begun to enforce peace within states by military means. The former principle of all parties consenting to peacekeeping operations has thus become non-mandatory. New civilian tasks have accompanied this expansion of military tasks (UN 2000). Policing, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants have become standard prac-

tices. In the cases of Kosovo and East Timor peace operations even took over the direct administration of these territories. The establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission at the end of 2005 is the latest step in these developments.

## 2.2 Reasons for the current nexus

Development policy concerns itself with violent conflicts for various reasons. Developing countries account for 90 per cent of all wars and other violent conflicts. Many countries benefiting from Western development cooperation are consequently experiencing, or have recently experienced, violent conflict. Violent conflicts hinder and reverse economic and human development. They claim many peoples' lives and increase the likelihood of state failure (BMZ 2005a). Collier et al. argue that the average income of a country after a civil war is 15 per cent lower and the incidence of absolute poverty 30 per cent higher. They also claim that child and overall mortality rates rise sharply during a war and remain higher thereafter. Another effect of war is an increase in Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection (HIV) (Collier et al. 2003). *"The security-development nexus is therefore extremely important for development co-operation."* (BMZ 2005a).

Security and development are correlated, but it remains unclear how a holistic approach by development and security policies should cope with these issues. While the correlation between a lack of security and underdevelopment is well established, the direction of causality remains unclear (Tschirgi 2006). Such circular arguments as "no development without security and no security without development" are the response to these findings. Yet there are conflicts over scarce resources and of objectives that development and security policies cannot escape in this way (Maihold 2005). Instead, they must be deliberately resolved by political actors.

Since 9/11 the "securitisation" of development policies (Brock 2004) and the "developmentisation" of security policies have gained ground. The terrorist attacks have revealed the vulnerability of Western countries. It is generally accepted that homeland security can no longer be achieved with military defences at national borders. Consequently, fragile states, civil wars and poverty are seen as direct threats to the well-being and security of Western states (Tschirgi 2006). Development policy has therefore incorporated secu-

rity issues in its strategies and operations, and security policy has done the same with development issues.

In particular, the war on terrorism “is refocusing aid resources on those sub-populations, regions and issues seen as presenting a risk to homeland security” (Duffield 2006, 11). The idea of development cooperation securing and bettering people’s lives in developing countries as a goal in itself may come to an end. Yet development policy can also gain in importance on the political agenda and so receive additional resources with the backing of security policy. The events of 9/11 have given actors in the development arena the opportunity to exchange the moral and ethical legitimisation of development cooperation for hard political reasoning (Maihold 2005).

### 2.3 Managing the nexus

Interfaces between development and security policy can be found at different levels, from strategies to financing and operations. These interfaces may directly or indirectly concern interests of both policy arenas. Some have just come into existence as a more holistic view of development and conflict has spread; others have already existed for a long time, though possibly neglected by political actors.

Overarching strategies for development in conflict-affected countries and regions or for security in or of developing countries are examples of the conceptual level. Political actors in the development and security arenas may exchange information on their respective strategies or develop joint strategies. At the financial level, the financing of non-civil instruments by development actors or of civil instruments by military actors are possible interfaces. Sometimes development and military actors may also compete for funds targeted at activities in overlapping fields of interest. At the level of operations, many possible interfaces exist. The two policies can work together in whole-of-government activities. Development actors can also “contract” military actors to enable and secure their operations and vice versa. Another option is for the military to engage in development-oriented activities, as in the case of NATO’s Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine. And many joint activities are already being undertaken in the field of capacity-building (Klingebiel / Roehder 2004).

Four distinct concepts can theoretically be established for development policy to manage its interfaces with security policy (Klingebiel / Roehder 2004):

*Distancing:* Development and security policy could retain their autonomy and not interact. This would ensure the independence of their respective goals. Development policy could then focus on its long-term objectives, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). At the same time, it would forfeit its leverage over security and foreign policy with respect to countries suffering from conflict. Nor could development policy influence the framework of security needed for development.

*Complementarity:* It is also possible to implement complementary policies on the basis of commonly agreed goals. In this scenario policies would complement and correspond to one another. Coherent and efficient policies could then be implemented without their having to give up their autonomy and distinct areas of responsibility. However, the influence the two policies had on each other might not be equally strong.

*Cooperation:* Development policy could coordinate closely with security and foreign policies. This would make for more coherent policies and enable development policy to have a stronger influence on military interventions and security and on foreign policies. In return, development policy might have to adhere to shorter-term, military objectives. It might also have to shift its financial resources from its long-term goals to short-term goals in the security sphere.

*Subordination:* Development policy could securitise all its policies. It might then have a chance of receiving more funding. But it must be borne in mind that a causal link has yet to be clearly established between development and conflict, let alone between development and terrorism. This in turn creates significant difficulties for successful policy interventions. If, then, development policy bases its legitimacy on its ability to prevent terrorist attacks in a concept of endangered self-interest, development policy and development cooperation may themselves be endangered.

## 2.4 The nexus in Africa

Peace and security have also played an important role in recent reform dynamics in Africa. The newly established African Union (AU) is at the core of this process. New instruments to secure peace have been established and the principle of sovereignty has given way to a principle of non-indifference. However, these ambitions need to be transformed from words into enduring deeds. For this to happen, the inertia of some actors in Africa must be over-

come, and external actors, who have recently discovered their interest in the continent, should support these efforts.

Peace and security have become a priority on Africa's political agenda. Such positive tendencies as an increase in the number of stable and democratically governed states and a decrease in the number of violent conflicts and wars have been observed in Africa over the last decade. Nonetheless, sub-Saharan Africa remains the region of the world most severely affected by violent conflict and war. Recognising the important role of security as a precondition for development, African leaders have increased their efforts to prevent and resolve violent conflicts in their continent.

The Human Security Report therefore suggests that the decrease in violent conflict is not a result of changes to the underlying risk factors, but rather of increased involvement of the international community and African regional organisations in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction (Human Security Report 2005, 4). As Cilliers stresses, underlying Africa's security crisis is its serious developmental failure; the common denominator of civil war and conflict in Africa is poverty, and much of that poverty is the result of bad policy and poor governance (Cilliers 2004, 27).

In July 2002, 53 African nations launched the AU at their meeting in Durban, South Africa. The transition of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the AU has brought major changes to the African peace and security agenda. The principle of sovereignty has given way to the principle of non-indifference, the aim being to protect human lives. The AU is thus the first international body to acknowledge "The Responsibility to Protect" agenda (Powell 2005). At the same time, it must be admitted that these changes do not automatically translate into action and that some actors will have a strong interest in adhering to the traditional principles of state sovereignty and non-interference.

The Constitutive Act of the AU (AU 2000) and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (AU 2002) envisage a strong continental security regime capable of preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts in the African continent. The Constitutive Act declares that the African Union has "*the right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances: namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity*" (AU 2000). As war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity have been defined in interna-

tional law, they could serve as clear criteria for interventions. *“Implicit in these provisions is the understanding that sovereignty is conditional and defined in terms of a state’s capacity and willingness to protect its citizens”* (Powell 2005).

To live up to its promises, the AU is developing capacities for conflict prevention, early warning, quick reaction, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction in collaboration with African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the NEPAD. The AU consolidates the information obtained from subregional warning systems and coordinates the African Standby Force (ASF). It is also planning to establish a Panel of the Wise to negotiate in conflict situations by diplomatic means. Each REC has been asked to develop or reinforce an early warning system and an ASF. NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is intended to prevent conflict by ensuring good governance. NEPAD is also developing strategies for post-conflict reconstruction.

African reform dynamics come at a time when the international community is increasingly discovering its interest in the continent. Donor countries use their development, security and foreign policies to assist the reforms. Despite all efforts in the African continent, the reforms are largely dependent on this external assistance. Yet the heavy reliance on donors in the peace and security field is no exception: it matches the overall influence of donors in Africa. ODA accounts for 55 per cent of all external flows to the region (Klingebiel 2005d). The international community must support the African peace and security architecture financially, logistically and politically if it is to persist and live up to its pledges. African states do not provide even half of the African Union’s ordinary annual budget of US\$ 150 million. Peacekeeping operations, like that in Darfur, cost several 100 millions of US dollars a year. The African peace and security architecture also lacks the infrastructure needed to operate effectively. International actors have a further role to play in supporting national and regional political efforts to address the root causes of conflicts.

## 2.5 Outlook

The nexus between development policy and security policy is developing dynamically. Africa is the most important region in which these dynamics manifest themselves. They can be seen both in African reform activities and

in the external contributions to those activities. The following chapters will reveal how different African actors comprehend the nexus between peace and security and how they act in response to it. It will be shown how donors understand this nexus and how their various policies manage it. The interaction between the AU and donors will also be considered. Does the donor community allow for African ownership in such a politicised area that is also highly dependent on donor support? Does one policy dominate in the contributions given or requested? How does the cooperation between donors and AU strike a balance between the different objectives of security and development? With these insights a number of conclusions will be drawn to inform the overall debate on managing the nexus of security and development policies.

### **3 The new African peace and security architecture: institutional and programmatic change**

Although the African Union's predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), had engaged in conflict resolution in Africa since its inception in 1963, it did so with a restricted mandate and had little impact on peace and security in Africa. The replacement of the OAU with the AU in the year 2002 raised hopes of change, especially with regard to the peace and security agenda. Generally, as its Constitutive Act states, the AU seeks to promote progressive political and economic integration, democratic societies and sustainable development as a whole, on the basis of African-owned strategies. In terms of content and institutional development, the area of peace and security has been the most dynamic and has attracted most donor attention. Breaking with the tradition of the OAU, the Constitutive Act introduces the pioneering intervention clauses Article 4 (h) and Article 23 (2), which provide for sanctions on AU members that fail to comply with the AU's decisions. Article 4 (h) underlines the AU's right to intervene in member countries in the event of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (AU 2000). This led Powell to comment that *"the transition of the OAU to the AU ushered in far-reaching changes to the pan-African peace and security agenda, particularly with respect to the parameters of sovereignty and intervention for human protection purposes"* (Powell 2005, 2). The African Mission in Sudan, for example, has shown that long-standing principles of state sovereignty and indifference to the internal affairs of other countries have been watered down – and that the AU is willing to act to protect its citizens.

The AU is not only proposing programmatic change but has also set in motion a process of rapid institutional development to ensure a robust architecture, especially with regard to peace and security. A few years after the official inauguration of the AU in Durban in 2002, the Heads of State and Government of the AU have therefore launched organs intended to ensure a higher degree of enforcement and oversight of AU decisions, especially those concerning security and good governance in the continent. They include the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) (Cilliers / Sturman 2004). The PSC and its supporting organs are central components of the new peace and security architecture, covering the areas of conflict prevention and management and post-conflict reconstruction.

Although the AU is struggling to develop its human and financial resources and faces internal political challenges when it comes to turning words into deeds, its aim of providing "African solutions to African problems" is taken seriously by donors. The European Union (EU), a major supporter of the AU, has noted that the AU has earned "*international respect as a credible and legitimate political actor and agent of change*" (EU 2005c).

In fact, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), founded in 2001 on the initiative of five African leaders, preceded the AU in providing an Africa-wide, dynamic response to Africa's problems. Its programmes concern the AU's peace and security agenda in so far as they relate to governance issues and socio-economic development. This is because a lack of governance is seen as nurturing the potential for conflicts, and socio-economic development is considered instrumental in both conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction (NEPAD 2006b). Within the broader framework of peace and security, both the AU and NEPAD continue to receive support from donors. It remains to be seen whether NEPAD will be integrated into the AU as decided at the Maputo Summit in 2003 or whether it will continue to act independently in the peace and security field (AU 2003a).

In this chapter we examine the AU and the RECs as the main institutional pillars of the new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): while the former is responsible for devising policies, the latter implement them at regional level. Furthermore, civil society's role in the APSA is significant in several respects; on the one hand, it can ensure capacity-building for the AU's peace and security agenda; on the other hand, it can perform a watch-


dog function, providing the AU with the necessary legitimacy and credibility. The importance of popular participation and civil society for peace, security and stability is reflected in the launching of the Pan-African Parliament in March 2004 and of ECOSOCC in 2005 and in the establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights in January 2004. However, no matter how far-reaching the institutional and programmatic change has been since the establishment of the AU, it is ultimately African leaders who determine the success or failure of the new peace and security architecture: they are the AU's ultimate "owners" and can be either "drivers" or "spoilors" of change.

To enable the reader better to assess donor contributions to the APSA, this chapter gives an overview of the African structures that are being set up to ensure peace and security in the continent. Thus we analyse the progress so far made in implementing the AU's peace and security vision. In this, we take into account the main challenges that face the AU structures, the RECs, the regional players and civil society in fulfilling their roles within the peace and security architecture.

### 3.1 Structure of the African peace and security architecture

A brief overview of the structures of the African peace and security architecture as defined in the PSC Protocol will be followed by an analysis of the challenges facing implementation. At the highest decision-making level within this architecture is the Assembly of the Union, consisting of all Africa's Heads of State and Government (except Morocco's), which gives directives to the Executive Council (Foreign Ministers of AU members).

Since the PSC was established in May 2004, it has acted as the AU's standing decision-making vehicle and implementation structure for the management of conflicts, war and other emergency situations and for the restoration of peace. According to the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council, "*the PSC shall be a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa*". However, there are limits to its powers: although the PSC – in conjunction with the Chairperson of the Commission – may authorise the mounting and deployment of peace support missions, no military action may be taken without the consent of the Assembly.



The PSC operates at three levels – Permanent Representatives (ambassadors), Foreign Ministers and Heads of States and Government. The 15 member states on the PSC represent the five regions of Africa, and membership rotates, none of the members having a permanent seat or a right of veto. In theory, then, decision-making is efficient, especially as decisions are taken by a 2/3 majority rather than by consensus (AU 2004d).

Other elements of the PSC envisaged by the Peace and Security Council Protocol are the Panel of the Wise, a panel of five eminent Africans, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) to warn of impending conflicts, and an African Standby Force (ASF) of peacekeepers to intervene when mediation fails. The Panel of the Wise will report to the PSC and the Chair of the Commission for Peace and Security, as shown in Figure 1. Once fully estab-

lished, the CEWS will be mandated to analyse data in the Situation Room, collected from the Observation and Monitoring Units of the Regional Mechanisms. The data will be based on political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators. Ultimately, this information will be used to inform the PSC's decisions (AU 2004d). The ASF is important for a security architecture that includes military options (Klingebiel 2005c). Theoretically, it will be developed by 2010 in two phases and will be available for activities ranging from observer missions to peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations and post-conflict activities. The force will be composed of five standby contingents, with civilian and military components, in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment (AU 2002b).

The role of the Commission's Chairperson, currently Mali's former President Alpha Konaré, has been expanded in the new APSA. The Chairperson, together with the PSC, advises the AU Assembly on matters relating to peace and security. In general, the Commission has an important role to play as the AU's driving force, which also extends to its peace and security architecture. Its task is to implement, coordinate and document the PSC's decisions and to forge links with the other relevant departments and their programmes. It is also responsible for helping member states to implement specific programmes and policies, preparing studies and strategies and mobilizing resources for AU financing, including peace and security (ISS 2005a). However, owing to a lack of capacity, donors supporting the APSA have in fact dealt directly with the Peace and Security Directorate (PSD). Links between the PSD and other relevant departments have also been weak because of capacity bottlenecks.

Within the Commission, the PSD represents one of the AU's eight programmes. While the Directorate's Conflict Management Centre is responsible for conflict prevention, early warning and post-conflict reconstruction, the Peace Support Division is in charge of establishing the ASF and ultimately deploying peace support operations. The Commission also has a Strategic Planning Unit for policy research and formulation, a Resource Mobilisation Division and the Darfur Integrated Task Force, which is the strategic planning unit of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) based in Addis Ababa.

Finally, the Military Staff Committee – composed of the Chiefs of Defence Staff or their representatives (from the countries serving on the PSC) – advises and assists the Council in all questions relating to military and security

requirements (ISS 2005a). Inherited from the OAU is the Peace Fund, a mechanism for financing these structures.

There are other organs relevant to the PSD with which the latter could and should liaise. For example, the Political Affairs Department is responsible for human rights, transparency and accountability, refugees, the emergence of democratic institutions, humanitarian crises and the monitoring of elections (Cilliers / Sturman 2004).

Other organs mentioned in the Protocol establishing the PSC are the Pan-African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. The Protocol stipulates that these institutions and the PSC are to exchange information on matters of peace and security. As regards civil society, the PSC is to encourage activities aimed at promoting peace and security. The Protocol also states, vaguely, that "*when required, such organisations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council*". It remains unclear to what extent civil society will be given a role in the APSA (see the subchapter on civil society).

### 3.1.1 NEPAD

The New Partnership for Africa's Development, more commonly known as NEPAD, addresses the wider aspects of peace and security – governance and socio-economic development in Africa – and is not therefore shown in Figure 1. It was established in 2001, largely owing to the Thabo Mbeki's vision, but was also carried forward by the leaders of Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and Senegal. NEPAD forges the link between security and development by seeing them as interdependent elements of a better African future. NEPAD began its governance activities in the peace and security context before the AU came into being. However, the Maputo Summit in 2003 decided that NEPAD should be integrated into the AU after no more than three years (by 2005) if the AU was capable of absorbing it as one of its programmes (AU 2003a). Although NEPAD is officially regarded as an AU programme (the decision in this respect has yet to be implemented politically), NEPAD's secretariat is still located in South Africa and its future has yet to be decided. In these circumstances, confusion reigns as to who is responsible for post-conflict reconstruction. A strategy paper on this subject was drawn up by NEPAD in 2003, but the AU is currently working on its own, based partly on NEPAD's paper.

The sooner these issues are clarified, the more directed and effective donor support for the APSA can be.

Although there is uncertainty surrounding NEPAD's future, it has succeeded in raising Africa's profile in the international arena. It has also managed to gain support for a partnership approach between donors and Africa which emphasises the accountability of both donors and the recipients of their support.

The following table gives an overview of the envisaged components of the APSA and the stage they have reached in their implementation.

<b>Table 1: Components of APSA and stages of implementation</b>	
<b>Components of APSA</b>	<b>Stages of implementation</b>
Peace and Security Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operational at all levels (Ambassador, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Heads of State and Government), i. e. regular meetings at all levels</li> <li>• Second elections for two-year members (10 countries) in 2006, three-year members due to be newly elected in 2007</li> <li>• Deployment of political and military missions (e. g. Sudan, Burundi, Comoros, Central African Republic and Côte d'Ivoire)</li> </ul>
Continental Early Warning System	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not yet operational, so far no protocols on its establishment</li> <li>• Roadmap in process of development (March 2006)</li> <li>• Situation Room has eight staff analysing conflicts in the continent and giving the AU advice</li> <li>• Not yet performing intended function – one reason being that ECOWAS and IGAD are in process of establishing early warning systems</li> </ul>

Panel of the Wise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not yet operational, so far no protocols on establishment</li> <li>• Roadmap in process of development (March 2006)</li> </ul>
African Standby Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To be established by 2010</li> <li>• Not yet operational, but Concept and Roadmap for Operationalisation available</li> <li>• Workshops in 2006 creating basis for terms and conditions of future ASF deployment (payment, training, command and control, etc.) and harmonising RECs</li> <li>• Planning elements to be established at regional and AU level</li> </ul>
Military Staff Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operational, but does not yet have its own offices in Addis Ababa</li> <li>• Meets on ad hoc basis to prepare any PSC meetings having military component</li> </ul>
African Union Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operational but weak</li> <li>• Chairperson plays major role</li> <li>• Commissioner for Peace and Security plays major role</li> <li>• Not coordinating and managing donor interaction with the Peace and Security Directorate as it should</li> </ul>
Peace and Security Directorate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operational but weak</li> <li>• Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) developing ASF, but separate unit outside PSOD responsible for management of AMIS</li> <li>• Conflict Management Centre weak, few personnel and so far roadmap for CEWS and post-conflict reconstruction</li> </ul>

Regional Economic Communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Close relationship between AU and RECs necessary for functioning of APSA, e. g. CEWS, ASF</li> <li>• Not yet fully established – Memorandum of Understanding between AU and RECs at draft stage</li> </ul>
Political Affairs Department	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operational but weak</li> <li>• Although responsible for aspects of early warning and post-conflict reconstruction, no significant influence on peace and security architecture and agenda</li> </ul>
ECOSOCC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ECOSOCC launched in 2005 – not yet fully operational</li> <li>• One of ten sectoral cluster committees is Peace and Security</li> <li>• Role in APSA yet to be decided; depends on whether civil society invited to attend PSC, AU and other meetings relevant to peace and security in the future</li> </ul>
Source: own compilation	

### 3.1.2 Political dynamics

Although the structures described above are impressive and vast, many obstacles remain before they can function as intended, owing in part to the political dynamics among member states, the neglect of the civilian components of the APSA and the lack of internal financial resources.

The PSC, which performs the politically most important function in the APSA after the Assembly, has shown its political capacity to mandate an operation through the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Nevertheless, its reputation is in danger owing to ongoing debates on its composition. This has cast doubt on the extent to which the new political principles of the AU are being taken seriously (Klingebiel 2005c). Some of the members have failed to meet membership requirements with regard to contributions to peace missions and

*“respect for constitutional governance as well as the rule of law and human rights”* as required by Article 5 of the Protocol establishing the PSC (AU 2002b). Should the members of the PSC include countries led by dictators or with a grave human rights record, the Council could lose credibility and legitimacy at domestic and international level. The same debate is reflected in ongoing discussions on whether Sudan should take over the Presidency of the AU after Congo Brazzaville’s tenure. At the Khartoum Summit in 2006, it was decided to delay Sudan’s Chairmanship until 2007 (AU 2006a).

### 3.1.3 Military and civilian components of the APSA

The area of peace and security within the AU clearly receives the lion’s share of donor support. The AU Commission estimates that 90 per cent of donor support goes to the PSD rather than the other Directorates. The most dynamic developments in this sphere have been in the strengthening of military capacities, as demonstrated by the AU missions to Burundi and Darfur, the workshops on the African Standby Force in 2006, the development of a roadmap and the creation of the Peace Support Division, the administrative structure for the AU’s military operations. In terms of human capacity and conceptual development the AU is advancing more slowly in the areas of early warning, mediation and post-conflict reconstruction, all of which are the responsibility of the Conflict Management Centre. There is as yet no roadmap for conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. While the Peace Support Division has a permanent staff (albeit numerically small), no permanent position has been created in the Conflict Management Centre for post-conflict reconstruction.

Furthermore, civilian components also seem to be neglected within the ASF. Although the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and the Military Staff Committee (AU 2003c) and the Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the ASF (AU 2005b) envision integrated missions as the norm, peace support operations are still primarily equated with military missions. For example, while military aspects are extensively covered in ASF documents, references to civilian aspects are limited to a few general sentences. In addition, the AU and RECs have employed retired military officers to head their peace support units, reinforcing the *“institutional bias to the military aspects of peace operations”* (Vogt 2005, 27). The capacity to integrate civilian components into the activities of the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) is lacking at this stage. Ideally, the PSOD would have civil society

put forward a proposal for a framework or roadmap and – as a second step – receive donor support for implementation.

The poor integration of civilian components and broader issues of peace and security is also reflected in the tenuous links between the PSOD and the Political Affairs Department. Theoretically, the Political Affairs Department could assist the PSD with the development of the ASF's civilian component and with post-conflict reconstruction issues, as mentioned above. However, there is little formalised interaction between the two Directorates. The Political Affairs Department received € 2 million from the EU between 2004 and 2006 to build its capacities and to support human rights, governance and election activities. The UN (UNHCR) also provides some support for the Political Affairs Department. The amount of assistance is well below what the PSOD has received for capacity-building, and yet currently the Political Affairs Department cannot absorb more.

Another problem related to the PSOD's capacity is that parallel structures have been created for peace support operations. While the PSOD was established in 2004, the much larger Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) was created specifically for AMIS. Apart from the DITF reporting on a weekly basis to all AU departments, there was no process of integrating the lessons learned by the DITF into the PSOD, although the end of AMIS was already in sight. In fact, the DITF is physically located outside AU headquarters, making communication even more difficult.

### 3.1.4 Financial resources

The AU's financial basis is formed by its operative and programme funds. The operative annual budget of around US\$ 60 million is based on assessed, mandatory contributions by member states. In 2005, the AU received only US\$ 48 million, and the arrears have grown in recent years. Theoretically, the programme fund is used to pay for the Commission's eight programmes and is based on voluntary contributions from members, private donors (civil society, individuals, private sector) and official donors. In 2005, according to the AU Commission, donors provided around 95 per cent, or US\$ 80 million, of the US\$ 95 million needed to finance the AU's programmes, which shows that the fund is in fact heavily donor-dependent. This financial state of affairs reflects the AU's inability generally to finance its activities, including the area of peace and security. The Peace Fund, for example, used to cover the

costs of the PSC and its supporting organs, and in theory receives 6 per cent of the operative fund and voluntary contributions from donors and member states. Similar to the operative fund, voluntary funds are almost entirely provided by donors, and this despite the fact that most funds for AMIS or other missions have not flowed through the peace fund.

Nevertheless, despite obvious dependence on donor contributions, ownership of the agenda seems to be located within AU structures. This can be seen in the AU's ability to make political decisions to engage in peace support operations, which means that it is moving away from the principle of non-indifference that characterized the OAU. Furthermore, although donors' interests vary in their support for the APSA, they are so widely scattered as to provide financial support for all of the AU's areas of interest. Even the fact that a great deal of donor contributions, especially for AMIS, are paid in kind rather than in the form of financial contributions or budget support is welcomed by the AU, despite the limits this mode of delivery imposes on the AU's influence (see Chapter 5 for modes of delivery). In-kind contributions are viewed favourably as an interim mode of delivery, until the AU has strengthened and de-bureaucratized its internal financial and procurement systems.

### 3.2 Role of the regional economic communities in the APSA

According to the Peace and Security Protocol, the Regional Conflict Mechanisms are "part of the overall security structure" of the AU and therefore play an important part in promoting peace, security and stability in Africa (AU 2002b, 24). While the AU coordinates, monitors and devises policies and acts at political level, the RECs are intended to implement at regional level decisions taken at continental level. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is supporting a nearly completed process, involving the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding, including peace and security issues, between the AU Commission and eight RECs: ECOWAS, the Inter-Governmental Agency for Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC).

However, this process clashes with the AU's rationalisation programme, led from the Office of the Chairperson, which seeks to convince countries to belong to only one of the five RECs representing the AU's regions.<sup>3</sup> The five RECs hosting the workshops on the development of the ASF and preparing to provide ASF contingents are: ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the northern region. The last of these is not yet represented by a unified body but consists rather of a conglomeration of countries interested in playing a role in the APSA (the main ones being Algeria, Egypt and Libya).

Once the appropriate RECs have been established, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) will be responsible for coordinating and harmonizing their mechanisms with the AU. The Chairperson of the Commission will convene meetings at least once a year to ensure harmonisation and coordination and to facilitate exchanges of information between the RECs and the AU. The RECs will be invited to PSC meetings to discuss any PSC matters, and the Chairperson in turn may attend meetings on the Regional Mechanisms. The next section compares these RECs and the northern region in terms of a) operational structures, b) external support and resources, c) peacekeeping experience and d) political will and dynamics.

### 3.2.1 Operational structures

This subchapter provides an overview of the status of the operational structures for each of the various RECs with a peace and security mechanism. The term "operational structures" thus refers to the establishment of an early warning mechanism and standby forces.

IGAD attaches importance to the implementation of the Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism (CEWARN), its own early warning mechanism, and this is underlined by its establishment of secretariats in Nairobi and Addis Ababa. The three staff members who work at CEWARN headquarters have been trained in early warning data analysis. Currently, cooperation partners are being identified and early warning indicators developed. The regional early warning units (CEWARUs) have existed since July

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3 Nevertheless, at the latest meeting on the rationalisation of the RECs held in Ouagadougou in March 2006, the experts advised the retention of the configuration of eight RECs and the harmonisation of their policies and programmes.

2003, and the 14 staff members report weekly to the CEWARN Unit in Addis Ababa. IGAD has been commissioned by the AU to coordinate the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). EASBRIG is expected to be ready for deployment by June 2006, its schedule having been extended several times. It will comprise 5,500 civilian and military staff (AU 2005b, 7).

ECOWAS's early warning system is not yet operational, but significant progress has been made. Four regional headquarters have been established in Banjul, Lomé, Monrovia and Ouagadougou. Data is collected and analysed on a state-by-state and day-by-day basis. However, the activities of the regional headquarters are not yet harmonised, and a uniform concept has still to be established (Hettman 2004, 11). ECOWAS is the most advanced of the RECs in terms of the operationalisation of standby forces; it is the only REC to have an operational standby force that has been deployed in peace operations.

The SADC's early warning system and the South Africa Standby Brigade (SOUTHBRIG) have not yet been put in place. Given the financial weaknesses, it is very hard to envisage a peacekeeping force by the year 2010 or 2015, as outlined in the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO). Yet the reopening of the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare is an encouraging sign for the SADC's military plans.

Since 1994, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) has been dormant at the level of the Heads of State, the organisation's highest decision-making and policy-guiding body, because of political tensions among the member countries. The AMU does not yet have an operational standby force. Nevertheless, some North African countries are willing to form a North Africa Standby Force (NORTHBRIG), and they have peacekeeping experience in UN and AU missions. Algeria, for example, has sent troops to the Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Liberia, while Egypt has been active in Sudan and Burundi.

In 2002, ECCAS set up a peace and security mechanism known as the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) to promote, maintain and consolidate peace and security in the region. It calls for the creation of an Early Warning Mechanism of Central Africa (MARAC) to collect and analyse data for the prevention and detection of crises. The protocol calls for the creation of a Central African multinational force (FOMAC) to assist in the

event of humanitarian crises, serious threats to peace and security in the region and unconstitutional changes of government. However, MARAC and FOMAC have yet to be established.

### 3.2.2 External support for the RECs and their resources

#### *External support*

The budgets of all the Regional Economic Communities are financed by annual assessed contributions from member states and assistance from other sources. Programmes and projects are funded from grants, other financial contributions and technical assistance from development partners and multi-lateral agencies. External contributions account for a significant share of overall budgets.

IGAD and ECOWAS in particular benefit from support from external donors. This is due to their comparatively strong engagement and progress in peace- and security-related issues. Donor support for IGAD primarily comes from the European Union, followed by the USA and Italy. CEWARN is supported by Germany, the USA, the UK and Canada. EASBRIG is mainly supported by the UK.

The principal sources of donor support for ECOWAS are the European Union and France. France financed the entire ECOMOG mission to Guinea Bissau (Juma / Mengistu 2002, 30). Other contributors to ECOWAS are the UK, Canada, the USA, Denmark and Germany.

The SADC has found it more difficult to obtain external support to implement structures because of the mounting pressure on it to react to events in Zimbabwe. The USA, for example, offered to provide US\$ 20 million for some aspects of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) – the SADC's security mechanism – on condition that it marginalised Zimbabwe, but the SADC refused (Fisher / Ngoma 2005). Similarly, Canadian financial support has decreased. Germany provides the SADC with advisory services through the GTZ.

ECCAS is mainly supported by France through its Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP V) programme. The exercise is to be carried out in partnership with ECCAS, the AU and the EU and is scheduled for 2005–2006.

The USA is the principal partner of the five ASF workshops with NORTHBRIGS that take place in Cairo.

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), EAC and ECCAS receive limited support. Germany is currently evaluating the option of supporting ECCAS in the future.

#### *The RECs' own resources*

The RECs' capacities for generating their own resources are generally weak. This is partly due to member states' inability to pay and to bad payment morale. Inefficiency in obtaining external donations further complicates the situation.

Some of the RECs count on regional powers to pay the lion's share of all member states' contributions because they are the most powerful economies in the region. Examples are South Africa in the SADC and Nigeria in ECOWAS.

### 3.2.3 Peacekeeping experience

The AU has commissioned five RECs to establish regional standby forces that will be the pillars of the African Union's planned African Standby Force (ASF). Officially, the regional ASF brigades will be provided by ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC, ECCAS and AMU Common Defence and Security Policy. However, since the AMU is not active in peace and security matters, a few countries of the northern region have decided to participate. The establishment of the ASF will take place in two phases and be completed by the year 2010. It will be available for a variety of activities ranging from observer missions to peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations and post-conflict activities. The troops will be deployed under an AU mandate and placed under AU or UN operational control, as appropriate (AU 2005b).

However, current peacekeeping experience differs widely among the Regional Economic Communities. Whereas ECOWAS can already draw on an operational standby force, others have not even established the structures for deployments. In some of the regions, member states have gained experience of peacekeeping by deploying their troops in AU or UN missions. Of the five RECs, only ECOWAS and the SADC have peacekeeping experience at regional level.

In terms of peace operations, ECOWAS is by far the most experienced, resourced and knowledgeable regional organisation (Vogt 2005, 28). ECOMOG, the ECOWAS ceasefire Monitoring Group, has so far been engaged in several peacekeeping activities and has deployed up to 15,000 troops (Sierra Leone and Liberia 1999) (ISS 2005d). Its activities include peacekeeping operations (Côte d’Ivoire 2002–2004 and Liberia 2003), as well as the deployment of policemen (Guinea Bissau 1998–2003) and election monitoring (Liberia 1997). In 2002, the Defence and Security Commission approved a harmonised training program for ECOMOG’s standby units at three training schools in the region. The setting up of two military bases for the storage of common user equipment is also planned (ISS 2005d).

The ECCAS multinational force for Central Africa (FOMAC) participated in a military mission to the Central African Republic in 2002/2003 with assistance from France. However, its deployment capacity was limited (Powell 2005, 63).

### 3.2.4 Political will and dynamics

The relationship among ordinary member countries and the presence or absence of leading powers in regional organisations play a large part in determining the ability of the regions to react to or prevent conflict situations. In particular, the low contributions made by most members of all five RECs is seen as a sign of a lack of political will rather than a lack of capacity.

Owing to its economic power<sup>4</sup> and military capacities, Nigeria appears to be the unchallenged regional power within ECOWAS. Nigeria assumes military responsibilities by providing the largest troop contingent and is in command of the majority of ECOMOG missions. It assumed the operational lead of the ECOMOG mission in Liberia in 1990 and financed 90 per cent of the costs or around US\$ 1.2 billion (Juma, Mengistu 2002, 30). Nigeria also provided the bulk of the troops for the ECOMOG mission in Sierra Leone in 1997. Its dominance is further evident from the fact that 35 of the 115 members of the ECOWAS parliament are Nigerians. Nevertheless, Nigerian President Obasanjo has made it clear that Nigeria cannot continue providing the lion’s share of ECOMOG forces in the future (ISS 2005d).

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4 Nigeria has a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US\$ 125,7 billion, roughly equivalent to 41 per cent of the combined GDP of all ECOWAS member states.

Similarly, South Africa provides the lion's share of the SADC's budget and supplies most of the troops for missions in and outside the SADC. Although, on paper, the SADC has created the structures needed to manage and solve conflicts, rivalries and tensions among its member states have hampered the development of a formalised security mechanism. This has meant that conflict management activities have relied on ad hoc alliances and mediation efforts (Petretto 2005, 60). At the same time, donors are no longer willing to support the SADC financially because of Zimbabwe, and this extends to the Regional Peacekeeping Centre, which is based in Harare. This is fatal for any regional economic organisation, since the development of conflict management capacities largely depends on external contributions.

Within IGAD there is no clear leader, although Ethiopia has tried to assume that position by contributing some troops to AU peace support operations and paying US\$ 100,000 in voluntary contributions into the AU's programme budget, making it one of only three countries to do so, the others being South Africa and Nigeria. However, Ethiopia is simply too weak economically and too discredited by recent internal political events to adopt a leadership role. IGAD also suffers more from the tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea than it gains from Ethiopia's support, since it complicates decision-making on many issues. The tensions between Sudan and Somalia have similarly hampered decision-making at regional level. Kenya has attempted to take on a coordinating role, since it is active in the process between Sudan and Somalia and has shown its willingness to become involved by sending 35 military observers and 25 civilian police to AMIS.

As ECCAS is at the stage of implementing its strategies, little can be said about how politics affects the region's peace and security agenda.

Some countries of the northern region have signalled their interest in supporting the APSA. Algeria, for example, now hosts the International Center Against Terrorism, which will invariably link it to sub-Saharan Africa, since the Center will serve as a data collection hub. The northern region is also hosting one of five ASF workshops together with the USA as the lead partner.

### 3.2.5 Assessment

There is no doubt that regional structures are needed to stabilise relations, prevent the spill-over of conflicts and secure emerging common values.

ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD are the main regional organisations engaged in the management and prevention of conflicts. All three are involved in mediation and conflict resolution activities, with IGAD and ECOWAS also engaged in conflict prevention. In terms of peace operations, ECOWAS is by far the most experienced and active subregional organisation. However, as even these relatively advanced RECs have no effective crisis response structures, peace enforcement continues to be ad hoc and mostly driven by the interests of the strongest in the region (DFID / FCO / MoD 2001, 19).

### 3.3 Regional powers

#### *The concept of regional powers*

African leadership and regional powers play an important role in the new African peace and security architecture. The transformation of the OAU into the AU resulted from a grand idea mooted by Libya. While the origin of the substance injected into the operationalisation process remains contested, there is little doubt that the process has largely been led by South Africa and Nigeria. And again, the implementation of the ambitious peace and security agenda at continental level through the AU and at regional level through the RECs largely depends on the political will and active engagement of what are known as regional powers.

In our conception, what makes a country a regional power is the combination of a certain economic supremacy, a government with financial and human capacities and a strong, influential leader. Besides being the driving forces behind regional developments, these countries often have a continental influence and are behind initiatives at pan-African level.

#### 3.3.1 More constructive and less constructive African states

The paradigm shift in the AU from the principle of non-intervention to “the right to intervene” (AU 2000, Article 4) is due to African leaders – supposedly the often proclaimed new generation of leaders – who have succeeded in pushing a new way of thinking on to the African agenda. Even though the real picture negates much of this optimism, a distinction can be made between more constructive and less constructive African states in relation to the enhancement of the African peace and security agenda.

Widely perceived as drivers of the pan-African cause are not only South Africa and Nigeria, but also Algeria, Senegal and Egypt; Ghana, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania are also seen as keen supporters. Standing on the other side are Zimbabwe as well as Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Swaziland, who are reluctant to see the African Union flourish and are opposed to potential interventions in their internal affairs. Their resistance to democratic change and democratic principles, such as the rule of law and civil society participation, "might be attractive to old-style African leaders who resist change and who continue clinging to power" (Schoeman 2003, 5). The role played by Libya, often bluntly accused of being driven by Gaddafi's "chequebook diplomacy", is very ambiguous. Through President Gaddafi Libya can be considered a great proponent of integration in Africa, although his grand pan-African ideas are often transformed into more practical and realisable compromises.

Yet the new peace and security architecture in general, and the AU in particular, is dependent on the engagement of influential leaders or powerful countries. It is South Africa, Nigeria and Libya that play crucial roles in political mediation, peacekeeping and the allocation of financial resources. Together with Egypt and Algeria, they contribute 75 per cent of the AU's operational budget, for example. Funding the building of the AU is putting a strain on the member states, especially the regional powers. As the same states are also playing leadership roles in their regions, they are also the ones in many cases that fund activities implemented through the RECs, examples being Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in the SADC (Schoeman 2003, 10).

Besides the economic aspect of this commitment, the leading countries provide intellectual power and technical expertise. They are also the real interlocutors. International actors and donors work with and through those regional powers, since the credibility of NEPAD and of the AU is based on their constructive engagement. As an example, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and (surprisingly) Ethiopia are "anchors" of US engagement with the continent (Taylor / Williams 2004, 10). The European Union's new Strategy for Africa similarly takes account of Africa's regional powers, recognizing them as anchor countries – "poles of attraction and economic and political driving forces for their neighbours". Nigeria and South Africa are mentioned as lead-

ing examples.<sup>5</sup> “Due to the size of their economies and their commitment to regional and continental integration, they play a central role in economic development and political stability across Africa. Politically, the leaders of these two countries, former President Obasanjo and President Mbeki, have taken on the roles of peace brokers, often far beyond their own sub-regions” (EU 2005d, 11).

### 3.3.2 South Africa’s contribution to the APSA

South Africa, being the leading economic, political and military power, is Africa’s interlocutor with major foreign powers (Hughes 2004). In its new Africa strategy the EU acknowledges South Africa’s role as an anchor country and as a key actor for regional stability and integration: “*On the continental level, South Africa is one of the driving forces behind the AU and NEPAD, a beacon of democracy and good governance and a major peace-keeper. On a global scale, it plays an increasingly important role as a representative of Africa and the entire developing world*” (EU 2005d, 20 f.). Pillars of South Africa’s foreign policy are partnership with the developing world and a bridging role between South and North (Landsberg 2005, 751).

Within a decade South Africa has transformed itself from being an isolated and boycotted pariah state under apartheid to one of the globally most active, open and connected countries in the world. While Nelson Mandela’s central role is acknowledged, much of this rehabilitation can be credited to President Thabo Mbeki. His further ambition has been to “*persuade Africa to set up its own institutions and mechanisms for solving its problems, thus ending the constant, humiliating requests for aid to the West’s former colonial powers*” (Economist 2006).

Hence, in the African context, South Africa is a driving force of integration and pan-African development. President Thabo Mbeki is central to South Africa’s foreign policy; his vision of an African renaissance drives the country’s national interest in building an African peace and security architecture. The development of the African Union is at the heart of Mbeki’s policy in the continent, and NEPAD is his pet project; both initiatives bear his signature (Schmidt 2005, 30 f.). In addition, South Africa hosts the NEPAD headquar-

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5 The German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development also regards Nigeria and South Africa as anchor countries.

ters and the AU's Pan-African Parliament. As it chairs the SADC's security organ, its priorities are clearly to build African potential for conflict management and peacekeeping in Africa. At sub-regional level, this translates into the establishment of an early warning system and an SADC peacekeeping standby brigade (Schmidt 2005, 30 f.).

Peacekeeping has become central to South Africa's foreign and defence policy. South African troops have been sent to the DR Congo and Burundi (first under the AU's command, then under the UN's), and currently troops are also stationed in Darfur and in the Comoros under an AU mandate. In these cases, South Africa has the financial resources to fund its own troops and is not dependent on meagre funds from the AU. It has also been very active in conflict resolution and mediation, especially in the Great Lakes region and in Rwanda, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire and, lately, Sudan. Another core concern is post-conflict reconstruction, which has led to the development of post-conflict units in South Africa's ministries. South Africa also engages in trilateral cooperation, where it joins with other donors from the North in providing assistance in an African state – as, for example, in the DRC, where it is cooperating with European states in post-conflict reconstruction. Yet South Africa still seems unfamiliar with its new donor role. There is also a lively debate in the country about the limits to its continental involvement.

### 3.3.3 South Africa's role in the African continent – hegemonic obligations?

South Africa's regional role is yet not clear-cut, its foreign policy even being described as schizophrenic. *"Its advocacy for NEPAD and stance in the AU, its drive to host the Pan-African Parliament and its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council demonstrate its eagerness to play this [regional] role"* (Habib / Selinyane 2007). Although South Africa shows willingness to play a pivotal regional role and its ability to assume leadership in Africa, it consciously refrains from taking a visible lead and hides behind multilateralism, emphasising the country's importance, but not its dominant position in the region. Its schizophrenic characteristics are illustrated by the following examples. On the one hand, South Africa has demonstrated hegemonic behaviour by intervening in Lesotho. On the other hand, Pretoria has turned a blind eye to breakdowns of law and order in such close neighbours as Zimbabwe and Swaziland and has been reluctant actively to encourage the linking of moral standards to South African investments in the continent. *"[Pre-*

*torias] discharge of its regional role has been a variegated tapestry of hesitance and enthusiasm” (Habib / Selinyane 2007).*

South Africa is very careful not to be perceived as a hegemonic power. Its government is reluctant to assume too prominent, too strong a leadership role in the AU, fearing rejection and accusations of hegemonic tendencies and of being in the pay of the West or international financial institutions (Schoeman 2003, 9). Some African states are displaying growing resentment of what they perceive as South African domination of African affairs and the aggressive expansion strategy of South African companies throughout the continent (Mehler / Melber / van Walraven 2005, 458). South African investment has exploded in Africa, but social ethics are known to be very low. Consequently, the South African government is being increasingly urged to force its corporate sector to adopt higher moral standards. The suspicions of other African states, South Africa’s legacy of apartheid and its recent independence leave Pretoria a role in the continent that has yet to be defined.

As Thabo Mbeki has often said, South Africa’s fate is linked to the rest of Africa, since its welfare depends on politico-economic developments and on peace and stability in the continent, as does its vision of an African renaissance. It is in South Africa’s own interest to promote peace and security at continental level, since its economic growth depends on Africa’s development, which in turn requires peace and security. This is also in the interest of the African continent, since South Africa’s active involvement in conflict resolution and peacekeeping has helped to foster stability and democracy. Some regions and countries in crisis avoided by Pretoria seem unable to break the spiral of conflict and instability. Stability in Africa, and consequently development and democracy, can be achieved only with the influence and power of a regional hegemon (Habib / Selinyane 2007). Because of these considerations and “as an economic and military power, South Africa must play an unambiguously hegemonic role” (Habib/ Selinyane 2007). This means not only being a pivotal state, but also accepting the role of continental leadership.

### 3.3.4 Nigeria: a second potential African power?

Expectations of South Africa’s leading role in the continent have been high, but are also “accompanied by fear of potential abuse of South Africa’s dominance” (Habib / Selinyane 2007). The major concern about hegemonic power

being abused can best be allayed by the existence of a counter-power. For the time being, this role is best played by Nigeria. Even though Nigeria has neither the economic nor the military power of South Africa, it has been more decisive in leading political and military initiatives to stabilise West Africa, including the sending of troops to peacekeeping missions (Habib / Selinyane 2007). It is almost impossible to imagine peace and security in West Africa without Nigeria's participation. The country contributes more troops to ECOMOG for peace support missions than other members of ECOWAS. Currently, Nigeria is also the largest troop contributor to AMIS.

Given its experience of peacekeeping in the continent and its role within ECOWAS, Nigeria is an important partner when it comes to peace and security in Africa. It also plays an active role at political level in Africa. It has done so in the resolution of the crises in Sierra Leone and Liberia and is currently hosting talks aimed at resolving the Darfur crisis. Besides this, former Nigerian President Obasanjo was until recently AU chairman and head of the Peace and Security Council. At international level he is the new chairman of the Commonwealth and is regularly invited to international conferences and summits (Mehler / Melber / van Walraven 2005, 143).

Consequently, Nigeria is a second potential power in the African continent. The existence of a counter-power would help South Africa to focus its thinking and to take on the role of regional power in the first place. Furthermore, a strong Nigeria would prompt South Africa to behave in systematically beneficial ways for the continent (Habib / Selinyane 2007). The obvious competition between Nigeria and South Africa in supporting the African peace and security architecture – Nigeria literally financing the AU building, South Africa responding by providing the furniture – has resulted in dynamics being added and a balance within the African Union being guaranteed. At the same time, Nigeria and South Africa are strategic partners – which does not conflict with the concept of a power and a counter-power – in advancing the pan-African cause in their role as continental leaders.

### 3.3.5 Competition for continental leadership

It comes as no surprise that other potential regional powers, too, are competing for continental leadership and for influence in conflict resolution and management across Africa. In East Africa, Kenya continues to provide much needed support for peace initiatives. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement (CPA) by the Government of the Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLMA) in early 2005 followed years of relentless mediation by Kenya. Recently, Kenya has hosted a transitional government of Somalia in Nairobi as part of the efforts to reintroduce political normality to a country that has lived without a government for more than fifteen years.

Competition for continental leadership became most evident recently, when Africa was lobbying for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. South Africa was "ready to represent the continent"; Nigeria felt "qualified" to take on the task; Egypt meant to "represent Africa", and Senegal tried to introduce a francophone alternative into the debate. Competitive behaviour is also common within the African Union. Even though Kenya clearly plays an important role in East Africa, like Ghana and Senegal in West Africa and, to some extent, Libya and Algeria in the North, it is Nigeria and South Africa that are perceived as continental leaders.

### 3.3.6 Conclusions

In summary, the regional powers – often in the person of their leaders – are clearly driving forces behind the new reform dynamics in Africa. Even though it is hard to identify obvious spoilers, there are certainly some less constructive African states hampering the integration process promoted by the African Union. While the principle of equality of membership in the AU should not be downplayed, it is an open secret that such pivotal states as Libya, Nigeria and South Africa play a preponderant role in influencing the AU's peace and security agenda. Against this background, it would not be an overstatement to suggest that the AU's peace and security architecture would not exist without the support of these key African states. The claim of "ownership" and of "African solutions to African problems" gains credibility through the clearly visible engagement of internationally recognised leaders, such as head of the AU Commission, Alpha Oumar Konaré, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and South African President Thabo Mbeki. Although the grand aims set out in AU and NEPAD documents, such as intervention in the name of human rights and the African Peer Review Mechanism, are gradually being achieved, the international community is impatient to see more rigorous action. The aspect of politics and political will hovers over all the AU's activities, and the implementation of its ambitious agenda depends on the African leaders (Schoeman 2003, 8). Regional powers can

also exercise their influence to further the RECs – representing integrative parts of the peace and security architecture – as pillars of the African Union.

The pan-African vision and the impressive aim of continent-wide peace, followed by stability and democracy, requires not only political will but, even more importantly, strong leadership. South Africa's foreign policy may not appear consistent and homogeneous, but it has led the way most unambiguously in the building of continental institutions for African integration and for peace and security. Pretoria is known to lead from behind, enthusiastically or hesitantly. In strategic partnership and dynamic rivalry with Nigeria and other potential regional powers, South Africa is crucial for the implementation and advancement of the African peace and security architecture.

### 3.4 Civil society

Civil society forms part of the African peace and security architecture in two ways. Firstly, certain civil society organisations (CSOs) form a valuable pillar of the APSA, directly promoting the continental peace and security agenda, through their research, policy advice and related activities, for example. Secondly, civil society in general has an official role to play in the structure of the APSA, namely within the African Union. What is meant is not their watchdog function of monitoring the intergovernmental institutions but rather their representation on the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) – the AU's civil society body.

Civil society organisations that form part of the APSA through their active engagement in peace and security at continental level are limited in number. This small group of organisations with a peace and security profile include independent policy think-tanks and professional NGOs, such as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and Safer Africa in Pretoria, the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in Johannesburg, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) in Durban, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in Cape Town, the African Peace Forum (APF) in Nairobi, the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) in Johannesburg, the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) in Midrand and the African Human Security Initiative (AHSI), a cross-border network.

These CSOs have been referred to as the intellectual driving force of the APSA, if only because they facilitate discussions and meetings on peace and security in Africa. Although their roles and functions within the APSA may

differ and overlap, different models of involvement have been considered central: policy advice “in the tent” and “out of the tent” and such implementing functions as mediation and training.

### 3.4.1 Policy advice

Their role as policy advisors puts CSOs in the position of experts. Better staffed and equipped to conduct in-depth studies and analysis, research institutions, think-tanks and, increasingly, universities are able to collect and offer the knowledge and expertise that is lacking within the AU and government structures. Policy advice is mainly provided on request and often in close cooperation with the APSA institutions, especially the AU. Cooperation with and work for the AU may, however, take different forms – “in the tent” or “out of the tent” – and clear distinctions cannot be made.

*“In the tent”*: “In the tent” describes direct access to the ‘multilateral tent’, which is the African Union. In this position, CSOs are admitted to the AU’s negotiating table and so help to formulate and draft policies and protocols. Belonging to the inner circle clearly has the advantage of giving them an insider’s view and influence in policy formulation, but they are expected to subscribe to a strict code of confidentiality. A disadvantage could be the lack of distance and consequently the limited possibility of voicing criticism. A CSO’s decision to position itself “in the tent” can be interpreted as a change of self-perception, independence from governmental institutions being fundamental for most CSOs.

*“Out of the tent”*: Being “out of the tent”, on the other hand, means working outside the AU structures. Such work also includes policy advice and formulation, but also permits general analysis and in-depth research, since a position “out of the tent” enables a critical distance from the AU and the APSA to be maintained. As such CSOs are not bound by confidentiality, they can engage in open discussions and make statements to the media.

### 3.4.2 Implementation

Implementation of the peace and security agenda is a broad term, which may include everything from conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction on the ground. In this regard, certain CSOs have engaged in mediation and training in conflict resolution and peacekeeping at continental level, while CSOs

working in post-conflict situations are almost all local NGOs, many created on an ad-hoc basis.

### *Mediation*

Besides diplomatic efforts by African heads of state and international personalities, civil society organisations, too, can take on a role as credible mediators in the prevention or resolution of conflicts. The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) is still rather exceptional in this regard. Since its foundation in 1968, it has developed expertise and an international reputation for policy advice, training and, above all, mediation. Capacity-building for conflict resolution and management forms the focus of the CCR's approach and is carried out by means of training, technical assistance, policy development and research, academic programmes and outreach.

### *Training for Peace*

Training in peacebuilding, conflict resolution and transformation are increasingly offered at local and national level through CSOs. At continental level, Training for Peace is a joint initiative between ACCORD, the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), ISS and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC). Within this framework ACCORD provides civilian training and the ISS police training, while the KAIPTC serves as a host for both types of training in the West.

Almost all the think-tanks mentioned above are situated in South Africa. While Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria are experiencing a vibrant civil society movement today, it is South Africa's open and transparent political structure and infrastructure that allow civil society to flourish. Moreover, civil society in South Africa has the resources to look at such broader issues as peace and security, while their counterparts in less developed African countries are more concerned with internal problems at grassroots level. These favourable conditions are essentially due to the support of an interested international community concentrating its efforts on the young democracy of South Africa. As a consequence, South Africa hosts the top civil society organisations in Africa in terms of range of competences, professionalism and research capacities.

At the same time, the CSOs referred to above are continental in nature – often with staff from all over Africa and offices in such strategic locations as Addis

Ababa and Nairobi. In addition, they adopt a regional approach in their work, but target peace and security issues at continental level.

As for civil society in general – which includes in this context grassroots organisations, advocacy groups, think-tanks and other non-governmental non-profit organisations – its potential for the APSA has yet to be discovered. So far no open participation of CSOs has accompanied the evolution of the peace and security architecture in general or the development process of the African Union in particular. For one thing, the building of the APSA, mainly by the AU, has been an intergovernmental process. *“Africa – particularly its political leadership – is still in the habit of trying to design and implement a fully-fledged organisation in a top-down fashion giving little opportunity for any bottom-up process”* (Schoeman 2003, 8). Furthermore, peace and security forms part of the foreign policy sphere, which is still tightly controlled by governments.

What is more, civil society in Africa is struggling with basic challenges. First of all, there is the lack of trust between CSOs and governments. Governments are often reluctant to recognise CSOs as valuable experts and consultants, but rather see them apprehensively as watchdogs. A second and closely related factor is that there is a lack of space for civil society. Hardly any governments in Africa support civil society or even allow it to develop. Thirdly, human capacity is simply lacking, as many people leave their restricted countries if they have not been recruited by international organisations or donor agencies. A chronic problem is, fourthly, the lack of funding. As CSOs are seldom supported by governments financially, they are dependent on foreign donors.

Nevertheless, the African Union’s Constitutive Act gives considerable prominence to civil society’s role in the AU’s activities (Schoeman 2003, 16). Articles 5 and 22 set the stage for the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) as *“an advisory organ composed of different social and professional groups of the Member States of the Union”* (AU 2000, Article 22) in order to guarantee legitimate representation and incorporation of civil society. In practical terms, ECOSOCC gives civil society organisations and other stakeholders an opportunity to establish formal relations with the African Union and to participate in its initiatives (Murithi 2005). The organ’s objectives, composition and functions are described in the ECOSOCC Statutes, which were proposed in June 2004 by the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) and adopted by the Assembly. As key operational mecha-

nisms, CSOs are grouped in Sectoral Cluster Committees. The first of the ten such committees is known as Peace and Security and comprises CSOs concerned with “*conflict anticipation, prevention, management and resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and peace building, prevention and combating of terrorism, use of child soldiers, drug trafficking, illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons and security reform, etc.*” (ECOSOCC, Article 11).

ECOSOCC is in place, and civil society has been given a voice in the African Union and so within a central pillar of the APSA – but that voice has yet to be heard. ECOSOCC has been of little importance so far, if only because of its limited transparency and inadequate organisation. Put simply, ECOSOCC has been launched, but is not yet operational. When it comes to peace and security per se, the AU continues to be rather vague about the participation of civil society. According to the Protocol of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) – the framework rules governing the peace and security architecture – civil society organisations “may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council.”<sup>6</sup> But it is too early to judge how open the PSC is to think-tanks and other NGOs, as it is still at a formatting stage and has not yet invited civil society organisations to address it.

All the same, “*the AU is and remains an inter-state or inter-governmental organisation – and it would seem that such organisations will be involved in the AU and in ECOSOCC in particular under duress of their governments*” (Schoeman 2003, 16). Nevertheless, the AU’s commitment to engage civil society in its work is clearly reflected in the creation of ECOSOCC and the establishment of the Pan-African Parliament. If this commitment is sincere, civil society and thus the member states will play an important part in the African peace and security architecture. Ideally, the AU will increasingly draw on their expertise and advice in a range of issues, including peace and security. In the meantime, civil society will struggle with a lack of capacities, resources and government trust.

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6 Article 20 of the AU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU, Relations with Civil Society Organizations, reads: “*The Peace and Security Council shall encourage non-governmental organizations, community-based and other civil society organizations, particularly women’s organizations, to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required, such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council.*”

Opinions differ widely over the role that civil society should, can and does play in the African peace and security architecture. In general, greater involvement of Africa's civil society is important for peace and stability in the continent, *“particularly since governance is often weak, corruption endemic and democracy in a number of countries little more than a façade”* (Cilliers 2003). Observing developments in the civil society scene, CSOs – especially existing think-tanks – can have a growing influence in the African peace and security architecture. Even though fewer than a dozen civil society organisations are actively engaged with the African peace and security agenda and in the African peace and security architecture, most of them located in South Africa, their expertise and work as policy advisors, mediators and implementers is highly valuable for the APSA and indispensable for the African Union and its member governments.

### 3.5 Conclusions and challenges

The African Union has taken impressive political and institutional steps to transform itself into a credible, major actor for peace and security in Africa. Where these political and institutional dynamics are concerned, much has been achieved in various fields relating to political will, the building of long-term institutional capacities and willingness to act.

Firstly, political will is essential if the peace and security situation in the continent is to change. One significant example of the progressive political dynamics has been the AU's Constitutive Act. The conscious decision to move from the principle of sovereignty to the right of intervention lies at the heart of the overall dynamics in the field of peace and security. Yet African countries, civil society organisations and regional powers as well as the AU Commission and the external community that support these changes must maintain this new and still fragile momentum at all times if it is not to cease.

Secondly, many activities are helping to build long-term capacities to ensure that peace and security in Africa are protected by African solutions. The process of setting up the African Standby Force (ASF) is a striking example. The holding of regional workshops with the aim of establishing comparable forces throughout the continent and the operational progress that has been made in the regions are major accomplishments in this regard.

Lastly, the political dynamics have not been confined to resolutions and speeches: willingness to act is another achievement. AMIS and the AU Mis-

sion in Burundi (AMIB) are important examples. The decisions to intervene and the deployment of troops on the ground have shown that the transition from OAU to AU has been marked not by a superficial change of words but by a profound change of action.

Despite the promising developments in the area of peace and security in Africa, the AU's success depends on whether it manages to establish fully operational institutions for peace and security. Many challenges lie ahead on this path to a satisfactorily functioning African peace and security architecture capable of preventing and solving conflicts efficiently and also of successfully engaging in post-conflict reconstruction. Donors, civil society and member states play an important role in this respect.

The AU faces three serious capacity bottlenecks relating to human, financial and infrastructure capacities. Firstly, human capacity is limited in the areas of planning and, on the ground, mediation and military intervention. The AU's PSD is still not fully staffed. By the spring of 2006, for example, no staff had been employed for the area of post-conflict reconstruction. One reason for the delayed deployment of AMIS was said to be the African Union's weak planning capacity (Powell 2005). A lack of command and control was also identified during the mission (Schümer 2004). The establishment of the DITF has been an important step in tackling this bottleneck. However, it created new problems owing to its establishment outside the AU's Peace Support Operations Division. It will be a major task to integrate lessons learned and capacities built into the regular AU structures. Another bottleneck in the human capacity sphere concerns mediators. While senior envoys of the AU have been highly effective at mediating in conflict situations, junior and mid-level mediators often lack mediation, administrative or managerial skills (Cooke 2005). The AMIS troops on the ground have also lacked the capacity to carry out the complex tasks assigned to them (Powell 2005), and interoperability has been limited. The lack of sufficient adequately trained personnel is in part due to low remuneration levels, especially in comparison to other international organisations, and also to high rates of HIV/AIDS infection (Schümer 2004). AU bureaucracy has been another important factor.

Secondly, the Peace Fund's financial capacities are almost non-existent on the African side. The African Union cannot even collect sufficient funds for its basic budget. In 2005, incoming payments from member states accounted for only US\$ 48 million of the operative budget of US\$ 63 million. The programme budget of US\$ 90 million is almost completely donor-funded.

Only Nigeria and South Africa made substantial payments – of US\$ 10 and US\$ 11 million respectively – to the 2005 programme budget. The lack of financial capabilities becomes obvious when these contributions are compared to the cost of AMIS. From 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006 alone, the cost of AMIS was budgeted at US\$ 466 million. Besides the lack of financial resources, the AU's budget and procurement systems lack credibility. The findings of a fiduciary assessment commissioned by the EU in spring 2006 has revealed considerable weaknesses.

Thirdly, infrastructure capacity is lacking both for routine procedures and military deployments. These problems encompass logistics, communications and intelligence (Schümer 2004). A striking example of an infrastructure capacity bottleneck has been the inability of AMIS to deploy its troops on the ground, having to rely on air lifts organised by donor countries.

Besides the capacity bottlenecks discussed above, other challenges play an important role. The AU will have to find a sound solution to the problem of interlinking its new role in peace and security with the existing mechanisms at global and subregional level. The AU is endeavouring to establish a single, coherent and comprehensive security system in the African continent. Yet its “building blocks”, the RECs, differ widely in capacity, political will and interests. The regional workshops currently setting up the ASF are an important first step to meeting this challenge.

Although integrated missions are regarded as the norm in AU declarations, peace support operations are still primarily equated with military missions. The AU is advancing more slowly in the areas of early warning, mediation and post-conflict reconstruction than in the field of military operations. Nor does the Political Affairs Directorate yet have the necessary capacities, and it is not routinely involved in the civil aspects of peace and security. The difference in planning and implementation between civil and military instruments needs to be carefully examined in the future. Before steps are taken to address this disparity, it must be considered whether planning has been unrealistically overambitious, given the AU's capacities, and whether it reflects the true priorities.

Heavy reliance on external donors will be inevitable for a long time to come and must be controlled if African ownership of policies and interventions is to be secured. This is all the truer as at least some donors have strong national interests in the field of African peace and security by which their assistance is

guided. Yet at the moment the AU sees its ownership as given. According to the AU, donor interests are so widely strewn as to provide financial support for all its areas of interest. At the same time, such instances as the envisaged intervention in Somalia that did not receive donor support and could not therefore be realised are proof that the African Union is restrained in its actions. However, ownership cannot be judged solely from the plans and requests of the AU's PSD. If the basis is extended to embrace the whole AU, the danger of overfunding peace and security activities must be borne in mind. It may be aggravated by the fact that donors supporting the APSA have been dealing directly with the PSD owing to poor overall AU capacities. If the basis is further extended to include all African states, the question of ownership becomes even more complex. Many countries fear that money which could have been used for their socio-economic development is being redirected to conflicts in other countries, thus constraining their opportunities for development and leaving them more prone to future conflict. A vibrant and representative civil society within the AU through ECOSOCC or outside the AU that might allow more insights into Africans' general priorities has still to be established. The Pan-African Parliament cannot yet play this role. The problem of ownership will not therefore be easy to solve in the near future. However, this is not to say that no attention need be paid to this question of cooperation. On the contrary, African actors, whether the African Union, African states or African civil society organisations, and donors must give even more consideration to the question of African ownership in the peace and security sphere. A more coordinated approach by donors could exacerbate this problem further. Closer donor coordination is often demanded because it would facilitate cooperation for the African Union in many ways. Yet it would also confront the AU with a donor bloc that might not offer the currently wide variety of assistance that enables the AU to find support for all its envisaged activities.

In general, the AU is not yet a strong, well established institution. It is also made up of mostly weak states. It is a given in international organisations that some member states bypass these organisations or even undermine their efforts in their desire to further their national priorities. This has been even truer of African organisations in the past. Moreover, many African governments strongly defend their national sovereignty and will not easily give in to the principle of non-indifference if it comes to putting words into deeds. It will therefore be a great challenge for the AU to develop sufficient autonomy to exercise real power in the field of peace and security. Emerging rivalries

between member states and the AU Commission, which does not see itself as a mere secretariat, are signs of this process. Consequently, the empowerment of major regional leaders in the peace and security field also needs a well designed strategy. These regional powers are meant to play a more active and positive role in safeguarding and establishing peace. Along the way, it remains unclear how they can be restrained from pursuing the hegemonic tendencies that so easily accompany these measures. Besides achieving political autonomy, the AU will have to install monitoring instruments to ensure the implementation of formal mandates and resolutions.

Civil society could play an important role where these challenges are concerned. Through its participation it could ensure African ownership of activities in the peace and security field, offer its training capacities and its know-how, have its say on a well designed civil-military balance and hold the AU and member states to account. However, civil society has its own challenges to face. The number of institutions with a continental outreach is small, and most of them are based in one country, South Africa. At the same time, many organisations are active in this field at grass-roots or national level. Their integration into the continental discourse should be fostered. While the AU still has to explain what role it plans to give think-tanks and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), this would allow civil society organisations to press for wider participation on more representative and therefore legitimate grounds.

#### **4 A shared responsibility for peace in Africa: framing AU-UN relationships**

In the area of peace and security, the United Nations (UN) may be considered the most important partner of the AU, especially with regard to peacekeeping operations. The word “partner” implies that the AU cannot and does not seek to take on the UN’s role in Africa. The UN still plays the predominant role in the deployment of peacekeeping missions in Africa and is likely to retain this role in years to come. Around 75 per cent or almost US\$ 2,9 billion of the UN’s peacekeeping mission funding in its 2004/05 budget was spent on Africa (Klingebiel 2005b, 2).

The need to strengthen regional organisations does not end with recognition and bestowed legitimacy. Material support and the transfer of lessons learned are needed to turn words into deeds. Here the UN, jointly with other regional

organisations and member states, is an increasingly important component of AU capacity-building (Fawcett 2006, 4). The current challenge for the AU is, ironically, not financial resources, but absorption of capacity and the identification of alternative and often novel ways of organizing peacekeeping without the experience gained by the United Nations and its Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the past (Cilliers 2005). The UN's experience in developing its own capacities thus plays a vital role in motivating the AU and African regional organisations in meeting similar challenges. Positive examples in this regard are the substantial involvement of highly experienced UN personnel in the ASF workshops and the early creation of a UN office of mission support for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS).

The following paragraphs focus on the relationship between the AU and the UN with special reference to cooperation in the field of peace support operations. First, the basis of cooperation will be outlined. Second, special attention will be paid to the question of the legitimisation of interventions. Third, various types of operations in the African continent will be considered. The AU missions in Burundi and Darfur and the modalities of an envisaged hand-over of the Darfur mission to the UN will be examined. Fourth, the debate on the establishment of an integrated AU mission capacity versus a model of a division of labour in which the UN continues to focus on the civilian components of peace support operations will be described.

#### 4.1 Basis for cooperation

The cooperation between the UN and regional organisations is based on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, Article 52(1) of which states that “nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” Since the 1990s, the UN's failures in the face of some of Africa's security challenges have reinforced a desire for greater autonomy and for an “African solutions to African problems” approach to peace and security in the continent (Ibok 2004, 16). Hence the worldwide trend to enhance regional architectures has also been reflected in the African security context.

While the “Brahimi Report” was surprisingly silent on the evolving role of regional actors, the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change underlined in its 2004 report that the “*Security Council has not made the most of the potential advantages of working with regional and sub-regional organisations*” (High-level Panel 2004, 14). The report emphasises that consultations and cooperation should be expanded and could be formalised, covering such issues as meetings of heads of organisations, exchange of information, early warning, co-training of civilian and military personnel and exchange of personnel within peace operations. Importantly, it gives special recognition to African regional and sub-regional capacities in that it suggests a 10-year process of sustainable capacity-building support by donor countries within the AU framework (High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004, 71). The 2005 World Summit Outcome reiterated the importance of forging predictable arrangements, again singling out the special relevance of the AU (UN 2005e, 24). The specific terms of a memorandum of understanding between the AU and the UN are being discussed in this light.

## 4.2 Basis for legitimising peace operations

The High-level Panel emphasises that the authorisation of the Security Council should be sought by regional organisations in all cases, but it allows Council authorisation to be given after a regional operation begins (High-level Panel 2004, 85 f). It is striking, however, that neither the AU nor ECOWAS requires its actions to be authorised by the UN Security Council. Both organisations intend to seek UN authorisation, but not to be restricted by it (Holt 2005, 49 f). With regard to the AU, the provisions of the UN Charter on the promotion of peace and security in Africa are acknowledged in the preamble of the Protocol on the Peace and Security Council (PSC). However, it is unclear how the PSC will react when the UN is unable or unwilling to authorise appropriate action. This leaves some freedom for interpretation and hence enough scope for the AU to react before receiving UN authorisation (Golaszinski 2004,3–4).

The responsibility to protect, first outlined in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, is implicit in the founding document of the African Union (AU 2000) and has only recently turned into a normative vision of the United Nations (High-level 2004; UN 2005a). However, this concept has yet truly to overcome the tension between competing claims of state sovereignty and the right to intervene. At AU level, as

Powell observes, “both the missions in Burundi and Darfur do not represent the ‘last resort’ type of interventions envisioned in the responsibility to protect and the AU’s Constitutive Act. In both cases, the AU’s involvement was conditional upon receiving consent from the host authorities/governments” (Powell 2005, 4). Thus the future will reveal how the two organisations interpret their right or responsibility to protect civilians against war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity and how interpretations of this norm – always influenced by political will – match, differ or conflict.

As regards the UN Security Council’s practice of referring to Chapter VIII, four recent African peace operations led by the ECOWAS and the AU reveal how the Security Council’s approach varies. Firstly, in February 2003 the UN welcomed the actions of ECOWAS and the previous deployment of French troops in Côte d’Ivoire. It requested both missions to report periodically to the Security Council. Secondly, in Liberia in 2003, the UN authorised an ECOWAS multilateral force under Chapter VII and cited Chapter VIII.<sup>7</sup> Thirdly, the UN did not authorise the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) under Chapter VII or VIII in 2003. In 2004, the Security Council welcomed the contributions of the AU operation, but did not provide direct authorisation. Lastly, the Council welcomed, rather than authorised, the AU mission in Sudan (Holt 2005).

#### 4.3 Division of responsibility for peace operations in Africa

To simplify the relationship between the AU and UN with respect to peace operations, four types of operation in the African continent can be identified:

1. *UN peacekeeping missions*: At the end of 2005, the United Nations was leading eight peace operations in Africa: in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the

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7 While Chapter VI of the UN Charter covers the pacific settlement of disputes, Chapter VII forms the basis for “actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression”. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter concerns regional arrangements. It begins with Article 52 which reads as follows: “*Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.*” For an online version of the UN Charter see <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>.

Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Western Sahara and Southern Sudan. A total of 54,129 peacekeepers – compared to 69,717 worldwide – were deployed in these missions (UN 2005d).<sup>8</sup>

2. *Deployment of missions of regional organisations or the AU:* The AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is one example that will be considered further in the following chapter.
3. *Co-deployment:* This type of operation involves the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops alongside those of regional organisations or the AU. The most important examples in the African continent have been the UN and ECOWAS co-deployments in Sierra Leone and Liberia (Francis et al. 2005, 52 f).
4. *Sequenced deployment:* This type combines the first two types described above, a mission by a regional organisation or the AU being followed up by a United Nations mission.

In the following paragraphs empirical evidence will be presented for the mission in Burundi, which is an example of sequenced deployment, and for the mission in Darfur, an example of a mission undertaken by the AU on its own. As will be shown during the discussion of the mission in Burundi, which also has characteristics of co-deployment, and of the “re-hatting” of the mission in Darfur from an AU to a UN mission, this classification is not perfect.

### *The AU mission in Burundi*

The AU mission in Burundi (AMIB) constituted what de Coning refers to as a “hybrid mission” inasmuch as it was undertaken to keep the peace in the absence of a comprehensive ceasefire, but lacked the civilian functions that usually form part of such complex peace operations (de Coning 2005). During the AMIB mission, the United Nations operated alongside the AU in the Burundi political process and offered resources from its United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). The AU understood from the outset that it could not sustain the mission for long and negotiated with the UN to take over the leadership in Burundi in 2004 (Holt 2005, 41). When it took over, the UN retained AMIB’s command structures largely

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8 As at 31 October 2005; the number indicates total military and police personnel; civilian personnel are excluded.

intact and absorbed the African troops already on the ground. Overall, this “re-hatting” was widely judged to have been successful (Powell 2005, 38). Powell suggests that the AU’s recent experience in Burundi lays the foundations for the emergence of a division of labour between the AU and UN, with the AU deploying a military mission in response to a crisis and creating sufficiently stable conditions for the Security Council to authorise UN deployment. The UN and other international actors will perform the civilian functions that typically form part of complex peace operations (Powell 2005, 24).

However, the division of labour between the AU and UN may reveal a troubling double standard. As Powell comments:

*“The fact that AMIB was deployed to an insecure environment with half the resources and personnel as ONUB [United Nations Mission in Burundi] risks creating a two-tiered system of international security where the lives of some peacekeepers and the people for whom they are keeping the peace are implicitly accorded less value than others.”* (Powell 2005, 40)

She also stresses the need for a shared understanding of the nature of the conflict and an agenda for its resolution on which all the cooperating organisations are agreed. While these conditions obtained between the UN and AU in Burundi, it is not clear that they exist in Darfur (Powell 2005, 49).

### *The AU mission in Sudan*

As regards the mission in Darfur, the AU can be described as being at war while still building its defence ministry. Only two years after being established, the AU was already engaged in a mission. The following section will give some insight into the mission’s achievements and setbacks and discuss the pros and cons of the mission being handed over to the United Nations.

As it is the AU’s first genuine peace operation, AMIS represents an important political step towards African responsibility in the continent. The fact that the AU sent 7,000 troops into the crisis area is a success in itself. In a critical situation the AU had the courage to take action, while the international community was still observing the situation and the UN was preoccupied with its engagement in Haiti and Liberia. To meet their commitment, AMIS helped to stabilize the situation in Darfur. One of the goals was to create stability, others were to take care of internally displaced persons and to build administrative structures, neither of which has been achieved.

**Box 2: Background to the Darfur conflict**

The United Nations described the situation in Darfur as one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. Attacks by the Sudanese government and militia have forced around 2 million people, mostly black African farmers, out of their homes, and 120,000 have fled to neighbouring Chad. Possibly more than 180,000 (estimates rise to 400,000) have died in violent raids – despite a nominal ceasefire – and many more of starvation (IRIN News 2006). Behind the crisis is a conflict between sedentary farmers of Arab descent and nomadic cattle-herders of African descent, which began in the mid-1980s and erupted violently in February 2003. Then the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), both rebel groups of African descent, took up arms against the Arab-dominated government in Khartoum to end what they call the neglect and oppression of the inhabitants of the region (IRIN News 2006). In response, the Sudanese army and Janjaweed militia, recruited from local Arab tribes and armed by the government, brutally fought back, conducting “*indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, (...) throughout Darfur*” (UN 2005 f.).

When it became clear that the international community would not intervene to stop the conflict, the AU stepped in. By sending first observers, then troops into the immense and hostile area of Darfur, the AU showed it was ready to resolve a very complex conflict involving not only different ethnic groups and associated rebel groups, but also the Sudanese government and neighbouring countries.

**AMIS (AU Mission in Sudan)**

The AU's initial reaction was to set up a Ceasefire Commission in May 2004, accompanied by a small monitoring force on the ground. Then the AU Director for Peace and Security, Sam Ibok, announced on the eve of the AU summit that the number involved in this force would be increased to 60 military observers, who would monitor the ceasefire signed in April 2004, with 300 troops to protect them. “*With escalating violence, however, the two-year-old AU saw the Darfur conflict as a test case for its self-declared mandate to have Africans resolve African conflicts*” (O'Neill / Cassis 2005). What was then known as the “Ceasefire Monitoring Mission” was largely made up of Rwandan and Nigerian troops.

The view of the AU's Peace and Security Council that Sudan's cooperation and consent were required resulted in a mandate restricted to monitoring the ceasefire and to protecting the monitors (O'Neill / Cassis 2005). On 20 October 2004, the PSC decided to increase AMIS to 3,320 personnel, including 2,341 troops (of whom 450 would be military observers), up to 815 civilian police and an appropriate number of civilian personnel. AMIS II was given a stronger mandate to improve the security situation throughout Darfur, to ensure a safe environment for

humanitarian assistance and, most importantly, to protect civilians, the internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, it was stressed that the protection of civilians was the responsibility of the government of Sudan. This task was based on a fundamental but false assumption “that the government of Sudan would provide basic protection to civilians, including IDPs. Instead, government soldiers and their militias have constituted the greatest danger to civilians and especially IDPs” (O’Neill / Cassis 2005).

On 9 November 2004 the government of Sudan and the two leading rebel groups, JEM and SLA, signed two short-term peace agreements seeking progress towards an end to the conflict. The first treaty established a no-fly zone over rebel-controlled areas of Darfur, a measure designed to end the Sudanese military’s bombing of rebel villages in the region. The second accord granted international humanitarian aid agencies unrestricted access to the Darfur region. The agreements were the product of AU-sponsored peace talks in Abuja that began on 25 October 2004. Another increase in the strength of AMIS took place in April 2005, when the PSC decided to deploy 7,731 personnel by 30 September 2005. Consequently, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Gambia, Kenya and South Africa also deployed troops. There is still a disparity between authorised personnel and staff on the ground, with 6,752 currently deployed in Darfur.

Currently, the ceasefire is being violated from all sides, and the prospect of sustainable peace in Darfur still seems remote – despite recent advances in peace talks in Abuja. After missing the deadline for a comprehensive agreement set by the AU for the end of April, a peace agreement was finally signed on 5 May 2006 by the Sudanese government and one group within the rebel SLA, while the rival SLA group and the smaller rebel group JEM refused to participate. The division among the rebel movements has posed one of the main difficulties all through the two years of peace talks in Abuja and still threatens the peace process.

A joint AU/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur was authorised by Security Council Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007. The Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, authorised UNAMID (United Nations – AU Mission in Darfur) to take the necessary action to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and to protect its personnel and civilians, without “prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan”. The Council decided that UNAMID should begin implementing its mandate not later than 31 December 2007.

Despite the admirable deployment of an African peace operation and the improvements in Darfur, the humanitarian situation there is still intolerable. Consequently, the international press is almost unanimous in describing AMIS as a failure. When it comes to the reasons for the failure of the AU

mission, a wide range of explanations is put forward. The mandate is often mentioned as the main obstacle to attaining a greater impact in the Darfur region. It is perceived as having been too weak and too vaguely worded, partly because the AU's Peace and Security Council has described the situation in Darfur as an "internal conflict" rather than "genocide", as the United States has done, and partly because of the Sudanese government's uncooperative stance. Taking a different view, some observers recall that the AMIS mandate was fairly robust, but point to the lack of will to implement it on the ground owing to the inadequate briefing of the troops. Accordingly, the main problem is the divergence between the mandate and its enforcement. Closely linked to this criticism – especially in the eyes of foreign donors – is the unsatisfactory command and control structure. The virtual non-existence of a functioning chain of command is responsible for many difficulties experienced on the ground, such as badly maintained camps, a lack of qualified health personnel and poor coordination in general. The planned Joint Operations Group, bringing together the military, the police and the humanitarian component under one head, to lead and coordinate the mission has yet to be formed.

Another common explanation for AMIS's shortcomings – often put forward by the African side – is the lack of financial support. In fact, AMIS has been heavily supported by foreign donors, but funds were running out by the end of April 2006. Along the same line, the number of troops was not commensurate with the size of the region. To keep the area under control, an increase in AU troop strength to at least 20,000 would have been necessary (O'Neill / Cassis 2005). An additional credible explanation is the AU's lack of logistics and equipment.

In short, AMIS's primary responsibility is to protect IDPs from attacks by rebel groups, foremost among them the Janjaweed, in camps spread across Darfur. In fact, the security situation has improved significantly in areas where troops are deployed. Nonetheless, the humanitarian situation is still far from acceptable, and AMIS is unable fully to protect IDPs. If it is to carry out its mandate successfully, AMIS needs to be reinforced. In addition, the mission lacks effective command and control structures, logistical support and operational practice (ACCORD 2005).

At political level, peace talks chaired by the AU are regularly held in Abuja, Nigeria. In addition to representatives of the AU, all the groups involved and the governments of Sudan and Chad, experts from donor countries try – in a

rather uncoordinated manner – to advance the peace process, which is largely funded by donor contributions. While the money may be well spent, negotiations are making very slow progress. The high-level talks – mediated by Africa Union Chairman and Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso – have reached the seventh round. However, the signing of a peace agreement in early May 2006 was the first sign of success. Further mediation efforts and political pressure will continue in an attempt to persuade the hitherto absent rebel groups to sign the document. In any case, the new peace agreement has yet to be applied on the ground. So far, ceasefires have been violated by various sides, including the Sudanese government. Yet, the AU consistently fails to bring up these issues at a higher political level or with Sudan.

A joint AU/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur was authorised by Security Council Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007. The Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, authorised UNAMID (United Nations – AU Mission in Darfur) to take any necessary action to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and to protect its personnel and civilians, without “prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan”. The Council decided that UNAMID should begin implementing its mandate not later than 31 December 2007.

In summary, the AU mission in Sudan can be regarded as an important political step, since the AU “took up the challenge from scratch” and sent troops into the rough and immense region of Darfur to stabilize, monitor and protect. Starting as an ad hoc mission, AMIS developed impressively into a full mission. By reacting to the crisis in Darfur, the PSC enhanced the African response to conflicts in the continent. However, when the AU proved incapable of handling the situation in Darfur, the UN had to intervene, building on the successes of the current mission and learning from AMIS’s shortcomings. *“Such an intervention can no longer be deferred on a misplaced reliance on ‘African solutions for African problems.’ Otherwise the ‘responsibility to protect’ will become as empty a phrase in the 21st century as ‘never again’ was in the 20th”* (O’Neill / Cassis 2005).

## **5 Donor contributions to the African peace and security architecture**

The African peace and security architecture (APSA) is not an isolated regime comprising only African actors: this evolving architecture forms part of an

international context, and foreign actors are increasingly becoming involved in African peace and security matters.

Africa, and especially peace and security in Africa, has been in the spotlight of international attention in recent years. The renewed engagement of the international community can clearly be interpreted as a response to new African dynamics and, above all, to the creation of the AU. The paradigm shift from the principle of non-intervention to non-indifference, demonstrated by the AU's Constitutive Act and, in practice, by the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and the political will reflected in such initiatives as NEPAD give rise to hope and optimism.

Chapter 5 forms a central part of our study, as it summarises our findings on donor contributions to the strengthening of the African peace and security architecture. In order to give a clear picture of donor support and its shortcomings, the findings are presented in a condensed fashion, indicating the focus and areas of this support, the modes of delivery and the management of the nexus between security and development. Coordination, demand orientation and funding are then identified as challenges to support for the APSA – as perceived from both the donor and the African side.

The first part of the chapter introduces the major external actors – multilateral, supranational and bilateral – and gives a brief overview of their rationale, the focus of their support, the modes of delivery and nexus management in relation to the strengthening of the African peace and security architecture. The distribution of donor support at different levels of the APSA and to its various areas are then analysed. A closer examination of the recipients of assistance reveals the levels of the organisational structure at which the donors engage – by supporting the AU, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), civil society or regional powers. A breakdown of the support into capacity-building, conflict prevention, military capacity, post-conflict reconstruction and support for peace operations exposes both well-funded and rather neglected areas of support.

The modes of delivery are then considered. Ranging from 'in-kind' contributions to budget support, the various ways of delivering assistance are illustrated with the aid of striking examples.

Another focal area is nexus management by donors, where coordination and coherence among the various policies are examined, along with organisa-

tional structures, sources of funding and in-situ implementing mechanisms illustrated by case studies.

The chapter concludes by considering existing challenges encountered by donors and African institutions alike. Coordination poses a major challenge for the donor community and is a major complication for the AU. Demand orientation is a principle to which many donors may subscribe, but where follow-through is often lacking. Finally, the volume and predictability of funding are essential for an effective partnership between donors and the APSA.

In fact, the attempt to find “African solutions to African problems” and efforts to ensure African ownership of the peace and security architecture contrast with dependency on external actors and the lack of implementation capacities. Funding and capacity-building must be continued in order to empower African states to take on the responsibility to protect. Responding to the requests of NEPAD and AU, external actors are challenged to provide a coherent and well-coordinated policy. While some international actors successfully integrate their national approaches into greater international activities, others keep to unilateral action and bilateral cooperation. But in their efforts to promote peace and security many, if not all, donors are trying to conform to the new African initiatives.

## 5.1 Major donors

Donors increasingly engage in peace and security in Africa. What, how, where and why do they contribute to the strengthening of the African peace and security architecture? This subchapter profiles major donors, providing an overview of their support, including their goals, focus, modes of delivery and management of the nexus between different policies related to peace and security in Africa. External actors with a long tradition of engagement with the African continent – the United Nations (UN) and former colonial powers – have been joined by newcomers to Africa, such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and such bilateral actors as Germany and Japan. A combination of newcomers and countries with considerable experience of Africa, the Group of Eight (G8) also plays a central role in supporting the APSA.

Africa and – even more important in our context – peace and security in Africa are clearly the focus of the G8 summits. Furthermore, the G8 members

draw on the G8 Africa Action Plan (AAP) as a framework for their engagement in the African continent and for their national strategies towards Africa. Traditionally unilateral actors, such as the USA and the UK, increasingly use the G8 as a platform for international initiatives for Africa, as Blair's Commission for Africa and Bush's Global Peace Operations Initiative illustrate. In addition, the new EU Strategy for Africa presents an overarching framework for engagement with the APSA and will be elucidated in the following. Major partners of the APSA identified by the study are the EU, NATO, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (USA). The following table gives a brief overview of their key characteristics and the main support they give to the APSA.

## 5.2 Areas of support

### 5.2.1 Capacity-building for the political and administrative structures of the AU and regional organisations

There are two main instruments used by donors to enhance the AU's capacity in the area of peace and security: the UNDP project (see 5.1) and the EU's capacity-building funds. As the UNDP project is nearing its end and the European APF expires in 2007, donors are seeking alternative forms of engagement. It is therefore impossible at present to determine the shape of support from this donor group for capacity-building in the AU from 2007 onwards. With respect to the EU, a total of € 35 million is set aside for building the capacities of the AU and RECs that are relevant to peace and security. Owing to its lack of absorptive capacity, the AU has been able to accept only € 1.5 million of the € 6 million initially allocated for AU capacity-building.

The most obvious problem for the AU is the slow recruitment process, which has resulted in its having a small number of overburdened staff. Among the many reasons for this slow recruitment are the comparatively higher salaries paid by other institutions, such as the UN. The consequent lack of capacity has therefore led donors to engage in capacity-building, but the recruitment problem is also the main cause of the AU's lack of capacity to absorb donor funds: a "capacity-building vicious circle". In addition, given the powerful notion of African ownership, the involvement of external advisers is a very sensitive issue in the AU.

Engagement in the strengthening of capacity in the areas of mediation and diplomacy takes very different forms. For instance, the UK is supporting the establishment of the Panel of the Wise, Canada is improving the AU's civilian observer capacities for political mediation, and the United States is considering the option of assisting the AU preventive diplomacy pool.

In the case of capacity-building at the level of the regional organisations, ECOWAS is supported by Denmark through the Danish Africa Programme for Peace, by Canada and by the EU, which also supports the SADC and ECCAS, with Germany assisting the SADC.

**Table 2: Overview of donor profiles**

<b>DONORS</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>	<b>Support for AU structure</b>	<b>Support for RECs</b>	<b>Support for peacekeeping missions (especially AMIS)</b>	<b>Nexus management (incl. implementing structures in situ)</b>
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Important player, due to generous support for ECOWAS &amp; AU through Canada Fund for Africa (CFA) and for AMIS</li> <li>• Human security, Africa &amp; Right to Development as important components of foreign policy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CAN\$ 4 m (€ 2.9 m) for military observers, civil observers &amp; contributions to UNDP</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CAN\$ 4.5 m (€ 3.25 m) for ECOWAS through CFA in 2002-2007 and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIP/TC)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Funding for AMIS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Distinctive roles of various ministries, but well coordinated in situ.</li> </ul>

**Table 2 (continued)**

<b>DONORS</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>	<b>Support for AU structure</b>	<b>Support for RECs</b>	<b>Support for peacekeeping missions (especially AMIS)</b>	<b>Nexus management (incl. implementing structures in situ)</b>
Denmark	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Despite relatively small financial contribution, conspicuous for its coherent strategy and demand-oriented approach</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development of conflict prevention mechanism as well as doctrine and standards for ASF</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supports ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC and structural relationship between RECs and AU</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development activities are integrated into Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DANIDA)</li> <li>• Military, diplomatic and development resources meant to strengthen the APSA are all implemented by DANIDA</li> <li>• DANIDA is represented in Addis Ababa by only one person, the ambassador</li> </ul>

**Table 2 (continued)**

<b>DONORS</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>	<b>Support for AU structure</b>	<b>Support for RECs</b>	<b>Support for peacekeeping missions (especially AMIS)</b>	<b>Nexus management (incl. implementing structures in situ)</b>
European Union	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Took over a leading role in coordinating the donor community in Addis Ababa</li> <li>• Supports whole spectrum of peace &amp; security</li> <li>• Has recently established a peace &amp; security profile in Africa, as evident from new EU Strategy for Africa</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supports capacity-building within AU structures with € 35 m</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lead partner for ASF workshop</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Through the African Peace Facility, supported AMIS with € 162 m</li> <li>• and additional € 50 m for transitional period of AMIS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In Brussels, responsibilities for development and security divided between Commission and Council</li> <li>• Foreign policy, development and military cooperation closely coordinated in situ</li> </ul>

**Table 2 (continued)**

<b>DONORS</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>	<b>Support for AU structure</b>	<b>Support for RECs</b>	<b>Support for peacekeeping missions (especially. AMIS)</b>	<b>Nexus management (incl. implementing structures in situ)</b>
France	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Main support for development of ASF in form of military training using military bases on African soil</li> <li>• Here, gradual shift from bilateral assistance to Multilateralism, Europeanisation and Africanisation</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ASF establishments assisted through RECAP training as well as logistics and equipment</li> <li>• Traditional cooperation with ECOWAS and ECCAS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for AU mission in Comoros</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Military Cooperation and Defence Directorate is part of Foreign Ministry and in charge of military training throughout Africa</li> <li>• French Development Agency (AFD) comes under joint supervision of Ministry of the Economy and Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs</li> <li>• Military Attaché in Addis Ababa responsible for assistance for APSA</li> </ul>

**Table 2 (continued)**

<b>DONORS</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>	<b>Support for AU structure</b>	<b>Support for RECs</b>	<b>Support for peacekeeping missions (especially AMIS)</b>	<b>Nexus management (incl. implementing structures in situ)</b>
Germany	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for APSA mainly through development policy</li> <li>• Focus on capacity-building</li> <li>• Provides an average of € 11 m for APSA p. a.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capacity-building for P&amp;S</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus on CEWARN</li> <li>• Capacity-building for IGAD, SADC and ECCAS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provided air lift for Gambian troops for AMIS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At institutional level, three German ministries involved in cooperation with the APSA: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development</li> <li>• At operational level, embassies/political attaches and representatives of Defence Ministry and GTZ – the implementing organization for technical cooperation – responsible for cooperation with APSA</li> </ul>

**Table 2 (continued)**

<b>DONORS</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>	<b>Support for AU structure</b>	<b>Support for RECs</b>	<b>Support for peacekeeping missions (especially, AMIS)</b>	<b>Nexus management (incl. implementing structures in situ)</b>
Japan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Newcomer to support for APSA</li> <li>• Only support for civilian aspects</li> <li>• Hardly any coordination with other donors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contributions of US\$ 2 m for UNDP pool, earmarked for PCR in Great Lakes region and AU capacity-building</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for civilian components of AMIS worth US\$ 5 m</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Only Foreign Affairs has been active in situ</li> <li>• Development policy integrated into Foreign Affairs has lately become engaged through JICA</li> </ul>
NATO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Engaged for first time in the African continent through assistance for AMIS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capacity-building for military officers</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Airlift for the rotation of AMIS troops and pre-deployment training for AMIS staff</li> </ul>	

**Table 2 (continued)**

<b>DONORS</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>	<b>Support for AU structure</b>	<b>Support for RECs</b>	<b>Support for peacekeeping missions (especially, AMIS)</b>	<b>Nexus management (incl. implementing structures in situ)</b>
Norway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Steps in early in areas neglected by other donors</li> <li>• Represents NATO politically in Addis Ababa</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP pool currently supported by Norway with US\$ 895,000</li> <li>• Together with Sweden, provides earmarked contributions to Peace Fund of US\$ 2.5 m from 2005–2007</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supports AMIS through construction and maintenance of 26 police stations in IDP camps in Darfur</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ministry of Foreign Affairs includes a Minister for Foreign Affairs and a Minister for International Development</li> <li>• Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) is a directorate in Ministry of For-</li> </ul>

**Table 2 (continued)**

<b>DONORS</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>	<b>Support for AU structure</b>	<b>Support for RECs</b>	<b>Support for peace-keeping missions (especially, AMIS)</b>	<b>Nexus management (incl. implementing structures in situ)</b>
Sweden	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for APSA through UNDP pool</li> <li>• Support for AMIS</li> <li>• Engagement in trilateral cooperation together with South Africa</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supporting UNDP capacity-building project with US\$ 500,000</li> <li>• Contributes earmarked funds to Peace Fund</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supports AMIS with a total of € 2.35 m until November 2005</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Minister for International Development Cooperation reports to Foreign Affairs Minister</li> <li>• Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency works on behalf of Swedish Parliament and Government</li> <li>• Joint representation in situ</li> </ul>
UNDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is sole pool for capacity-building</li> <li>• Administers US\$ 7.9 m (2003–2006)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capacity-building</li> <li>• Facilitation of conferences and working groups on MoU between AU/RECs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Helping to establish staff capacity at ECOWAS HQ for conflict resolution</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hardly any contact or coordination between UNDP and UNDPKO in situ</li> </ul>

**Table 2 (continued)**

<b>DONORS</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>	<b>Support for AU structure</b>	<b>Support for RECs</b>	<b>Support for peacekeeping missions (especially AMIS)</b>	<b>Nexus management (incl. implementing structures in situ)</b>
United Kingdom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supports all areas of AU. Important partner in support for AMIS</li> <li>• Efforts to coordinate with donor community</li> <li>• Has created Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pays into UNDP pool for capacity-building</li> <li>• Is developing a roadmap for the Panel of the Wise and for CEWS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lead partner for ASF workshop on logistics with IGAD/EASTBRIG</li> <li>• Building military capacity for post-conflict peacebuilding with ECOWAS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• £52 million went to AMIS as bilateral support through ACP</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coherent response through joint funding mechanism of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and Department for International Development (DFID)</li> <li>• Representatives of different political fields converge around common effort, ministerial background not so important in situ</li> </ul>

**Table 2 (continued)**

<b>DONORS</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>	<b>Support for AU structure</b>	<b>Support for RECs</b>	<b>Support for peacekeeping missions (especially, AMIS)</b>	<b>Nexus management (incl. implementing structures in situ)</b>
USA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Major supporter of AMIS</li> <li>• Distinct preference for in-kind contributions</li> <li>• Development policy hardly engaged</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assists with the situation room and communications structures for ASF</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lead partner of ASF workshop with NORTHRIG</li> <li>• Focus on IGAD and ECOWAS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for AMIS provided mainly in kind, value almost US\$ 400 million</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Only State Department actively engaged with APSA at management level in situ</li> <li>• Responsible military unit, EUCOM, located in Germany</li> <li>• Development policy plays only minor part</li> <li>• Top-down approach, with Washington in control</li> </ul>

Source: own compilation

### 5.2.2 Early warning systems

The support for early warning systems is either channelled through the regional organisations, mainly IGAD and the SADC, or takes the form of support for the development of the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The EU has been assisting ECOWAS and ECCAS in this area, Germany supports IGAD, the United States supports ECOWAS and IGAD and has provided equipment for the AU situation room, and the UK provides support for the implementation of the CEWS through the ACPP. Despite these commitments, overall support for early warning systems is rather limited. As the advanced development of an early warning system in the IGAD region reveals, such a mechanism is highly complex, creating the need to focus only on certain types of conflicts. Furthermore, it is costly and politically sensitive in that it examines member countries' internal affairs. Last but not least, early warning does not automatically generate action, which is based on the political will of states and regional organisations. The questionability of the success of early warning systems is an important reason for the cautious donor involvement in this area.

### 5.2.3 Enhancing military capacity

Support in this area focuses mainly on the development of the African Standby Force. The AU workshops for the development of specific components of the ASF as outlined in the March 2005 "Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force" are currently attracting most attention. Each of the five workshops is organised by a regional organisation in cooperation with a lead partner. The organisational set-up is as follows: doctrine, standard operating procedures, command and control, communications and information, logistics systems (IGAD/UK) and training and evaluation systems (ECCAS/France, Canada). The United States is providing additional material support for the ASF in the form of communications equipment. France is contributing to the establishment of the ASF by providing equipment and logistics, drawing on its military presence in the African continent. Where the civilian structures of the African Standby Force are concerned, Norway is currently funding the development of a conceptual framework by ACCORD. And through its Canada Fund for Africa Canada is seeking to enhance the AU's capacity for the rapid deployment of unarmed military observers.

At regional level, donor support in the form of military training and funds for peacekeeping training centres are important building blocks for military capacity in the continent. Examples of the former include such initiatives as African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) and RECAMP, and in the latter case the UK, Germany, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands and France (in descending order of amounts contributed) have committed considerable sums to the KAIPTC. The Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare was set up in 1997 with Danish support, which ended in 2002. Finally, the Peace Support Training Centre in Kenya receives funding from the USA, the UK, Germany and the UN.

All in all, the establishment of the ASF is a favoured area of donor support at AU level, since the AU structures and needs in this area are apparent, making donor support highly visible. Donor support structures for military training are still mainly bilateral.

#### 5.2.4 Support for peace operations

Most support goes to peace operations, principally the AU mission in Darfur, followed by smaller missions such as those in the Central African Republic and Burundi. Centrality exists in resource and strategic terms: firstly, the sheer volume of resources needed to deploy peace operations absorbs most of the donor contributions; secondly, support is in the strategic interest of many donors, who wish to enable the AU to deploy troops rapidly. The allocation of resources from the EU's APF is the clearest illustration of the financial bias towards peace operations. Of a total of € 250 million for the period 2003–2007, € 162 million had been spent on Darfur alone by the end of March 2006, with an additional € 50 million committed to AMIS until its hand-over to the UN. The largest donor to AMIS in monetary terms is the United States with almost US\$ 400 million, followed by the EU, Canada with € 139 million and the UK with a contribution of £52 million.

At subregional level, the UK and the EU have committed themselves to help fund the ECOWAS peace missions in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire.

#### 5.2.5 Post-conflict reconstruction

Engagement in the area of post-conflict reconstruction includes activities in countries emerging from conflict, such as the reintegration of former combat-

ants, assistance with elections, the establishment of the rule of law and governance structures, the improvement of the human rights situation and other measures that are important for long-term democracy, stability and reconciliation. The AU envisages interventions in post-conflict situations that complement the efforts of the World Bank, UN and others, but does not currently have any structures to undertake such activities. Consequently, support in the area of post-conflict reconstruction has thus far played a marginal role. While both NEPAD and the AU are making progress at conceptual level, there is limited scope for capacity-building and no entry point for the implementation of concrete measures. Interestingly, Japan, which is keen to become involved in this area, is now extending the UNDP project with US\$ 2 million earmarked for post-conflict reconstruction in the Great Lakes region, with the more specific objective of reintegrating former child soldiers.

### 5.2.6 Conclusion: unbalanced support for the APSA?

As outlined above, in the area of peace and security support for peace operations and military capacity is clearly the “donors’ darling” in terms of the allocation of financial resources. The question that therefore arises is whether peace operations and military capacity are being overfunded. To answer this question in the affirmative would be to overlook the fact that the AMIS resources have been stretched from the outset and that the development of the ASF has urgently needed the attention it is currently being given. In light of the immense difficulties encountered by AMIS on the ground, largely because of the lack of financial resources, which has resulted in “a mission on the cheap”, this conclusion would be cynical to say the least.

Even though there is donor support for “soft” peace and security issues within the AU, the question of capacity-building seems to be the crux. Finding a way to increase the number of qualified staff and effecting organisational transformation would most probably lead to greater absorptive capacity and, in turn, to more fruitful and substantial engagement in the areas of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. Yet this would be to assume that such engagement is wanted by the AU. Debating areas of AU engagement also raises the question whether an already overburdened AU should engage in all the areas mentioned above or whether it should focus on the most pressing areas.

Lastly, there is not only a discussion on over/underfunding in the area of peace and security, but also in the AU in general. Here it is precisely the area of peace and security that is increasingly perceived by some donors to be overly favoured, leading to even weaker capacities in other departments, such as political affairs. This preference for the AU's PSD – particularly if it focuses on “hard power” issues – may lead to a situation in which developmental, governance and human security questions related to conflict cannot be adequately addressed by the AU. The reform process that the UN has painfully undergone over the last decade in bridging the fields of development and security may serve as a good example of the AU as it is currently developing its own structures. In the eyes of many poorly informed onlookers, the AU is all about peace and security. If the organisation wants to alter this perception, constructive ways of engaging and a clear role for the AU in other fields should be identified. For donors it is consequently important to question their own motives in supporting the AU, to react to the demands of its organisations and to decide on areas of engagement.

### 5.3 Modes of delivery

Donors offer a variety of modes of delivery when supporting APSA. The AU, being the main partner in this regard, does not have any clear preferences in the short and medium term. In the long-term, however, the AU favours budget support. Owing to the flexibility on the African side in the short and medium term, the modes of delivery usually reflect the donors' preferences. This results in a contribution that in most cases relies heavily on one mode of delivery, other modes being used only for smaller contributions. Overall, six different modes of delivery can be identified and will be considered in this chapter: equipment/‘in-kind’ support, financial support, budget support, technical support, pooled support and trilateral cooperation. These modes of delivery have been chosen because of their interesting features. Some overlapping therefore exists, this being most obvious in the case of financial contributions and budget support, but the same can be said of pooled contributions, which may consist of financial or technical support.

#### 5.3.1 Equipment / ‘in-kind’ support

In-kind contributions are offered and made by many donors. The USA, UK and Canada deliver significant amounts of their contributions to AMIS in

kind. But there are also many more examples of smaller in-kind contributions for civil and military uses. The United States relies almost completely on in-kind contributions in the support given mainly to AMIS. Camps are built and troops equipped by US companies awarded contracts through US tenders and paid by the US Administration. The USA therefore retains an important say in its contributions. The AU has little say. In the case of AMIS camps, for example, it is limited to their number and location. Interestingly, the AU does not generally resist in-kind contributions despite the comparatively little influence it is able to exercise as a result of this mode of delivery. Yet the AU also sees it as having its positive sides. It receives the goods more quickly in this way than if it invited tenders itself. In-kind contributions thus relieve the AU of the tendering process and also of reporting obligations to donors. The AU's positive stance towards in-kind contributions is therefore likely to continue, at least until its financial reporting mechanisms have matured and its bureaucracy has become more efficient.

### 5.3.2 Financial support

Almost all donors contribute cash earmarked for specific purposes. These sums are usually rather small and intended for conferences, mediation efforts, etc. The most significant exception to this rule is the EU's APF. Of its total of € 250 million, € 210 million is earmarked for peace support operations in general. The activities funded from these cash contributions are decided jointly, in practice on a request from the AU. Cash contributions are vital to the operation of the APSA. Without donors' financial contributions, the PSD could function only at a basic level.

### 5.3.3 Budget support

Many donors – the EU, the Nordic countries and Germany, for example – have considered giving budget support to the AU. At the moment, the EU is the only donor actually to have pledged a considerable amount as budget support. It has committed itself to giving € 55 million in budget support from 2007. In connection with this commitment, the EU has commissioned a fiduciary assessment of the AU's internal financial and accounting mechanisms. The negative preliminary results of this assessment have caused many donors to drop their plans to give budget support in the near future. The AU also sees

the need for adjustments and will not insist on budget support until its financial mechanisms have matured.

### 5.3.4 Technical support

Technical support is a very common mode of delivery for development and military actors assisting the APSA. Hence the large number of technical support projects that have to be managed by the AU and RECs. With most donors pulling out of the AU/UNDP project, the AU is expecting an even larger sum in bilateral technical support. Donors have begun to react to this problem. At the beginning of 2006, they discussed a technical assistance pool, but no decision has yet been taken and no memorandum of understanding has been signed. Technical support is given to build capacity within the AU and REC structures related to peace and security, to facilitate the formulation of strategies, to help set up the ASF or to manage peace support operations. The DITF aside, long-term experts from donor countries are not common in AU structures owing to the AU's efforts to ensure an African identity.

### 5.3.5 Pooled support

Both financial and technical support can also be pooled by donors. The AU/UNDP project, also known as the UNDP capacity-building basket, is the most prominent example of pooled funding for the AU. Other than that, a contribution of US\$ 2.5 million to the AU Peace Fund by Norway and Sweden and € 200,000 contributed annually to Denmark's Africa Programme for Peace (APP) by Austria are the only examples of pooled funding. UNDP has pooled funds from Germany, Sweden, Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK amounting to US\$ 7.9 million for the AU/UNDP project that ends in 2006. The funds have been spent on AU staff salaries paid through the UN, equipment, external expertise and facilitating meetings and conferences. Yet most donors are not prepared to maintain this mode of delivery and plan to withdraw from the project once it expires. They consider it to be inefficient and expensive because of the overheads of UNDP and the United Nations Operation Project Services (UNOPS). Among the AU member states, this mode of delivery and the AU/UNDP project enjoy a good standing. The PSD appreciates the one-stop communication with donors through UNDP. Reporting is also facilitated for the AU and its capacities are therefore spared, because all donors have agreed to apply the same reporting

requirements and assessment indicators. Moreover, the AU/UNDP project has been a reliable partner for the AU through its predictable, programmatic and aligned funding.

### 5.3.6 Trilateral cooperation

The newest mode of delivery in support of the APSA is trilateral cooperation. The idea underlying this mode of delivery is that it enables regional powers to implement projects in other countries of the African continent. All three parties to this form of cooperation are states. The assistance given to the African implementing partners may take the form of financial or technical support. Projects can be implemented by the donor and the partner country or by the partner country on its own. If the assistance provided is to be regarded as genuine APSA support in the context of this study, the AU must assign to the regional power the task which donors enable it to perform. Hitherto, the only donors to have engaged in this form of cooperation in the peace and security field have been the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden and the only African implementing partner state has been South Africa. Beneficiaries of trilateral cooperation in the peace and security field have so far been the DRC, Angola and Rwanda. The small number of donors using this mode of delivery is due to the novelty of trilateral cooperation. It appeals to many donors, and many are planning similar projects with South Africa. Yet trilateral cooperation also poses serious difficulties and dangers. One major constraint is the capacities of the African implementing partners. Not even South Africa, which is actively promoting this form of cooperation, currently has an efficient implementing structure. It also lacks an underlying political strategy, resulting in the odd situation of its intentionally acting as a donor, while refusing to be regarded as an emerging donor because of its apartheid past and the suspicion in Africa that it has hegemonic aspirations. Donors should indeed be aware of the risk inherent in trilateral cooperation of its increasing hegemonic tendencies and capabilities. This mode of delivery may also weaken the AU's position within the APSA, if donors do not regard an AU mandate as mandatory or, even better, extend this mode of delivery to 'quadrilateral' contributions by channelling their funds to African implementing partners through the AU.

## 5.4 Nexus management

As shown in the conceptual debate in Chapter 2 and as became evident during the empirical fieldwork, interfaces between security and development policy exist when development policy supports the APSA. Thus an assessment of four criteria enables four management models to be developed (see Table 3): distancing, complementarity, coordination and subordination. The criterion approach is applied to determine whether the strategies of development and security policy are separate, aligned or identical. Actors can either have separate funds to finance their activities or pool their funds. The same is true of the implementation of activities, which can be either separate or joint. The criterion hierarchy has a special meaning in that it differentiates between the management models of cooperation and subordination. When both policies act at the same level, they cooperate. When one of the actors is superior in the hierarchy, the management model is subordination. Although it tends to be possible for donors to be assigned to one of the four management models, it must be borne in mind that, in most empirical cases, donors use hybrid forms when managing the nexus.

<b>Table 3: Nexus management models</b>				
Management model	Distancing	Complementarity	Cooperation	Subordination
Approach	Separate	Aligned	Identical	Different options possible
Funds	Separate	Separate, but aligned	Pooled	Different options possible
Implementation	Separate	Separate, but aligned	Joint	Different options possible
Hierarchy	No	No	No	Yes
Source: own compilation				

In this subchapter, the aforementioned typology of management models will be illustrated with the aid of empirical evidence. Through the assignment of

one matching donor approach to each management model, risks and challenges posed by each model can be identified inductively. This will allow a better understanding of the implications when political actors reflect or decide on a certain model for managing the nexus. It will also be possible to infer what various impacts each management model entails for support given to the APSA. It is assumed that the impact of donor contributions varies according to the various management models.

#### 5.4.1 Distancing

If one of the policies acts independently from the other, development policy can pursue self-reliant, development-oriented and mostly long-term goals, but may possibly run the risk of losing influence on the government's framework of security, which guides, directly or indirectly, development engagement in conflict countries.

For example, Germany's management of interfaces is based on distance between the different policies. At institutional level, three German ministries are involved in the cooperation with the APSA: the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the German Foreign Ministry (AA) and the German Ministry of Defence (BMVg). Rationale, political will to take action and experience of peace- and security-related issues in Africa differ from one to the other. The BMZ, the AA and the BMVg have each outlined their own policy strategies for sub-Saharan Africa that guide their engagement, and each has its own fund.

Advantages and disadvantages of this nexus management model become apparent when the German example is analysed. On the one hand, German development policy interacts independently with other policies, which allows it to pursue its own long-term and development-oriented goals. If these goals are to be achieved, the structural causes of conflict must be reduced and crises nipped in the bud, civil society and state actors must be supported in non-violent conflict transformation and contributions made to peace-building in post-conflict situations through conflict transformation, reconstruction and reconciliation measures (BMZ 2005b). For these activities, the BMZ has access to its own funding and so does not need to coordinate closely with other ministries. On the other hand, the divided institutional structure does not permit a coherent approach to be adopted, which stands in the way of any significant contribution to the APSA. As a result, the visibility of engagement

is diminished owing to there being a number of organisations in situ, each with its own approach. Furthermore, complex mechanisms of coordination among the representatives of the various ministries and organisations in situ are needed if a common position is to be demonstrated. Coordination therefore becomes comparatively time-consuming and costly.

The German government is taking its first steps towards the cooperation model. Its strategy for worldwide peace and security since 2004 has called for closer cooperation at strategic level among several government departments (AA 2004b). Germany's support for regional peacekeeping training centres is another example of closer cooperation among several policies. The Peace Support Training Centre in Nairobi and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare are supported by various instruments of the German Foreign, Development and Defence Ministries.

#### 5.4.2 Complementarity

Coherent and efficient policies are implemented on the basis of aligned goals, with none of the stakeholders having to give up clearly defined areas of responsibility.

Canada's restructured foreign policy is the best example of the alignment of diplomacy, defence policy and development policy, which is outlined in its International Policy Statement entitled "A role of Pride and Influence in the World" (Government of Canada 2005a). The funds and instruments differ among the implementing institutions but are aligned as a consequence of the common approach. Financial support for the APSA is provided by the Canada Fund for Africa, which is managed by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and goes to areas of support that include political, administrative and military capacities. Foreign policy has its own financial instrument, the Global Peace and Security Fund. The support for AMIS, the largest financial contribution by the Canadian government, is partly funded by the Foreign Office through the Global Peace and Security Fund (CAN\$ 20 million). The bulk of the support for AMIS (CAN\$ 170 million) is managed by the Foreign Office, but comes directly from the Treasury. Local activities are closely coordinated with representatives of the various policy areas, who are located together in one office.

In conclusion, Canadian support for the AU is significant in terms of financial contributions and of the range of activities that can be covered by the

various actors involved. The Canadian position in situ is well aligned and, as it is usually expressed with one voice, carries weight at donor meetings. Nevertheless, the extensive commitment to military support compared to civilian support poses the potential risk of development policy being unable to exercise sufficient influence on the security agenda.

### 5.4.3 Cooperation

Where there is close cooperation among the various policies, development policy can have a strong influence on the government's security framework owing to the common approach adopted, but it may have to shift its commitment and funds to more short-term, military objectives.

The UK is an example of a model that is based on close cooperation between development, foreign and defence policy in terms of funding and coherence of approach. The joint Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, through which most of the UK's support for conflict resolution in Africa is channelled, was created in 2001. It pools UK expertise and funds from the Department for International Development, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence to provide a coherent response to peace and security in Africa (UK 2005). This interdepartmental pooled funding arrangement is designed to increase the effectiveness of conflict prevention, thus reducing the high costs associated with military intervention (Austin / Chalmers 2004, 4). At the same time, pooled funding requires better coordination of non-military activities with peacekeeping missions, which may more effectively prevent the re-emergence of conflict in violence-prone countries and regions (DFID 2005b).

In general, the coherent approach may be one role model for engagement with the AU. The close cooperation among all the stakeholders enables the UK to allocate large sums. At the same time, it precludes high overheads since it has a common concept at strategic level, and coordination in situ is comparatively uncomplicated. This approach also allows the UK to cover a wide range of areas of support with short-, medium- and long-term perspectives, such as assisting military capacities for AMIS and the ASF, contributing to conflict prevention and early warning and providing the AU with logistical aid.

Another example of the cooperation model is the European Union's African Peace Facility, which demonstrates how development policy cooperates

closely with various other policies in a common approach, with the focus clearly on strengthening the AU's military capacities. The establishment of the African Peace Facility will be backed by EU development resources up to the year 2010. Other funding possibilities were not available for supporting African peace missions. Furthermore, owing to the EU's legal structure, which leaves responsibility for military activities with the Member States, the EU cannot count on its own funds for military activities. This means that support for the APF can be provided only if the Member States agree on funds, which will then be supplied from development resources and employed for military purposes.

#### 5.4.4 Subordination

Chapter 2 introduced a fourth theoretical approach to managing the nexus: the subordination of development policy to other policies. No empirical evidence of this model was found in terms of external support for the APSA. This implies that development policy is not securitised in any of the relevant donor countries. Consequently, development policy in all these countries can either influence a common security policy or implement its own independent policy.

In this subchapter, the management of interfaces by four donors is analysed. All of these donors are major supporters of the APSA. There is no best nexus management as such, and advantages and disadvantages, which depend on rationale and objectives pursued in each case, must be examined by policy-makers. Besides institutional and legal restrictions, the importance of purely development-oriented goals, the required amount of financial resources and the range of activities will be decisive when it comes to choosing one of the four models. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the complementarity model is preferable to the distancing model since institutional structures are similar, whereas complementarity has some minor disadvantages, especially where a coherent approach is adopted. For the same reason, coordination may be a good choice, but it may also pose the potential risk of development policy having to subordinate its objectives and funding to security policy.

<b>Table 4: Nexus management</b>				
<b>Country</b>	<b>Approach</b>	<b>Funds</b>	<b>Implementation</b>	<b>Hierarchy</b>
European Union	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Aligned through “New Strategy for Africa”</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Separate: development assistance through African Peace Facility; military assistance through Council funds</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Joint, through European Commission delegation in Addis Ababa, including a Council representative</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No</li> </ul>
UN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Separate from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Separate: UNDP basket fund for capacity building and DPKO has cell</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Separate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No</li> </ul>
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Aligned through “A role of Pride and Influence in the World”, stresses a whole-of-government approach</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Different, but aligned. Global Peace and Security Fund managed by Foreign Ministry, Canada Fund for Africa managed by CIDA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Separate, but well coordinated</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No</li> </ul>
Denmark	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Same, through “A world of difference”</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pooled and managed by DANIDA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Joint, supervised by DANIDA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No</li> </ul>

<b>Table 4 (continued)</b>				
Germany	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Three separate Africa strategies, but increasingly more cooperative in the field of peace and security</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Separate, mainly allocated within the BMZ</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Separate, except support for peace-keeping training centres</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No</li> </ul>
France	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Separate, but under aegis of Foreign Affairs Ministry</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Separate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Separate. Defence attaché at embassy and French Development Agency (AFD) office</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No</li> </ul>
UK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same, through “UK/Sub-Saharan Strategy for the area of peace and security”</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pooled through Africa Conflict Prevention Pool</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Joint, all actors located in embassy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tendency for objectives to be mainly military</li> </ul>
USA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aligned through national security strategy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Separate, but aligned</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Separate, but aligned with focus on military activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tendency for military objectives to have primacy</li> </ul>
Source: own compilation				

## 5.5 Coordination

The following subchapters identify a number of problem areas – coordination of donor activities, donor orientation to the AU's needs and problems related to donor funding – which are then analysed in greater depth. First, what should ideally be the standard with regard to these areas is outlined. Second, the current state of donor support with regard to these areas is summarised with a view to revealing, where possible, tendencies in donor behaviour.

Donors have four options for coordinating their support for the APSA. First, they can pool their funds within a jointly agreed support framework. As a second option, they can also attempt to harmonise their efforts, i. e. adopt the same standards and reporting requirements for the recipient in question. Third, complementarity, or a division of labour, is another way in which donors can interact with one another. In this case, they share sectors and thematic areas among themselves, with the aim of avoiding donor crowding. Less result-oriented interaction may simply involve keeping each other regularly informed of their various activities – the fourth form of coordination. This exchange of information makes individual donors' actual activities transparent and may feed into individual country strategies towards the APSA. Needless to say, donors can also opt not to coordinate their efforts at any level (no pooling of resources, no harmonisation, no complementarity and no regular mechanism for exchanging information).

The advantage of pooling funds is that donors can achieve their goals more effectively by pursuing a specific strategy that is in all likelihood divorced from the particularist interests of individual donors. The harmonisation of reporting requirements and other standards does not necessarily entail the pooling of funding but, like the pooling of funds, helps to reduce transaction costs and the burden on the recipient organisation or country. The advantage of complementarity is that the over- or underfunding of certain areas or structures of the APSA can be avoided. Although the fourth option, the institutionalised exchange of information, is the least binding of all, it can also inject a high degree of transparency and effectiveness into donor activities. Not to coordinate efforts may be the easiest and cheapest option for donors, but it may not produce the most effective result, since there is a risk of support for the APSA becoming unbalanced and of the recipient of support being overburdened with reporting requirements.

The problems connected with any form of coordination are that it takes time to identify common interests and that donors with specific interests may not consider effectiveness their primary concern and so deliberately choose not to coordinate. The recipient, however, may prefer the pooling of resources and harmonisation in areas which attract a great deal of donor attention because this reduces the transaction costs of otherwise having to manage and interact with so many different donors.

In the context of the APSA, two approaches are applied. First, an example of the pooled approach is the UNDP pool for capacity-building due to end in 2006, but there are also smaller “pools”, such as Austria’s and Denmark’s cooperation on the APSA. With the end of UNDP pooled donor funding in sight, donors are looking for new and innovative approaches to pooling their efforts to support the AU. These donors include Germany, Sweden, Canada, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the EU. Harmonisation (after the UNDP pool ends) has not yielded any results, and complementarity can be identified only in the support for AMIS.

Second, donors have formalised information exchange mechanisms, both at headquarters and in situ. At meta level there are the quarterly or semi-annual Clearing House meetings, the first of which took place in May 2004. They are attended by senior officers from the USA, the EU and Canada for the exchange of information on security assistance in the African continent. The topics discussed cover a range of security issues, including the building of African military capacities. Half-yearly conferences of the G8 plus a few other interested donors are also held in Addis Ababa for the discussion of support for the AU.

The coordination mechanisms in Addis Ababa also focus on military issues, and in particular support for AMIS. They include the Partner Technical Support Group, chaired by the EU and comprising the political and military representatives of all interested actors, who meet to discuss support for AMIS. The donors who attend are Denmark, France, the UK, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, the USA, Canada, NATO and the UN. The group instructs a group of representatives known as the Liaison Group to meet representatives of the Darfur Integrated Task Force, the AU unit responsible for AMIS. The AU and donor representatives meet twice a week to offer AMIS direct support and to review the state of the mission on the ground. At these meetings, the EU represents the EU Member States.

Coordination among the Special Representatives of the USA, the EU and the AU in AMIS has also worked well.

As regards military capacity-building, the UK has initiated and organises regular meetings of military attachés for the discussion and coordination of support for the ASF, including the ASF workshops. Outside the military area, peace and security are discussed in one forum, which is chaired by the EU programme manager for the AU. This is a donor-AU forum, which covers all aspects of donor support for the AU. In March 2006 it was considering whether to form thematic subgroups, including one for peace and security.

In general, there is a tendency for donors to exchange information on activities and plans relating to peace and security, as the many meetings in situ prove. This makes for the transparency of donor activities in this field. However, the emphasis is on AMIS and building African military capacities. When it comes to the more development-oriented goals, such as civilian components of the ASF, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, examples of coordination are rarer. This may be so, of course, because the AU itself is more dynamic in the areas of military capacity and peacekeeping missions and its absorptive capacity in other areas is relatively low. Nevertheless, it is important for donors to ensure that efforts in all areas of support are pooled or at least harmonised (especially after the UNDP project ends) and that there is a division of labour when commitments extend to civilian components of the APSA.

Political interests may also explain why some donors, such as the USA and France, show rather less interest in coordination through harmonisation, complementarity or pooling, although they do attend coordination meetings in situ. The USA seems to base its support for the APSA first and foremost on its own interests, rather than on a division of labour and its comparative advantage. Although France has opened its RECOMP programme to African and European partners, it is reluctant to coordinate closely with other donors. The USA, the UK and France have formally agreed on a common approach in Africa, although it has resulted not in close coordination among the three donors, but rather in the absence of interference in each other's activities.

## 5.6 Demand-orientation and flexibility

Budget support would be the most demand-oriented type of support that donors could provide. It would allow the recipients to allocate their funds freely,

according to their needs rather than what donors are willing to fund. However, the AU's financial systems and the internal regulations of many donor countries do not inspire hope that budget support for the AU is imminent. Less demand-oriented support mechanisms might be in-kind or earmarked support for equipment or technical assistance. The defining characteristics here are reduced flexibility with regard to the service or product offered, especially if such contributions are not embedded in a strategy agreed with the partner.

An interim model until budget support becomes an option is exemplified by the Danish and EU approaches. Denmark's contribution to the APSA enjoys a good reputation with the AU and donors, even though its financial contributions are relatively low compared to those of other donors. Its flexible allocation of funds under its Africa Programme for Peace (2005-2009) allows it to hold regular, bi-annual consultations with the AU, at which the programme can be adjusted (DANIDA 2005, 18 f.). The programmatic approach, whereby money is allocated over a fixed period of time within the framework of a programme, makes funding reliable. This helps the AU to mobilise resources for areas not covered by Danish support. The EU also provides the AU with much sought-after assistance through the African Peace Facility, which is also programmatic and could cover a broad spectrum of support for the AU.

Donor approaches to demand-orientation differ widely. Although most donors claim to cater to the AU's needs, demand-orientation only really applies in the case of Denmark and the EU. It would indeed be possible for donors to be more demand-oriented without having to resort to budget support. This would mean providing flexible funding to meet AU needs (joint strategies and programmes) on a long-term basis.

## 5.7 Funding

Funding for the APSA is a challenge to donor support in two respects: first, the appropriate volume of support for the APSA has to be determined, and second, funding must be predictable. At the same time, the AU faces the challenge of ensuring the AU member states' ownership, which should also be reflected in their willingness to pay into the AU's operative budget more regularly.

A question that has arisen in the donor community and in Africa is whether it is justifiable to use funds set aside for development to address security challenges, be it for peacekeeping missions or military capacity-building. There are those who are opposed to using development instruments for security purposes. In Africa some countries ask why their development needs should be sacrificed to solve other countries' security problems. Is there a way out of this conundrum?

Donor countries or organisations concerned about using development funds for security purposes might begin by considering the option of setting up a new funding conduit specifically designed for security assistance. Relevant government departments (such as defence) in donor countries could serve as tributaries to the newly created security fund. Other (non-)state agencies with an interest in supporting security efforts would also contribute directly to this fund. Those interested in financing development would, in this case, continue to contribute through traditional development funding instruments.

The second option would be to create a security adjunct to existing development-funding instruments targeted specifically at peace and security. Donor countries and organisations would know, as and when they made contributions, that part of their development resources would be channelled into the security adjunct. A formula based on percentages or other technical considerations might be used as a means of determining the amount of funds to be earmarked for either security or development.

Whichever option is chosen, both development partners and African countries should bear in mind that financing security and development at the same time requires the donor community to commit more resources than it has traditionally done. Sharing existing resources between security and development can only lead to complaints from countries receiving development assistance that they are being neglected. The justifiability of using development-funding instruments for security purposes would also continue to be questioned in the donor community.

Another question that arises is how funding can be made predictable so as to ensure that the APSA, including the military options for action, is sustainable. At the same time, there are cases where donors have made commitments which they have not been able to honour when the time came. How can this kind of funding insecurity be addressed in the future?

Currently, support for peacekeeping missions includes multilateral-to-multilateral support (e. g. the EU's African Peace Facility), trust funds for particular missions as in the case of AMIS, bilateral arrangements (e. g. US support for AMIS) and military funding of/by African members states. When it comes to alternative funding for AU peacekeeping missions, UN-assessed contributions for peacekeeping missions by African regional organisations may be an option worth considering (Adebajo / Rashid 2004, 344). Especially in light of closer AU-UN cooperation, some authors argue that an agreement between the UN and African regional organisations must develop clear funding structures for regional peacekeeping operations in order to provide a regular and robust basis for UN assistance.

The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change suggests that the rules for the UN peacekeeping budget should be amended to give the UN an option on a case-by-case basis to finance regional operations: "the rules of the United Nations peacekeeping budget should be amended to give the United Nations the option, in very exceptional circumstances, to use assessed contributions to finance regional operations authorized by the Security Council, or the participation of regional organisations in multi-pillar peace operations under the overall United Nations umbrella" (High-level Panel 2004, 86).

Yet, while this may seem a predictable source of funding and hence the way of the future, there are important and partly restrictive implications. As Cilliers points out: "such missions can only be mandated through the UN Security Council. This arrangement would probably require that the regional organisation present and defend the budget for a particular mission to the UN Security Council working with and through the UNDPKO. Or, it might require that the regional organization establish the necessary oversight and financial accountability structures" (Cilliers 2005).

## **6 Conclusions**

The main question considered in the study is how development policy is contributing to the strengthening of the APSA. This section will summarise the most important findings of the study. Conclusions are drawn on three thematic areas. The first focus on the state of APSA, which is composed of the AU, acting as political coordinator, and the RECs, acting as implementing agencies. Civil society and regional powers are considered to be important factors of influence for this architecture. Secondly, we draw conclusions on

the characteristics of donor support for the APSA and indicate the major challenges that need to be addressed. Thirdly, there are conclusions on the role of development policy in the context of its nascent engagement in the field of peace and security. Lastly, we raise some questions for further research related to the subject of our study.

## 6.1 State of the APSA

The new African Peace and Security Architecture arose from the transformation of the OAU into the AU and has been reinforced by newly established continental and regional structures and by the political step of deploying peacekeeping missions. Institutionally, the APSA is in place or has at least been launched, although further development and implementation very much depend on the political will of the AU member states and sustained donor support, both financially and politically.

In general, the development of the APSA is proceeding well, despite the challenges the AU faces on several fronts. These challenges are partly due to its transformation from the OAU to a more dynamic and interventionist AU. The political dynamics among the AU's member states will be one of the main factors to determine whether it can promote good governance, stability and peace and security in Africa.

The AU has both made progress and faced challenges in developing the APSA. Activities suggesting positive change have been the AU's ability to act at political level to mandate peacekeeping missions, the steps it has taken to establish an African Standby Force and the ambitious political agenda it has set itself. Challenges that the AU faces consist in striking the right balance between establishing its structures and intervening in such emergency situations as Darfur to create stability. Furthermore, it may want to consider focusing more on conflict prevention and post-conflict issues to correct the current bias towards military capacity-building. Securing membership dues to the operative budget and the AU members' political ownership are two further formidable challenges, on which the AU's future hinges.

The African Peace and Security Architecture is still fragile and does not constitute a fully operational structure as such. One major problem is the relationship between the AU, RECs and NEPAD, which is still only in its infancy. The RECs, the AU's implementing agents, are very heterogeneous and at very different stages in the development of their peace and security mecha-

nisms. For functioning structures, all these interdependent elements must work together effectively.

Support from donors is indispensable to the APSA's future, and yet this is a time charged with political sensitivities. In such times, a 'wrong' political move by the AU may reduce donor enthusiasm for the APSA. A potential example of this was the debate surrounding the Sudanese Chairmanship of the AU.

## 6.2 External support

External support for the APSA is crucial and extensive, though with the focus on peace and security and, in this context, on military capacities and peace operations to the detriment of other AU programmes. Donors use a range of instruments and modes of delivery in support of the APSA, according to their national interests and internal peculiarities. Consequently, there is a great need for the coordination and harmonisation of their efforts. The debate on the UN takeover of AMIS shows that the *modus operandi* for future operations in general and the 'AU first, UN later' model in particular needs to be discussed further.

External support for the APSA from all policy areas (development, defence and foreign) is essential. Unless these policies pay increasing attention to peace and security, the African structures will be *de facto* incapacitated. Technical, financial and logistical support is crucial in terms of both establishing the APSA structurally and enabling peacekeeping operations to take place. External political pressure on and increased media attention to the AU can have the impact needed if it is to live up to its constitution and resolutions.

Generally speaking, donors will have to ask themselves whether supporting the AU's peace and security agenda without paying much attention to its other areas of engagement is a sensible long-term strategy. If donors do not want to create an AU that is primarily concerned with security issues in Africa, considerable catching up needs to be done if the AU is to be able to perform all its functions as intended.

The rise of the AU does not replace the need for UN engagement in Africa. There will therefore be a continued need for burden-sharing between the two institutions. In the area of peacekeeping, the 'AU first, UN later' approach is

likely to persist in the years to come, since it will take time for the AU to build up sufficient capacity. Discussions about the UN takeover of AMIS show that there is a need to consider whether the current modus operandi is a blueprint for future UN-AU cooperation. In general, the UN has complemented and supported AU missions and transmits its knowledge within the framework of establishing the African Standby Force. Scope for support remains in the context of establishing an AU-integrated missions capability sooner rather than later, so that the negative implications of such a two-tiered model can be avoided.

In their support for the APSA donors use a range of instruments, or modes of delivery, each with its distinct advantages and disadvantages. The way in which donors provide support shows, however, that important measures in the field of development, such as the pooling of resources and the harmonisation of standards and requirements have not been fully implemented. This may be due to the fact that the field of peace and security touches on the national interests of external actors and that donors are constrained by specific, internal rules and regulations. Hence the reluctance to pool resources or to institutionalise a ‘division of labour’ amongst donors in support of the APSA. While coordination on capacity-building for the APSA is weak, especially among the Regional Economic Communities, coordination efforts in respect of AMIS have been relatively strong.

External actors have focused mainly on building military capacity and funding/supporting the peacekeeping missions mandated by the AU (Burundi and Darfur). In part, this is also due to the AU, since reform dynamics seem to revolve around the AU’s Peace Support Divisions and the Darfur Integrated Task Force, both of which are responsible for peace support operations. Furthermore, owing to the internal and external political pressure on the AU to take action in emergency situations it has been difficult for both the AU and donors to pursue long-term development strategies.

### 6.3 Nexus management – the interaction of three policies

In supporting the APSA, foreign, defence and development policies must interact in some way, but there is no best overall solution. Generally, well coordinated and harmonised approaches are better than fragmented ones. The debate on nexus management is more of an issue on the donor than the African side.

There is a need for external actors to apply the competencies and strengths of all three policies – development, defence and foreign – in helping to construct a viable peace and security architecture in Africa. Notwithstanding this insight, it should be noted that, as these areas of competence cannot be neatly separated from each other, close collaboration, or what we call ‘nexus management’, is required. The nexus management models of external actors differ considerably, ranging from broadly integrated to more fragmented approaches. Owing perhaps to the absence of a tradition of cooperation among the policies in this field, several external actors are still struggling to manage this nexus. It is, after all, a field to which some actors are new in the African context, and it is certainly relatively new to the field of development as a whole. This problem will have to be tackled conceptually at a political level in the capitals of the donor countries and by the implementation structures in situ. Interestingly enough, the question of nexus management has not seemed to make a difference to the AU except where there has been competition for the same resources, as in cases where development funds are reallocated to peacekeeping missions.

#### 6.4 Other issues to be studied

Since the area of study is quite new, this section sets out areas for further policy research based on the findings presented here. These further issues could yield interesting and important results with regard to donor contributions to the APSA. Firstly, it would be interesting to find out whether individual donors’ nexus management has an effect on donor coordination and vice versa, i. e. does the way in which individual donors manage the nexus among three policies (development, defence and foreign) affect the way in which they interact with other donors and vice versa? Does a model where the three policies are remote from one another make it more difficult to coordinate with the donor community, for example? Could a division of labour among donors by thematic areas lead to a model of closer cooperation among individual donors’ policies? With further access at headquarters level to decision-making processes and strategies relating to support for the APSA, this question of the relationship between nexus management and donor coordination would be an interesting extension of the study.

Secondly, the question of the long-term funding mechanism, especially for peacekeeping missions, is important for further policy research. What might be the pros and cons of using UN-assessed contributions to assist the peace

support operations of regional organisations, including the AU and RECs? Could the disadvantages, political as well as financial, outweigh the possible benefits, so that it in fact continues to be better to mobilise resources from donors on an ad hoc basis or to count on the longevity of the EU's African Peace Facility?

Thirdly, ownership in the context of donor support for the APSA is a tricky and interesting question. It would be interesting to investigate systematically how and how far donors influence the AU's and RECs' peace and security agenda. If donor support was not tied to specific activities and conditions, would the AU's priorities and activities change significantly? The AU is institutionally frail because it is still at the stage of developing its concepts and strategies in the area of peace and security. It is therefore crucial to consider how donor influence at this level can be monitored. Another interesting aspect of this question is whether donor support has an effect on African ownership by actually reducing the commitment of African countries to the African Peace and Security Architecture.

Fourthly, there is the question whether best practices based on development principles, as outlined in the Paris Declaration, for example, and bilateral development cooperation can be transferred to all policies (defence and foreign) in their interaction with multilateral organisations such as the AU. Is it actually feasible and does it make sense to apply a set of best practices gleaned from the world of development to all external assistance for the APSA?

Lastly, there is room for a more detailed picture of how the nexus among the policies is managed at headquarters level in donor countries, since the study focuses mainly on nexus management in Addis Ababa. For example, is the absence of USAID at AU level a sign that it has no influence at all at strategy level? As USAID is also engaged in supporting the regional mechanisms, it needs to be asked whether our observations in Addis Ababa are actually due to the division of labour among the ministries under a single strategy. Since the study did not yield enough data on how decisions are made in capitals, this would be another option for further policy research.

## Glossary

**Aid:** “The words ‘aid’ and ‘assistance’ refer to flows which qualify as Official Development Assistance (ODA) or Official Aid (OA)” (OECD/DAC 2006).

**Alignment:** Donors base their overall support on partner countries, national development strategies, institutions and processes. Donors would progressively depend on partner countries’ own systems, providing capacity-building support to improve these systems, rather than establishing parallel systems of their own (OECD/DAC 2005b).

**Budget support:** Budget support is a financial contribution that is not earmarked for specific purposes.

**Co-deployment:** Co-deployment involves the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops alongside those of regional organisations. It is a military deployment or deployment of a field mission in conjunction with regional peacekeeping forces specifically authorised by the UN Security Council. As such, it covers a variety of operational activities, such as training and monitoring local police, protecting safe havens and maintaining humanitarian relief corridors, caring for internally displaced persons and refugees, monitoring protection of human rights, and providing development assistance. The most important examples in Africa have been the UN and ECOWAS co-deployments in Sierra Leone and Liberia (Francis et al. 2005, 52 f.).

**Commitment:** *“A firm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by the necessary funds, undertaken by an official donor to provide specified assistance to a recipient country or a multilateral organisation. Bilateral commitments are recorded in the full amount of expected transfer, irrespective of the time required for the completion of disbursements. Commitments to multilateral organisations are reported as the sum of (i) any disbursements in the year reported on which have not previously been notified as commitments and (ii) expected disbursements in the following year”* (OECD/DAC 2006).

**Complementarity** (also known as ‘division of labour’): Donors share sectors and thematic areas among themselves with a view to avoiding the crowding of donors in particular sectors and areas. The consequence is that donors usually end up concentrating on a limited number of sectors or areas and sometimes have to disengage from others.

**Conflict prevention:** Conflict prevention is the object of a wide range of policies and initiatives to avoid the outbreak of a dispute or its escalation into violence. This may include activities focused on preventive diplomacy or a more comprehensive approach that is defined as structural prevention. An example of preventive diplomacy is the coordination of planning to prevent the outbreak of conflict when humanitarian aid is delivered and during the process of development. Another example might be the creation of a mechanism to detect early warning signs and to record indicators that may help to predict impending violence. Longer-term structural approaches involve addressing the root causes of conflict. Conflict prevention encounters problems because it is extremely difficult to assess whether conflict prevention initiatives have been responsible for the failure of a conflict to happen (Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) 2006).

**Grant:** *“Transfers made in cash, goods or services for which no repayment is required”* (OECD/DAC 2006).

**Harmonisation:** Harmonisation should focus on upstream analysis, joint assessments, joint strategies, coordination of political engagement and practical initiatives such as the establishment of joint donor offices. It thus includes donors’ reporting, budgeting, financial management and procurement procedures (OECD/DAC 2005b).

**In-kind contributions:** A contribution is in kind if a donor provides the beneficiary with equipment rather than financial or technical support.

**Peace-building:** Peace-building is undertaken in the aftermath of conflict; it means identifying and supporting measures and structures which will consolidate peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to prevent a relapse into conflict; it often involves elections organised, supervised or conducted by the United Nations, the rebuilding of civil physical infrastructure and such institutions as schools and hospitals, and economic reconstruction (UN 2006a).

**Peace enforcement:** Peace enforcement was first mentioned in the “Agenda for Peace”. It denotes the mission of forces under Article 43 of the UN Charter to respond to outright aggression, imminent or actual. This task may exceed the mission of peacekeeping forces. Peace-enforcement units must therefore be more heavily armed than peacekeeping troops (Agenda for Peace 1992). According to the High-Level Panel report, peace enforcement forms

part of operations in which the robust use of force is integral to the mission from the outset (High-Level Panel 2004, 58).

**Peace-making** is a diplomatic process of brokering an end to conflict, principally through mediation and negotiation, as foreseen under Chapter VI of the UN Charter; military activities contributing to peace-making include military-to-military contacts, security assistance, shows of force and preventive deployments (UN 2006a).

**Peacekeeping** is a hybrid, politico-military activity aimed at conflict control, which usually involves the presence in the field of military and civilian personnel, with the consent of the parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces, etc.), and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) and/or to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief (UN 2006a).

**Peace support operations** include preventive deployments, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, diplomatic activities, such as preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-building, as well as humanitarian assistance, good offices, fact-finding and electoral assistance (UN 2006a).

**Political dialogue:** Exchange of views between two or more cooperating parties at policy or management level. The objective is to reach an understanding on issues relevant and sensitive to both sides and to organise the present and future relationship of the partners involved.

**Pooled support:** If donors pool their support, they combine their financial or technical support in one common basket administered by one actor, who is the one-stop agency for the partner.

**Post-conflict reconstruction** has long-term economic, political and social reconstruction as its goal. The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants plays a vital role in post-conflict reconstruction. Increasingly, it is understood that the mostly military-oriented tasks of disarmament and demobilisation will be successful only in combination with sustainable reintegration measures, which must be implemented in close cooperation with local partners and communities. More holistically, post-conflict reconstruction includes such activities as assisting with elections, establishing the rule of law and governance structures, improving human rights situations and other measures that are important for long-term democracy, stability and reconciliation.

**Official Development Assistance:** Grants or loans to countries and territories on the Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC) list of developing countries which are: (a) provided by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) on concessional financial terms (in the case of loans, having a grant (q.v.) element of at least 25 per cent). In addition to financial flows, technical cooperation (q.v.) is included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. For the treatment of forgiveness in the case of loans originally extended for military purposes, see Notes on Definitions and Measurement below (OECD/DAC 2005a).

**Ownership** is a measurement of the extent to which partners participate and take responsibility. It assesses whether all actors affected are involved in the planning and implementation of instruments and whether local institutions, resources and expertise are used sufficiently (OECD/DAC 2005a).

**Re-hatting** is a process in which regional or multinational forces have been deployed and are followed by a United Nations peacekeeping force (UN 2005d, 2).

**Responsibility to protect:** According to the High-Level Panel report, the responsibility to protect entails recognition that the issue is not any state's "right to intervene" but its "responsibility to protect" when its people suffer as a result of an avoidable catastrophe – mass murder, rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion, terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease. Sovereign governments have the primary responsibility to protect their own citizens from such catastrophes. When they are unable or unwilling to do so, that responsibility is assumed by the wider international community (High-Level Panel 2004, 56). The responsibility to protect has three dimensions: responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react and responsibility to rebuild. Military intervention should be considered only when preventive options have been exhausted (Government of Canada 2006a).

**Technical cooperation** includes both (a) grants to nationals of aid recipient countries receiving education or training at home or abroad and (b) payments to consultants, advisers and similar personnel and to teachers and administrators serving in recipient countries (including the cost of associated equipment). Assistance of this kind provided specifically to facilitate the implementation of a capital project is included without distinction among bilateral project and programme expenditures and is not identified separately as technical cooperation in statistics of aggregate flows (OECD/DAC 2006).

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