Towards a Joint Africa-Europe Partnership Strategy

Issue Paper II

Setting the Agenda

ECDPM, Maastricht (Netherlands), December 2006

Background

1. Africa and Europe have a long history of dialogue that has occurred at many levels and taken many forms. It is only in the last decade, however, as each continent has become more united, and started to project a more unified image to the external world that this dialogue has really taken on the characteristic of a political dialogue between two pan-continental political entities on each side. This newest level of dialogue is thus added on top of the huge variety of existing dialogues at national and sub-regional levels, between official instances and between non state actors. Issue Paper 2 traces the main outlines of this history and brings out the richness and diversity of this dialogue.

2. This official 'continental level' dialogue is now expected to enter a new phase, which builds on this history, but takes it further with the intention of giving new momentum to the collaboration between these two old neighbours. It is hoped that the vision for this future collaboration will be formalised in some form of joint statement or strategy for cooperation at the planned 2nd EU-Africa Summit to be held in late 2007 in Lisbon.

3. Since the first EU-Africa Summit in Cairo in 2000 both Africa and Europe have changed. There are new political institutions on both sides of the Mediterranean and a new drive to work together. Times have also changed. Globalisation has moved forward rapidly and we have all become more conscious of our mutual interdependence. Security issues have moved up the agenda since 9/11, but with global agreements like the UN’s Millennium Declaration we have also all become more aware and committed to working together to tackle the extremes of poverty and opportunity that divide us. New institutions, new times and new challenges imply the need for new strategies and new solutions, but these must also be built on experience and the lessons learnt in the past if we are to move forward.
The need for a Public Consultation

4. The AU and EU institutions have thus strengthened and developed their dialogue and now as they approach this 2nd Summit it is important for them both to make it more concrete and to check it with concerned stakeholders on both continents. Hence the need for this public consultation process that will build up over the year ahead, collecting ideas from civil society organisations, other official bodies, parliamentarians, etc. and delivering them to the authorities on each side for inclusion where possible in the officials documents. There will then also be a need to react and comment on the proposals coming out of the official process as it also gathers steam and moves stage by stage towards the Summit. Ideally as the official negotiation moves forward step by step it will be nourished and enriched with ideas from the public consultation, but it will also throw points back to the public domain for more detailed debate and thinking. The joint strategy that emerges from this process should therefore not just be a strategy for officials, but also one to which civil society on both continents can relate, contribute and support in their own work.

5. Africa and Europe are also moving closer together as globalisation gathers pace. Many Africans live in Europe and vice versa. There is a constant flow of exchanges at all levels: in trade, academia, information and knowledge flows, tourism, migration, politics, finance, etc. etc. Although there are clearly differences of perspective and divergences of attitude, it is rare that it is really possible to talk about a specific ‘African view’ or ‘European view’ on any one subject. Opinions on different subjects also vary hugely within both continents. It is thus more a question of levels of consensus or that a particular point of view is defended by groups of actors on both continents while others on each continent disagree. In other words agreement and disagreement, more often than not, transcend geographical and continental boundaries. All the more important therefore that, as a joint African-European strategy for the development of Africa is constructed, many different views and interests are heard.

Key Issues as a Starting Point for Discussion

6. The starting point for the consultation is therefore to focus on the four clusters of topics into which officials on both sides have found it most convenient to group the wide variety of issues that are relevant to the collaboration between the two continents and could be included in any joint strategy for cooperation. These are:

- Peace & Security
- Governance, Democracy and Human Rights
- Trade & Regional Integration
- Key Development Issues
7. This is of course only one possible starting point and very quickly we can expect other issues to come up. The officials themselves will gradually become clearer in the more detailed content they foresee for the strategy and will be able to explain their evolving ideas to the public consultation.

8. There are also existing documents on both sides that cover much of the ground from the point of view of one or other side. The EU, at the official level of the European Council, has already approved a year ago in December 2005, the EU Strategy for Africa. The AU for its part also adopted in the NEPAD document of 2001 a set of proposals for what it expects from international partners. More recently it has formulated strategies for what it seeks to obtain from its dealings with the ‘emerging powers’ such as China, Brazil and India. There have also been other initiatives to encourage joint reflection between Africans and Europeans such as the Commission for Africa initiative of UK premier Tony Blair in the run-up to the 2005 G8 Summit in Gleneagles. There is thus a solid basis for reflection on both sides in addition to the on-going discussion AU and EU officials have had together in the Cairo process.

9. At other levels EU Member States have cooperation agreements with individual African governments. Civil society organisations, such as NGOs, trade unions or faith based organisations on both continents also agree common cooperation strategies with their respective counterparts. These agreements and strategies can also provide a wealth of ideas from which to build a common strategy for promoting development in Africa. Indeed there is even a question, raised, for instance, by members of African and European civil society, about what is the added value of having a new strategy given the existing documents that already regulate and guide Africa-Europe relations, i.e. the EU Strategy towards Africa and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. The consultation process should thus also serve to clarify the purpose and value-added of a joint Strategy for Africa.

10. This wide variety of sources and potential views should however be able to relate relatively easily to the four very broad ‘clusters’ of the official dialogue. Annexed to the current paper are four notes relating to each of these clusters which identify some of the major current issues that could form the core of the debate. They do not pretend to be comprehensive views of these subject areas, but simply seek to raise a few key issues and questions. They are therefore intended to act as the starting point of the consultation to get the ball rolling.

**Differences of Approach among Actors**

11. A wide variety of different topics are likely to be brought forward in the dialogue between Europe and Africa in different ways and with different emphases by different groups of actors. In addition to trying to narrow down the field of discussion to key topics, the consultation and official dialogue will also have to consider divergences of approach. The way each actor involved
will see any one topic will also vary. Similar matters will be viewed through from different angles and this will also lead to variations in the order of priorities.

Differences of approach towards one theme among various actors

12. Similar themes and problems as well as the way to tackle them are perceived in different ways by the various European and African stakeholders. There is often limited disagreement on the substance, but rather divergences over the approach that needs to taken to various questions. For example:

**Economic development or poverty eradication**

13. Few actors involved in the development sector would disagree this is a fundamental agenda point for cooperation between Africa and Europe. Yet if one examines official pronouncements many African documents on the subject tend to emphasize growth and economic development first, whereas Europeans, both official and non-government, often stress the need to focus first and foremost on the eradication of poverty. Thus although Africa’s economic development is advocated by both European and African actors as a key priority, it is not always approached from the same angle. The African Union as well as the RECs and African Member States seek to address the economic development of the continent in its entirety, trying to tackle issues such as unemployment, particularly for the large numbers of unemployed African youth, the promotion of growth, infrastructure development, the industrialization of the continent and the avoidance of exportation of unprocessed agricultural and mineral commodities from Africa. On the other hand, the European institutional view of Africa’s economic development is far more based on the international consensus on the eradication of poverty and the need to reach the Millenium Development Goals, although there is of course also a willingness to work on other issues as is evident in the recently announced by the EU Partnership for Infrastructure. This is not to say therefore that these two views are opposed, but rather to show that although views on the substance are closely intertwined, the approach to tackle them may differ.

14. Other topics can also illustrate this question of differences of approach to the same issue.

**Trade and regional development**

15. In trade at an official level the EU is keen to see the creation of regional free-trade zones in order to stimulate regional trade and growth with the negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements being a push factor. Africans have long been interested in the potential of regionalization for promoting growth and development but they have reservations over the real value of EPAs to push this regional approach. There are also major divergences of views inside Europe in this area with many NGOs and people in the development sector having serious reservations about the official EU line on EPAs.
Migration

16. The migration debate is another example of a topic that is of clear concern to both Europeans and Africans for different reasons. European politicians and officials have to face a debate that is fuelled by high levels of media coverage of migrants crossing the sea to Europe and populist fears of ‘foreigners swamping Europe’ which leads to strong pressures from public opinion. The debate in Europe thus started from an angle that focussed strongly on security and immigration control issues and only later moved to seeing migration in a more positive way recognising the benefits migrants might bring to Europe and the need to also look at consequences it can have in terms of development on the migrants’ countries of origin. In Africa on the other hand the debate has all along been more focused on the causes of migration, the risk of loosing capacities in terms of highly qualified human resources (‘brain drain’) and the strong link to development not only through increased funding but also through assistance towards the creation of further economic opportunities. The results of the recent AU-EU conference on migration and development in Tripoli illustrate these differences of view as well as the middle ground that has been found between both parties.

Peace and Security

17. This is another area where solid common ground among the main stakeholders has largely been found, but where some differences of approaches can still be highlighted. An overriding concern expressed by many Africans in the security debate has been the wish for Africa to handle its security problems itself without systematic involvement of foreign troops on its soil, apart from interventions from the United Nations. The Rwandan genocide was a turning point that convinced many of the need for Africa to build up the capacity to tackle its own security problems so that it would not have to rely on the slow and divided reactions of the international community. Indeed, this has been one of the key motivating forces behind the building up of the AU’s capacity in the peace and security sector. Both Africans and Europeans are of course also concerned by the consequences of conflict and security issues in general on African development. In addition however the EU has a specific concern with its own security and wants to see adequate attention paid to conflicts taking place in the regions that border Europe as, if they are left unattended, they can spill over and affect Europe directly. Thus Europe and Africa do not necessarily speak with one voice on such sensitive issues, although they share the same concern with the need to promote peace and stability. These differences of approach have certainly not prevented them from finding good common ground, with for instance the funding of the African Peace Facility from the European Development Fund (EDF).

Governance Issues

18. The good governance debate also shows divergences while there is equally a strong drive to seek out common ground. The approach differs among the various actors. For instance, on rights issues, if Europeans are mobilised by strong lobbies that defend individual human rights, Africans tend to speak more of group or people’s rights as clearly illustrated by the very name of the
African Court of Human and People’s Rights. Neither Africans nor Europeans would deny the other view, but the angle from which they tend to see the issue differs. The case of Zimbabwe also shows divergences of view on how best to tackle governance issues though all would agree that it is important to end the suffering of ordinary Zimbabweans. Africa is in fact seeking to build up and strengthen its own conception of governance through initiatives at various levels ranging from the African Peer Review mechanism at the pan-African level to more local and decentralized initiatives by a multiplicity of non state actors. In Europe the all-encompassing notion of governance has become an imperative in European relations with third countries while still conflicting with other strategic and economic interests.

Prioritization by different actors

19. The key issues from among the four ‘clusters’ that AU and EU officials use as their agreed framework for the EU-Africa dialogue will clearly be at the core of the debate around the negotiation of a joint EU-AU Partnership Strategy although priorities may vary. As indicated above, these issues are covered in four separate short annexes to this paper.

20. From an EU point of view the priorities in its partnership with Africa have been expressed in the EU Strategy for Africa approved by the European Council of December 2005. It covers all the main themes identified in the four clusters of the EU-Africa dialogue, but it is also an expression of Europe’s willingness to establish an overall coherence framework for its relations towards Africa that would serve as a coordination tool among its own institutional actors, that is the European Commission, the Council Secretariat, and the European Member States. This political expression of these institutions willingness to work together in support of a common project is an important feature and asset of this Strategy.

21. On top of these agreed priorities, other issues are strongly emphasized by some key African actors such as the African Union Commission, some Regional Economic Communities or some African States. These issues are also by and large acknowledged by the European Union but they are not always given the same emphasis on the European side. It is worth dwelling briefly on some of the more important among these issues as some of them are fundamental to achieving a common strategy:

- Ownership is a fundamental concern for all African actors in every theme: peace and security, governance and development. It is also a principle regularly acknowledged by the EU and most recently in its Africa Strategy. It is a principle that is part of the international consensus on development cooperation translated through the Paris Declaration for instance. In the African context, this has been a core reason for the creation of the African Union and the NEPAD programme. Africa has also specified on several occasions its desire for a real and balanced partnership with its international partners and no longer a donor-recipient relationship. As one
of the key principles therefore, ownership should apply in a cross cutting manner to all themes covered in the Strategy. However, applying this principle is not always easy for the EU for various reasons, not least because it wants to see progress in development work, make a useful contribution and it needs to account to tax payers for the manner in which ODA is used. This therefore leads to the basic question of:

How should ownership be addressed in a consistent manner?

- **How can the EU treat Africa as one?** EU’s relations with Africa are influenced by history as well as by various strategic and geopolitical concerns. These links between Europe and Africa are structurally embedded in the EU-Africa relationship and are translated through the existing agreements between the European Union and Africa. Three agreements, that translate into three different financial instruments on the European Community side, define the official relationship between these two continents and reflect the various European priorities with Africa:
  
  - **The Cotonou Partnership Agreement** between all of sub-Saharan Africa (except South Africa) and the European Union
  - **The Barcelona Process** now translated into the European Neighborhood Policy with Northern African countries
  - **The Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement** with South Africa which has recently been complemented by an EU Strategy for South Africa

22. This split is also reflected at the institutional level both within the European Commission, with the division between DG Development dealing with the relationship with sub-Saharan Africa and DG RELEX dealing with relations with Northern Africa. The complex of the general European institutional construct and its numerous actors (Council Secretariat, European Commission, European Member States) further adds to the complexity of the Europe-Africa relationship and also raises the question of the coordination among these various actors. This fractioned relationship is reflected in the various themes and instruments used by the European Community to support the African Union. If the EC has put an emphasis on instruments that can support pan-African perspectives, the different logics and priorities defined in the different agreements remain. The EU Strategy for Africa has been the first attempt to define an overall European Strategy towards Africa. In that sense it is already a response to requests from the AU as voiced for instance by the Commissioner for Peace & Security Said Djinnit who has regularly brought out in his speeches that “Europe likes to look at Africa in a fragmented manner”. A key question is thus:
23. Overall coherence of EU’s relations with Africa. The European Commission and the Member States all have relations at three institutional levels in Africa: pan-African, sub-regional and national. Various links also exist between different actors in Europe and in Africa: civil society organisations, private sector, faith based organisations, professional institutions, trade unions, local governments etc. All these relationships create a complex setting, the aim of which is not necessarily consistency – since various organisations represent different interests. However it is important to keep in mind this wider picture while triggering the dialogue on the future joint Strategy as well as to examine whether synergies could be improved. Looking at the institutional relationships between European and African actors, questions of consistency and complementarity are raised by African actors. Indeed the relationship between Europe and the various Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are partly dependant on the EPA (Economic Partnership Agreement) agenda. The programming of the EU support to the African Union and to the RECs is not handled as one exercise but as several which, although attempts are made to overcome this disunity, therefore places obstacles in the way of African partners seeking to achieve a consistent overview on the division of tasks and funding between the AU and the RECs. This is therefore another fundamental question:

How can this fragmented Europe-Africa relationship be overcome to enter into a continent to continent relationship as desired by the African Union?

Conclusion

As can be seen from the above ‘Setting the Agenda’ for this public consultation on the formulation of a joint Africa-European strategy for partnership is not a simple straightforward matter. There is a need to understand how the public consultation fits in with the official dialogue and negotiation process, and to understand what the value-added of new joint strategy can be. Once the topic areas have been defined on the basis of what the official process has reached in terms of
structuring their dialogue, there is then also a need to recognise that even though they agree on the basic content to be covered, different actors can have different approaches to the same topic and are likely to see a need for a different order of priority.

As indicated above the four attached annexes provide a brief and hopefully accessible overview of some of the key issues that can be highlighted in the public discussion at least to off start the consultation.
Peace and security issues became more important in the political dialogue between the EU and African countries/organizations in the mid-90s, albeit timidly and amid African concerns of aid and cooperation being diverted from their fundamental economic and development priorities. At the EU-Africa Summit in Cairo, in April 2000, peace-building, conflict prevention, management and resolution (including issues like Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), terrorism, small arms and light weapons, anti-personal mines, non-proliferation and post-conflict reconstruction) were considered one of the main priorities for dialogue and cooperation.

These issues were also included in the Cotonou agreement of June 2000 (article 11), under the political dimensions of the EU-ACP partnership, which proved to be instrumental for the possibility of using EDF funds to finance the African Peace Facility (APF), created in 2003.

At present, peace and security is considered a top priority in EU-Africa relations reflecting the increasing convergence of thinking in this area. Both Africans and Europeans acknowledge the close link between security and development and have agreed to step up cooperation and coordination in international fora (UN, G8, WB) and with other donors (e.g. Canada, US) to support African efforts to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa. Their main focus remains addressing the root causes of conflict and instability, but European and African efforts have also been focusing on the need to address the whole cycle of conflict and peace, from prevention to peacekeeping and to post conflict relief, rehabilitation and development.

Progress in this area has been substantial, at least in terms of political, and increasingly also financial, commitments, but also been hampered by political and capacity problems at both European and African level. On the EU side, considerable efforts have been made to develop an integrated approach to conflict prevention, but also to post-conflict reconstruction (e.g. improving the links
between relief, rehabilitation and development; developing a policy framework for DDR and Security Sector Reform (SSR), as well as targeting issues like arms trade, use of natural resources) and to develop financial and operational means for crisis management both within the EU and in support of African efforts, namely the creation of the APF, the financial and technical support to the AU and CEMAC peace operations in Darfur and in Central African Republic, the support for African capacity-building for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and for the institutional development of African continental and regional organizations.

On the African side, the creation of the AU and the adoption of NEPAD have given a very significant boost to a much more ambitious and engaged pan-African agenda and dialogue with the EU. The AU and African regional organizations’ show of political will and determination to tackle conflicts in the region (sometimes at high human cost), taking a leading role in some regional and international peace efforts (e.g. the AU in Darfur), has also been decisive in achieving more committed international attention and support. The AU is in charge of implementing the coordination of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), a framework for security arrangements on the African continent. It agreed in 2002 to create the Peace and Security Council (PSC) as “a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts” and as a “collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa”. What indicators would trigger the involvement of the PSC is still under discussion. Support for the PSC is provided by the AU Commission, a Panel of the Wise, and a continental early warning system (based on early warning systems existing in sub-regional organizations), and an African Standby Force and a Special Fund or Peace Fund are being built up. The African Standby Force (ASF), with up to 25,000 personnel within five regional brigades, is designed to be a continental military intervention force capable of rapid reaction by 2010. The AU and the RECs, with the support of the EU, G8 countries and other AU partners are preparing five ASF policy formulation workshops intended to define the force’s Doctrine, Command, Control and Information Systems, Logistics, Training and Evaluation and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). The EU will act as lead support partner from the donor countries’ group for the Doctrine and SOP workshops, each REC hosting one of the workshops. The AU is also engaging and requesting international support for the development of its efforts in a series of related issues like capacity-building, post-conflict reconstruction and development, and terrorism.
Challenges

Europe has stepped up its efforts for a common vision and policy framework for Africa with the adoption of the Strategy for Africa. It is in the process of developing tools to strengthen coherence and coordination of policies, resources and instruments at the EU level (Council, CE and MS), e.g. the EU concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, EU Concepts for DDR and SSR. However, assuring consistency between community and MS policies and actions in Africa depends more on the political will and the 'state of European integration' rather than on policies or instruments. How far EU Member States are willing to go in this process is to be seen.

The need for African ownership of the process of developing the African peace and security architecture, including in the ongoing needs assessment by the AU and African SROs for capacity-building for conflict prevention, management and resolution and the elaboration of the concept for the future African Stand-by Forces is regularly underlined. However, EU support to that process seems to be more of an exercise of 'striking a balance' between African ownership and the urgent need of African capabilities to rise up to the challenges they face in many parts of Africa on the one hand, and the speed at which the EU can deliver on its own agenda for Africa on the other which is partly dependent on its own political integration process.

There are also questions on how effectively peace and security issues can be dealt with at a continental level in such a diverse region as Africa. How is the principle of subsidiarity to be applied in the African peace and security architecture? With regard to the ASF’s regional structures, the AU is expected to have a key leadership role in ensuring coherence, harmonization and uniformity. However, in practice, no specific accord has been reached regarding the division of responsibilities and political control between organizations, due to lack of agreement between the AU and the RECs.

The EU has agreed to strengthen and replenish the APF with 300M€ from the 10th EDF (2008-10), but more flexible and long-term resources are needed to complement it. How willing are Africans to mobilize own financial resources in addition to European and international donors financial support? The AU Peace Fund is its sole autonomous source of funding. However, at the present time it consists only of a 6% contribution taken out of the annual AU budget (currently running at about 63 million US dollars, minus an estimated 12 million in annual unpaid membership dues) and direct contributions by donors. International donors, EU included, should also rationalize and increase their financial support, but does the AU have the adequate financial systems in place to manage increased donor funding?
Questions

1. How best can the EU contribute to reducing conflict in Africa: by providing support to AU or sub-regional peacekeeping operations and building up African capacity to prevent and manage conflict? Or through the UN and in support of UN missions? Or by other means?

2. How do you feel about EU financial support to the AU peacekeeping operation in Darfur (Sudan)? Should the EU provide such support to the AU more often? Should it provide other forms of support? And if so, which type of support?

3. How do you feel about the EU military mission in DRC in support of the UN mission during the elections period?

4. How do you see EU Member States military operations/interventions in Africa? Do you see them as linked in any way to a comprehensive European policy towards Africa?

5. What is in your perspective the value-added of the EU in engaging in peace and security work in Africa?

6. What are, according to your knowledge of a specific country/region in Africa, the main causes of instability and conflict in that country/region? How best could the EU and the AU and African sub-regional organisations tackle such root causes?

7. In your perspective, should conflicts in Africa be dealt with by African forces or rather an international/UN force? Why? What are the advantages and disadvantages of having African forces dealing with conflicts in Africa?
Annex II

Governance, Democracy and Human Rights

Context

Governance, democracy and human rights have recently been placed high on the Euro-African agenda. The 2005 UN Millennium Declaration specifically emphasises the importance of good governance to meet the objectives of development and poverty eradication.1 The Commission for Africa2 shared the same opinion. But back in 2000, the ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement - that was signed for 20 years - already emphasised democracy and human rights as essential elements. Governance was seen as fundamental, and defined as “the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development.”3 Since then, numerous initiatives have been taken in Africa as well as in Europe.

The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) states that promoting democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance shall be one objective of the Union.4 Some 26 African countries, representing 75% of Africa’s population, have so far signed up to an initiative by the AU’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) programme to establish an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) - where a country puts itself forward for scrutiny by its peers to help identify its weaknesses and the actions needed to correct them. This mechanism is supported by the EU, which also took several initiatives to promote governance, democracy and human rights. One of the most recent ones is the Governance Initiative, which – among other things – proposes to grant additional financial support to countries adopting or ready to commit themselves to a plan

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1 See UN Millennium Declaration. Available at: http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf
2 Jointly composed by Africans and Europeans, the Commission for Africa released recommendations in March 2005, to achieve the goal of a strong and prosperous Africa. See: http://www.commissionforafrica.org/
4 Article 3, paragraph 1, g of the AU Constitutive Act, signed in July 2000. Available at: http://www.africa-union.org/About_AU/Constitutive_Act.htm
that contains ambitious, credible measures and reforms. On the path towards a Euro-Africa Partnership which should be endorsed at a possible EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon, several challenges regarding governance, democracy and human rights might nevertheless still need to be faced.

**Challenges**

In seeking to develop a joint strategy to promote governance, democracy and human rights, African and European partners will be confronted by the lack of a common understanding on what ‘governance’ means and entails. The EC, EU member states, African states, and increasingly also non-state actors are still struggling to reach a common comprehension of this relatively new and politically sensitive notion. The debate is ongoing in Europe as well as in Africa, where ‘home-grown visions’ on legitimate governance increasingly emerge.

Another challenge will be to jointly develop a shared governance agenda through genuine and balanced dialogue. Fears exist that ‘governance’ programmes will be used by the international community to impose governance models or as a new set of conditionalities (rather than as the base for a new partnership based on mutual accountability). This would erode the value of governance as a process of societal transformation, to be driven by local actors.

It also remains challenging to define what the specific role of each stakeholder is in the joint EU-African efforts to promote governance, democracy and human rights. The role of non-state actors (NSAs) has already been recognised for a long time. Yet, what is the comparative advantage of Northern and Southern NSAs? How can the EU best support NSAs? Relations between Africa and Europe are rooted in history. Yet, what is the EU added value in supporting governance in Africa compared to emerging powers like China? How can donors harmonise their approaches, building on complementarity for better aid effectiveness? At the African level, how can the AU, sub-regional communities, states and non-state actors best interact to promote governance?

It is acknowledged that the prime responsibility for governance in Africa lies with Africans themselves. However, external factors also have an important influence. This implies that the EU should also commit itself to governance principles in its support to Africa, ensuring consistency amongst its different policies (trade and governance for example) and towards its different partners (whether in Africa or elsewhere). This is the challenge of the so-called ‘aid governance’ and of mutual accountability, since success in supporting governance requires a global approach.

Another main challenging issue is the way to enforce agreed governance commitments. Commitments made are essential, but how to be sure that they

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would be respected? The African Union, the RECs, Parliaments, Courts of justice and civil society certainly have a decisive role to play for day-to-day scrutiny and oversight. How can these domestic institutions of political and civil society best be supported from the outside?

**Questions**

1. What does governance mean and what does it entail? What are the European and African agendas and priorities? To what extent are they common or complementary?

2. How can actors from political society like Parliaments, Courts of justice and civil society best encourage good governance? How can the EU best support them?

3. What role can non-state actors play in the promotion of governance? What are the comparative advantages of Northern and Southern NSAs? How can they best be supported by the EU? What do they think about the tendency to support States towards budget support as a preferential arrangement for promoting governance?

4. What is the added value of Europe in supporting governance in Africa, especially in the light of the emergence of new powers like China and Brazil?

5. How can the idea that the EU itself should respect good governance principles in its support to African partners be put into practice? How can mutual accountability be implemented?
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Annex III
Trade and Regional Integration

Context

Building on its own historical experience, the EU has placed trade and regional integration at the heart of its development strategy towards Africa. But, African leaders have also strongly advocated regionalism as a route towards sustainable development and poverty alleviation for a long time.

The Abuja Treaty (1991) conceived the African regional economic communities (RECs) as the building blocks of the African Economic Community (AEC). The AEC was merged with the OAU and formally became part of the African Union when the latter was established in 2001. The RECs are expected to contribute towards achieving the AEC’s objectives of accelerated economic growth, competitiveness in the global economy, self-reliant and self-sustained development, as well as raising the standard of living of African peoples, maintaining and sustaining economic stability and fostering close and peaceful relations among Member States. However, many African countries belong to more than one of these regional groupings, some of which therefore have overlapping membership and in some cases conflicting objectives and obligations. The AU has recently taken up the difficult task of the rationalisation of the RECs.

While African nations tend to consider trade liberalisation and regional integration as necessary yet far from sufficient conditions to fostering development and alleviating poverty, the EU argues that regional integration is a key requirement for the development of Africa. For the EU, regional integration will bring about peace, security and stability to the region, enable the creation of broader regional markets for African producers, lock-in necessary economic reforms, stimulate economic growth and accelerate the integration of African countries in the world economy. The trade agreements negotiated and concluded by the EU in the recent years all go in this direction, as demonstrated by the Barcelona process with Mediterranean countries (MEDA) including Northern Africa, as well as the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa. As for the non-reciprocal preferences granted by the EU under the Lomé Conventions (now the Cotonou Partnership Agreement), they are destined to disappear, in conformity to the rules established at the multilateral level within the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Indeed, since 2002, the EU and the ACP regional groupings, of which four are
African, have been negotiating towards the establishment of a new trade regime. These WTO-compatible Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) are envisaged as development-oriented free trade agreements between regional groups of ACP countries and the EU and should be concluded by the end of 2007.

**Challenges**

In pursuing this agenda, a key challenge for the EU will be to strike a careful balance between stimulating the creation of effective regional markets and respecting the autonomous regional integration agenda of Africa.

In a broader sense, another major challenge facing European and African partners in their trade relations is the need to go beyond market access issues and also create a business environment that is conducive to investment while at the same time contributing effectively to sustainable development and poverty alleviation. In other words, trade should not be considered as an end in itself, but as a means towards a broader development agenda.

Regional markets will be a pivotal aspect to this process and to fully meet the development objectives, it is crucial that they are supported by appropriate and effective institutions to monitor the process leading towards their creation, and in the long-run their successful implementation.

In addition to ensuring effective institutional capacity, constraints that are related to physical infrastructure, human capital, access to information, knowledge and technology (as well as ICT networks), access to credit and other business support services will also need to be addressed, as well as any other impediment to the efficient production and distribution of products within Africa and with Europe, in order to build Africa’s capacity to produce, diversify and export.

To achieve this goal, and closely intertwined with this challenge, is the Aid for Trade debate that has been ongoing at both the WTO and the EPA levels. The Aid for Trade initiative recognizes the developing countries’ needs for financial assistance to be able to effectively take advantage of the potential benefits of trade liberalisation and to facilitate their integration into the multilateral trading system. The question as to how to ensure effective, timely and efficient delivery of these resources however remains unclear.
Questions

1. Regional integration has done a lot to promote growth and prosperity in Europe. How can the EU most effectively support regional integration in Africa?

2. How best can African and EU trade policies be organised and coordinated so as to effectively promote sustainable development and contribute to poverty eradication?

3. What best can AU and EU authorities do to promote sustainable investment in Africa?

4. How can the EU support African initiatives and strengthen the capacity to export and make initiatives such as Aid for Trade, NEPAD and the rationalisation of RECs effective?

5. What initiatives should Africa take towards sustainable development and poverty alleviation and to have the capacity to seize new trade opportunities?

6. How can Africa ensure that gains from trade and regional integration are distributed in an equitable manner and conducive to poverty alleviation?
Context

Some of Africa’s most longstanding and established international partners are European Member States and the European Commission. Though others such as the USA, Japan and now China are also important partners, more than 50% of ODA to Africa currently comes from the European Union including through the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and its financial instrument the EDF or European Development Fund. There is thus a solid tradition of cooperation on development and a rich history of dialogue and debate on approaches and modalities. Africans and Europeans active in development work, be it at an official level or in the private sector, civil society or other organisations, therefore already know a lot about what each other think on these subjects even though assessments and approaches may differ.

Defining a common strategy to work together for Africa’s development can therefore build on past experience and discussion can focus in quickly on key themes. Over the past 5 years in the ‘Cairo process’, African and European officials have grouped a number of what they identified as the ‘Key Development Issues’ into one cluster for the dialogue. This forms a good basis for further debate. The cluster includes:

- Financing & External Debt
- Migration
- Investing in People (including Health, Education, Labour markets & decent work, Promotion of gender equality & women’s empowerment, Agriculture, Environment & climate change, and Information & communication technology)
- Infrastructure
Challenges

Each of these key areas raises different challenges and stakeholders have a variety of views. Some of the outstanding issues in each area include:

Financing & External Debt

One of the prominent issues in this area is high and unsustainable debt. The EU, in its Strategy for Africa, proposes to continue supporting the HIPC\(^6\) process and expects to provide up to €42 billion in debt relief for Africa in this way. However, according to the World Bank\(^7\) some countries that have benefited from the HIPC Initiative are now sliding back into debt and civil society actors and African governments feel more needs to be done. Better progress is being made on increasing ODA levels. The EU as a whole is currently on track to achieve the annual targets it has set itself for ODA to reach 0.7\% of GNI by 2015. This target includes a doubling of aid to Africa and there is considerable debate on how best to channel these additional funds when capacity constraints are already a problem in the management of current aid levels. Direct budget support, whereby EU contributions are paid directly into partner country national budgets, is one obvious solution which is gradually being used more, but EU Member States remain wary of such an approach.

Migration

The plight of African migrants seeking to reach Europe in small ill-equipped boats has attracted considerable attention over the past couple of years prompting an on-going debate between officials and politicians on both continents. At a recent EU-Africa conference on migration and development in Tripoli governments agreed to address the root causes of migration such as the lack of employment in many African countries through better targeted development policies and by ensuring that policies in other areas such as trade, agriculture and fisheries did not exacerbate migration. They also agreed to provide assistance to African countries for the management of both South-South and South-North migratory movements. However, many African governments feel that insufficient resources are available for this vital development work. Another of their concerns is the protection of their migrants in Europe.

At the same time Europe’s ageing population also means it will increasingly need skilled workers in various sectors. This opens up opportunities for individuals willing to travel and through flows of remittances can produce benefits for the communities back in Africa from which they come. However, care needs to be taken to ensure that these movements of people do not result in ‘brain-drain’ in

\(^6\) HIPC: Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, supplemented recently by the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, is an international programme managed by the International Finance Institutions that encourages better management of public finances and rewards qualifying nations with step by step debt cancellation.

\(^7\) Unsustainable debt threat for African states – report; 7 June 2006. AllAfrica.com
sectors vital for African economies and finding ways of managing migration and encouraging the circulation of skilled and professional workers are thus important to both continents.

**Investing in People**

This theme is intended to cover development programmes in a variety of different socio-economic areas which both Africans and Europeans generally agree are vital. Supporting programmes in health and education are key to radically reducing poverty levels and achieving the MDGs; but so also are steps to encourage employment and develop agriculture. Promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment in all sectors is vital. The poor are also the first to suffer environmental degradation and climate change is already affecting the availability of key resources such as water. Energy costs are equally becoming a serious problem in many countries. While European stakeholders perhaps tend to prioritise poverty eradication programmes, African actors are keen to ensure that productive sectors, industrialisation and economic growth are not forgotten. With demographically young populations, increasing employment opportunities is essential for the development of most African nations. It is generally recognised that local ownership of development programmes are vital to success and African nations should determine their own development priorities; yet European donors, government and non-government alike often feel that accountability to tax payers and the European public do not allow them to leave choices entirely in African hands. The debate is therefore perhaps less about what the needs are and more about prioritisation and sequencing.

**Infrastructure**

One of Africa’s biggest obstacles in encouraging economic development is the lack of good infrastructure of all types in many parts of the continent. The EU, particularly through the European Commission, is an important funder of infrastructure projects in Africa and if current proposals for an EU/Africa Infrastructure Partnership continue to develop this is likely to become an ever more important sector of cooperation.
**Questions**

1. What aspects of African development should the EU support in particular, or should it simply be ready to support any development programmes identified by African governments and the AU?

2. What should the EU Member States do about the remaining debt of African States? Take steps to accelerate HIPC or should the EU go even further?

3. Is Direct Budget Support whereby EU ODA contributes directly into national budgets of African countries the best way to handle the proposed increased volumes of aid?

4. People migrate in search of a better living and in response to opportunities and labour shortages. Increasing differences in prosperity between Europe and Africa inevitably attracts attention. Moreover with an ageing population Europe needs migrants.
   
   4.1 How best can the EU (Member state governments and the EC) work with African governments and the AU to better manage migration flows where they are needed between the two continents and reduce illegal migration and human trafficking?

   4.2 How best can the AU and the EU collaborate to counter the negative effects of the brain-drain from Africa?

5. Should European official development assistance to Africa be increasingly concentrated in a limited number of major support programmes managed in a coordinated fashion by EU governments and the EC, or is it better to have the maximum variety and choice with each EU government and the EC managing separate aid programmes?

6. What is the value-added of European assistance to Africa as opposed to that of other international partners such as the USA, Canada or Japan and now also of new partners such as China, India and Brazil?